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ABSTRACT.
The thesis comprises an analysis of the regulation of the
charity sector and its managerial implications, focusing
on internal control. The thesis begins with an
introduction which outlines the aim of the thesis,
research design and method, and is divided into four
further interlinking but self contained chapters with
appendices.
The second chapter reviews the definition problem of
charity; the debates on politics, convergence and
religious influences; a critical evaluation of the
Salamon and Anheier hypothesis; the problem for
statistical analysis and new developments.
The third chapter places charity into an historical,
political and economic context; the 'spirit' of charity
is reviewed; the emergence and dismantling of the
statutory welfare state is discussed and the policy
implications for the future direction of charity.
The fourth chapter looks at the history of charity
regulation and the events which led to the establishment
of the permanent Charity Commission. The 1987 criticisms
are considered from the perspective of how much was the
Commission itself to blame. The new system of
regulation and the charity accounting standard are
described and appraised against theoretical perspectives.
International comparisons are made and the British system
evaluated.
The fifth chapter looks at the regulatory focus, the
charity trustee. The role of the trustee is considered
against the new legislation and managerial perspectives
of the ideal trustee are considered. Liability and risk
considerations, we argue, inevitably focus on an
evaluation of control systems. The absence of
information on control functions in charities is
considered and why a survey was deemed necessary. A
synopsis of the findings in 1991 and their relevance in
1995 is discussed, which offers comfort and concerns
about internal control in the larger charities.
In the appendix are the full results of the 1991 Internal
Audit Survey and the European Survey of Audit, Accounting
and Supervision Practices.
The Conclusion provides a combination of practical
suggestions for improvements of internal control in
charities and suggestions for the Charity Commission as
it embarks upon a more pro-active role. Future directions
for research in this field are recommended.
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD.
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a study of regulation of the charity
sector and internal control functions within the charity
sector. We advance the following hypothesis - The
Charity Acts 1992/93 have formalised a new regulatory
regime on charities. The Acts cannot be divorced from
the wider social policy perspective of the state's
delivery of welfare services. Some larger charitable
organisations are increasingly being used to deliver
welfare services that were previously delivered by
statutory services. The Charity Act 1992 and the
subsequent De-regulation Task Force (Baring 1994) have
polarised the charity sector into two distinct sectors
according to regulation. The vast majority of small
charitable organisations,	 some 160,000,	 will be
relatively unaffected by these legislative changes.
A numerically smaller group of charities, some 10,000 in
number but financially accounting for 90 5t- of the wealth
(Aston 1994) will be subjected for the first time to an
overt regulatory regime. To meet the requirements of
this regime, the governing bodies of larger charities -
the trustees - will be compelled to review the adequacy
and efficiency of their system of internal control - a
review that we believe will inevitably lead to the
introduction of formal internal control functions.
From our literature search there is an emerging body of
charity study, but to date it has been relatively
segmented. While the social policy changes of the state
moving from statutory delivery to resource funding
voluntary agencies has been well documented, this has
been in the fields of social policy and politics (Billis
and Harris 1992; Deakin 1994; Flynn 1993). With some
notable exceptions (Paton 1993,Bruce 1994) there has been
an absence, particularly from business schools, of a
multi-disciplinary perspective. Beyond some useful,
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primarily prescriptive books (Leat 1993, Palmer and
Harrow 1994) there has been a dearth of business school
studies linking social policy through economic and legal
studies to accounting and managerial outcomes in this
field.
This is not surprising, for there is still emerging a
distinctive body of knowledge on the charity sector. As
we explore in chapter 1, there is still no universal
definition of charity and the voluntary sector. We
explore the reasons for this omission, including the
premise of Warburton (1993) of the charity 'black letter'
law tradition. Support for her hypothesis has been found
from studying the Hansards of the 1960 Charity Act. We
discovered that the leading legal texts and indeed any
other text referring to charity law and modern definition
have failed to reference the modern definition of
charity, debated in the House of Lords. A number of
different theoretical perspectives have recently been
developed to explain the absence of 'voluntary sector'
studies (Salamon and Anheier 1994), but there is still
lacking a substantive body of theoretical knowledge, for
example,	 the	 absence of critical theoretical
perspectives. Until 1994, there had been no
authoritative statistics on the size of this sector and
until 1995, there have been insurmountable methodological
problems to undertake quantitative empirical study on the
sector, for example, the formulation of a probability
sampling frame.
On the issue of internal control in charities, beyond
prescriptive best practice texts (Sams 1978, Dale 1985)
there have been three academic studies. Two studies were
sponsored by the Institute of Internal Auditors.UK and
both were conducted in 1985. The first was the
inclusion in the IIA-UK survey of 'Internal Auditing in
the United Kingdom and Eire'(IIA-UK 1985) of two hundred
top charities. However, only ten charities responded to
the survey and of that ten, only one had an internal
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audit function. The second study was commissioned
research by 'charity academics' Billis and Harris(1987a;
1987b). This study consisted of six interviews with three
charities that had internal audit and three that did not.
As we explore in chapter 4, this invaluable, pioneering
research posed a whole series of questions for action
research rather than any answers. The third study was a
working paper on charity regulation, accountability and
audit (Vinten 1989). This theoretical review, laid the
foundations for this thesis. At the managerial micro
level there is a complete absence of any statistical data
as well as qualitative information on internal control
functions in charities. One part of this study was to
obtain such information. At a policy level, this will be
one of the first studies to appraise the new system of
charity regulation.
The charity sector, despite claims of convergence which
we discuss in chapter 1, has distinctive characteristics
from the public and private sectors. The charity body of
management which directs the charity 'in trust' may not
be paid, beyond special circumstances requiring the
approval of the 'regulator' - the Charity Commission. The
Boards are therefore voluntarily giving their time,
however, they are personally accountable for the proper
management of the charity and its assets. While the
trustees can employ paid staff including chief executives
on salaries of £100,000, they cannot delegate their
authority or liability. A situation in the private
sector of the entire Board of Directors being composed of
non-executives. We explore in chapter 4 the literature
on how these bodies work and develop a typology (Palmer
and Harrow 1994) to explain their behaviour. We suggest
that the combination of liability, risk and new standards
of expected performance will lead these bodies to seek
comfort and reassurance with formal control functions.
The charity 'regulator' - the Charity Commission - we
argue is a unique body with a long and distinctive
9
history. Its dual role of 'promoter' and 'regulator',
while not new, has been undergoing change. We suggest
the Charity Commission still has not yet determined the
equilibrium of role balance. Through 'interviews' with
key Commission staff, both past and current, we explore
changes in the Commission. In particular, we review the
1980s and the critical reports on the Charity Commission
(Woodfield 1987;NAO 1987). From interviews and
subsequent review of reports and resources we suggest
that while the Commission does have to take
responsibility for some of the criticisms, many were also
unfair. In particular, the public 'humiliation' of the
then Chief Charity Commissioner was an injustice, as many
of the subsequent reforms had been enacted under his
leadership, against a hostile climate of woefully
inadequate resources.
The 'purpose' of charity we argue cannot be divorced from
the state. From the 'Tudor' period to the modern day,
charity has been interlocked with social and public
policy. We review the history of charity, social policy
and charity regulation from Tudor to the present day. We
note the authoritative historical works were written in
the 1950's by professors from Harvard (Jordan 1958; Owen
2965). There has been no contribution from British
historians in recent years to our charity history. In
particular, we note the lack of 'hermeneutics' studies to
understand the reasons for philanthropy and the
importance of the work of Titmuss. We critically review
contemporary social policy studies on the voluntary
sector and the limitations from their 'political'
perspective that these works have had on objectively
discussing a role for the voluntary sector. We also
critically evaluate the contribution of the new 'charity
scholars' - the impact of the contracting state and the
distinctiveness of the charity sector as a force for
change.
The changes in the regulatory role of the Charity
1 0
Commission have still to be enacted on the sector. We
look at market theories of regulation, notably from the
positivist theories of the Chicago school (Stigler 1971;
Posner 1974; Peltzman 1976) and their application to the
charity sector. We also evaluate applications from
critical accounting theorists on regulation (Okcabol and
Tinker, 1990). The final new regulation on charity
accounting at the time of submission had still to be
released, but from the last draft and papers of the
Accounting Review Committee we have been able to offer an
initial descriptive account of the new standard and its
radical adoption of a statement of financial affairs
based upon 'fund accounting' principles. We note how the
charity accounting standard, SORP 2, reflects the
domination of the 'interpretative' school of accounting,
its prescriptive nature following the failure of the
previous charity SORP. From the 'positive' perspective
of Watts and Zimmerman's (1978, 1979) critique on
accounting standards we evaluate SORP 2. We also apply a
critical accounting theoretical perspective to the SORP.
A comparative evaluation of English regulatory and
accounting measures is undertaken from studies in the US,
New Zealand and Australia. Attempting a similar exercise
for a European Union perspective, we note that in 1993
there was no knowledge either in the Charity Commission
or in the European Commission of what are the respective
accounting, auditing and supervision practices of
charities in the European Union. To resolve this
omission in information, using an international firm of
chartered accountants, we surveyed every union member
country and with the exception of Greece have compiled a
description of each country's practices. We discover
that the popular conception of the UK having the most
advanced accounting and supervision can be challenged.
In France, they have adopted a solvency requirement which
has not featured in the SORP.
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The research conclusions are both of a theoretical and
directly practical nature...and are divided into four
parts. The first part focuses on wider charity issues
and future policy. The second part is on the Charity
Commission and suggests a more pro-active agenda. The
third part deals with trustee issues both long-term and
current priorities. The final part is on internal audit
in charities. These examinations suggest further avenues
for research.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESEARCH METHODS.
Using Bryman's(1989) definition, for this section we
distinguish research design - which is the overall
structure and orientation of an investigation - from
research methods which are the techniques of data
collection. The division is somewhat arbitrary because in
the research design part we also discuss qualitative
research methods, personal position and the literature
review. It is a useful division, however, for this study
as it divides a primarily theoretical discussion in
research design, from the primarily descriptive account
of the quantitative survey methodology.
Part 1 - RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.
Herbert (1990) notes:
u 
...the main criteria of a research design can be summed
up in two questions: Does the design generate answers to
the research question? Does it adequately test the
hypothesis if it is a hypothesis-testing study?.. .The
crucial point to remember is that the research problem or
question should determine the approach."(Herbert 1990,
p18). The logical structure of the quantitative research
process has been depicted as follows:
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Intervening processes
	 Deduction
Main Phases
Theory
Hypothesis
Operationalization
Observation/
data collection
Data processing
Data analysis
Interpretation
Findings
Induction
Source: (Bryman 1989,p7)
The intention of this study was to follow this
traditional pattern. Following my training as a Charteied
Secretary and employment as a charity finance director I
had made the following observations in the mid 1980s:
a). The charity was undergoing massive growth, becoming
a national organisation with a network of geographical
centres and a complexity of local, regional and national
funders(Finlayson and Palmer 1989).
b).It was the intention of the Charity, to also become a
Housing Association. This meant compliance with the
regulatory procedures of the Housing Corporation. This
included annual monitoring reports and visits by the
Housing Corporation monitoring team. A feature of the
monitoring brief is to evaluate the system of internal
13
control.
c).There was a need to address control procedures by the
trustees.
I concluded the current control structures in the charity
were inadequate both operationally and for future policy.
Through consultation with external auditors and reading
of the control literature, I recommended that we needed
to introduce some form of internal control function. A
consultancy report was sought from the External Auditors
who recommended an internal auditor(Finlayson and Palmer
1989). Subsequently resources were found and an internal
auditor was appointed. In researching the implementation
of the function, I become associated with the Internal
Auditors Charities Discussion Group and subsequently a
member of the Institute of Internal Auditors(IIA.UK).
At the end of 1989, I changed career and became an
academic in finance studies at the then South Bank
Polytechnic. I had also become by this time Chairman of
the IIA.UK Charities Discussion Group and a member of the
Charity Finance Directors Group(CFDG). Teaching on the
IIA.UK professional examinations course and retaining my
interest in charities, particularly contributing
prescriptive papers to research seminars(Palmer 1989;
Palmer 1990) led to registration for a higher degree in
the Centre for Internal Auditing at City University
Business School. The intended original thesis was
Internal Audit in Charities based upon previous research
by Billis and Harris(1987a;1987b) and a working paper by
Vinten(1989). A working outline was prepared based upon
the lack of research, particularly quantitative, in the
charity sector(see section 4.7).
My initial approach was determinedly empirical. While I
valued qualitative studies, particularly participant
methodology (Becker and Geer 1970;Bruyn 1970 ). I felt the
'gap' in knowledge in this subject favoured some form of
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quantitative study. Specifically, as the only previous
research had been qualitative, following the poor
response by charities to the IIA.UK survey(1985). Through
my active membership of the respective charity discussion
groups, I would be able to keep up to date with
developments and while not a formal part of the study,
such feedback would be complimentary to the survey
interpretations. In addition for the policy aspects of
the thesis there would be interviews with key figures in
the Charity Commission. The thesis from the beginning was
intended to combine both qualitative and quantitative
approaches. Through 'triangulation' (Fontana and Frey
1994) I used several different methods for the study.
As subsequently discussed in chapter 1 and in the
following section(see also Perri 6 1992 report to the
Central Statistical Office), it became apparent that it
was impossible to construct a probability sampling frame.
Nor would it prove possible to do so until, at the very
earliest, 1995. As such the study had to change its
original focus. The decision to go ahead with the survey
was made on the basis that it would provide a useful
indicator of what was existing practice in charity
internal audit and control; in particular to focus on the
attitude of finalice directors to internal auditing that
had featured in the Billis and Harris(1987a;1987b)
original research and the prospects for its development.
Many of the practice issues and in particular the
'specialities' of charity could be addressed. The survey
would also be a useful 'historical bench-mark' on what
was practice and attitude in the early 1990s before the
intended legislation took effect. A major advantage of
quantitative research is its ability to permit
replication:
" One of the reasons for the distrust of qualitative
research among some proponents of quantitative research
is that the former does not readily permit replication."(
Bryman 1989,p10).
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While obviously there might be differences, the CFDG was
a purposive sample and subsequent research from 1995
should be based on a probability sample, from the
sampling frame now available at the Charity Commission,
it does not negate its value in providing a snapshot of
practice in the 'leading' charities at that time.
It had always been the intention to compliment and
underpin the qualitative research with qualitative
methods, particularly as the theoretical methodology was
based on 'grounded theory' rather than positivism:
...it is a mistake to think of all quantitative
research as concerned with the testing of hypotheses. In
many instances, the research is much more
exploratory."(Bryman 1989,p22).
The revised focus of the study was subsequently agreed in
the 'viva voce' from MPhil registration to PhD, when the
survey was presented and the future direction was agreed.
In particular its interpretation of policy, through
review of documentation, such as Hansard and interviews.
Grounded theory was developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967)
in the mid 1960s. Strauss and Corbin(1994) provide the
following definition:
" Grounded theory is a general methodology for developing
theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered
and analyzed. Theory evolves during actual research, and
it does this through continuous interplay between
analysis and data collection. A central feature of this
analytic approach is "a general method of[constant]
competitive analysis."( Strauss and Corbin 1994,p273).
Studies using grounded theory use the same data sources
as other methods of qualitative research; interviews,
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field observations, documents of all kinds and:
" Adaption will include combining it with other
methodologies(hermeneutical, phenomenological, for
instance).It will also be combined with quantitative
methods on predominantly quantitative or predominantly
qualitative projects, or on projects of equal emphasis."(
Strauss and Corbin 1994,p283).
The important difference is the emphasis upon theory
development throughout the course of a research project.
In particular, grounded theory has been used in
developing substantive theory studies, although higher-
level' general' theory is possible. The study's focus was
charity, where there had been to date few studies. As
Billis(1990) writing on the dramatic international
upsurge in the study of nongovernmental sector
organisations in the last few years, commented at the
time:
" Within this embryonic discipline the major research
questions are still in the process of
formulation."(Billis 1990,p77).
At the beginning of this study, following a seminar
between academic researchers and the Charity
Commission(Billis 1989) issues discussed in this thesis
were still being formulated:
" Government concern about the accountability of
charities and voluntary organisations is sometimes also
expressed as anxiety about the supervision and management
of charities. And at the centre of the debate lies the
Charity Commission. Thus all three reports referred to
earlier look towards some change in the role and duties
of the Commission as one way in which the objective of
increased accountability and greater efficiency might be
achieved. Quite what the impact of these changes might be
is not spelt out, but the appointment of a new Chief
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Commissioner has raised expectations that the Commission
will move away from what is generally agreed to have been
its previous rather narrow role."(Billis 1989 p2-3).
Grounded theory adopts a pragmatic position, which
believes that theories are interpretations made from
given positions. This of course, counter to a
positivistic conception which exists on the basis of
scientific rationality of something to discover out
there. A grounded theoretical perspective recognises that
theories are created by people, and people are fallible.
We are conditioned by our time and the beliefs of that
time, therefore, the interpretation of one age will not
necessarily be the interpretation of another. Therefore
all interpretations and, by inference, the status of a
theory has a limited life. Secondly, by its nature,
theory is never static as the world is constantly
changing, thus theory will always be provisional and will
allow for elaboration and qualification as time passes.
However:
" To say that a given theory is an interpretation - and
therefore fallible - is not at all to deny that
judgements can be made about the soundness or probable
usefulness of it." (Strauss and Corbin 1994,p279).
This study contributes to the body of knowledge
developing in the charity sector, and as such meets its
theoretical obligation. In addition, there is an
immediate and direct application of this research to both
the charity sector and to the wider society in which
charity is placed. This is not to claim that all grounded
theory studies have an immediate practical or direct
application. We do, however, take the perspective that
this study has provided a historical and policy framework
for understanding the current regulatory regime. It also
offers to both the charities and to the Charity
Commission clear practical advice on the implications and
limitations of the policies being pursued.
18
Adopting an interpretative approach facilitated the
historical element of the study and the approach of the
respective historians:
" To interpret their theoretical work one must appreciate
what they took for granted as characteristic of their
time and their interpretations of the
past."(Tuchman,1994, p310)
The integrity of Owen(1965) and Jordan(1958), as the two
principal charity historians, is not questioned, it must
be recognised that both were writing in the 1950s from an
'elitist' perspective of history. Our call for an
'hermeneutics' perspective on philanthropists after our
criticism of Knight(see chapter 2) must also be balanced
with a 'social' history of charity. In Chapter Two we
noted the absence of historical studies focusing on
working class involvement in charity. Two conclusions can
be drawn. Either it does not exist: charity was an upper
middle class preserve, or it did, but has been 'lost' by
the pre-occupation of historians like Owen who primarily
charted great men and political movements. Occasionally
one finds in Owen references to working class
involvement, such as the early origins of the Royal
National Institute for the Blind, although the principal
focus is on Dr Armitage. Owen's discussion on the Royal
National Lifeboat Institution similarly has no mention
that the actual 'volunteers' must have been working class
fisherman. Using this interpretative perspective one goes
beyond noting that there has been a 'gap' for some years
in charity historical studies to offering directions for
future study and omissions in the literature.
The use of grounded theory to constantly reanalyse data,
as it is collected, and to reassess upon a basis of
competitive analysis, is illustrated in Chapter Three
with the contemporary study of the charity commission and
the events of 1987. My initial perceptions of the Charity
Commission changed from a perception of the Charity
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Commission and particularly the Chief Charity
Commissioner from 1982-87 as reactionary to management
change, through to an appreciation of the complexity of
charity regulation and to the view that there was an
unfair 'public criticism' of the Chief Charity
Commissioner. The failures identified in 1987 was not
solely the fault of an 'intransigent' Commission but also
the failure of a government through its political dogma
to properly resource the Charity Commission. In
retrospect it may well be that the 'real' failure was the
then Parliamentary Accounts Committee, who followed the
easy option of 'blaming' the Chief Charity Commissioner
and not putting penetrating questions to the government
of why the Charity Commission had been allowed to become
so under resourced?
A criticism of qualitative methodology, notably
participant observation studies is the inability of the
researcher to be objective. Such a criticism goes also to
the heart of grounded theory. The following comment has
been made on participant observation:
"Moreover, it has been argued that in a sense all social
research is a form of participant observation, because we
cannot study the social world without being part of it."(
Atkinson and Hammersley 1994,p249).
The concept of the independent, detached, objective
researcher has been challenged and subjected to
considerable academic debate(Denzin and Lincoln 1994)
since the seminal paper of Becker's who declared on
neutrality and value free research:
" This dilemma, which seems so painful to so many,
actually does not exist, for one of its horns is
imaginary. For it to exist, one would have to assume, as
some apparently do, that it is indeed possible to do
research that is uncontaminated by personal and political
sympathies. I propose to argue that it is not possible
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and, therefore, that the question is not whether we
should take sides, since we inevitably will, but rather
whose side we are on." (Becker 1970, p15).
For example, the classic Weber study on the protestant
ethic has been questioned not only on the evidence, but
most importantly why did Weber choose that set of
data?(Tuchman 1994,p309) One explanation offered is that
Weber's use of historical data was intended to negate a
Marxist perspective and instead promote his own theory of
the development of capitalism. Another contemporary
example has been the critical accounting theorists
challenge to the independent role claimed by the
professional accountant( Rosenberg 1989; Lehman 1992).
This is not to claim that there cannot be an application
of 'scientific' tools professionally deployed to enhance
the quality of the research, for example a 'value' placed
on the research, measured by the application of research
methodology. What is rejected is the concept of the aloof
researcher. Recognition of your perspective and therefore
your interpretation of data is an aid to research
findings and conclusions. An objectivity can therefore be
sought, but it is a different objectivity to the
positivist conception. This objectivity is found in self-
reflection and honesty with the consumers of your
research. It is more honest to declare and be aware of
your perspective, rather than claim some unsupportable
scientific objectivity. It is important to the consumers
of your research that they are aware of your position and
can judge accordingly.
This research has involved active participation and
support for internal control functions(Palmer 1990a,
1990b; Palmer and Findlayson 1992;Palmer
1992a,1992b,1993a,1993b,Palmer and Harrow 1994). Our
support for such functions derived from our experiences
as a charity finance director. In active promotion of
internal audit functions and in discussions with charity
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finance directors, chief executives and trustees we have
not been presented with a viable alternative to meet the
management problems facing charities and particularly
their trustees. Our support for internal control
functions has not been limited to a narrow assumption
that they inevitably need to be 'in-house'. Nor does it
mean we cannot be critical both of some charities not to
undertake internal control reviews or the limitations of
some charity internal control functions.
With regard to the future direction of charity, we wish
to see retained and encouraged the advocacy role of
charity. We believe the diversity and individualism of
the charity sector is appropriate to meet a plethora of
needs from AIDS to womens' issues. We are not
sentimentally looking back to the nineteenth century but
instead towards the twenty-first. Hence the important
need for a new definition and legal status for
charity.The need for a wider debate on the role for
charity not an agenda set for it as some cheap substitute
for statutory welfare services. The accountability of
charity is also different. In the same way that companies
cannot exist in a vacuum devoted only to profit,
charities cannot be shielded from the demands of society.
Chality has a responsibility to the wider society. The
tax privileges enjoyed by charity is met by a mass tax
paying public not as in the last century by a few wealthy
individuals. Charity Trustees should be ensuring that
their charities are being run as effectively as possible
for their intended beneficiaries and for society. That is
the 'trust' they have been given. The role of regulation
is to ensure that they are meeting that trust. This is
our personal perspective on charity and how we have
interpreted regulation. We have attempted to demonstrate
an 'objectivity' by the respective use of positivist and
critical theory interpretations of policies.
An important qualitative methodology used in this study
was interviews. Interviews can take three forms,
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structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Bryman 1989) .
The structured interview for example, whether face to
face or by telephone and reliant upon coding and
consistency, was developed as part of the 'quantitative'
approach in social sciences. Unstructured and semi-
structured interviewing on the other hand belong firmly
in the qualitative research methodology. Unstructured
interviews provide a greater breadth than structured
interviews as they allow for discussion and an
unrestricted approach. The principal disadvantage is the
problem of bias, for example by use of follow -up
questions or by style of delivery encouraging one form of
response. Completely unstructured interviews raise the
issues to be discussed but leaves it to the interviewee
to talk about it in their own way. The disadvantage of
this method is the problem of validation and the skill of
the interviewer. For the purposes of this study semi-
structured interviews were used, though all of the
interviews tailed into discussions. This type of
interviewing was deemed best for key persons in authority
to provide clarification on past policies as well as
providing scope for elucidation on present and future.
They were designed in the study to be complementary to
the secondary data. Using semi- structured techniques
allowed for key information gatheling and clarification
role. On this basis the study adopted the traditional
open-ended ethnographic(in-depth) interview and we
therefore view the interviews as a separate research
method from participation observation.
In part we also make this distinction because, as with
the postal survey we followed some 'best pi.actice'
techniques to obtain the specific information. The
questions designed as an 'aide-memoire' were 'pilot-
tested' to ensure they were clear in meaning. They were
arranged with these 'specific questions' requiring
answers following an 'ice-breaking' introduction to the
research aims. All the interviews were prepared in
advance with the interviewee being given a written or
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verbal brief on the purpose of the interview and the
focus of the study. Confidentiality of what was said and
the right to see interpretative material before
publication in this study was guaranteed to the
interviewee. Given the civil servant responsibilities of
the individuals this was important to both obtain the
interview and most importantly to make the interviewee
relaxed and able, if they wished, to explore wider
topics. The background of the interviewer, as a chartered
secretary with charity management experience who was now
an academic, facilitated the openness and part discussion
aspect of the interview. In addition there were gathering
information interviews for specific purposes ie for the
European Survey with staff at the Charity Commission,NCV0
and the European Commission.
The schedule of formal interviews were
Janet Morrison - European Policy Officer, NCVO 14.12.92
Richard Corden - Charity Commission
	
21.12.92
Andrew Crook - DG23, European Commission 	 23. 2.93
Patrick De Blesser - Moores Rowland, Brussels 23. 2.93
Richard Fries - Chief Charity Commissioner	 1. 9.94
Dennis Peach - Former Chief Charity Commissioner 6.10.94
Peter Mimpriss - Allan & Overy, Solicitors 	 21.10.94
Victor Mitchell - Director of Operations,
Charity Commission 	 8.12.94
In addition to the formal interviews with the commission
and for the European research, a series of informal
discussions both prior to and after were held with
correspondence confirming the accuracy of the reported
interviews.
It was considered inappropriate to resurvey in 1994/95
due to expected changes in the accounting and auditing
regime not coming into force until the end of 1995. In
addition there is some evidence (Gillingham 1994) that
the increasing number of charity surveys is leading to
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resistance by senior charity staff to complete survey
requests. After consultation with the respective chair's
of the CFDG (Hind 1994) and charity internal audit (Rooke
1994) they both advised against a survey. They
considered support for a survey in late 1996 or early
1997 would be more likely. It was considered some form
of qualitative input to check the relevance of the 1991
data would, however, be useful.
To ascertain the relevance of the 1991 internal audit
survey data in 1995 a group of Charity Finance Directors,
Internal and External Auditors were invited to meet for
a morning to discuss the relevance of the survey results
and the future for internal auditing charities. The
group was selected from those who had completed the
survey in 1991. The Finance Directors were chosen from
those who had indicated they were considering introducing
an internal audit function. There of the Finance
Directors had done so and the third still had plans too.
The group met on the 25.4.95 and comprised:
Edward Bates, Finance Director, The Childrens Society.
Ian Powell, Finance Director, Sight Savers.
Marie Flangan, Internal Auditor, Macmillan Cancer Relief.
John Tame, Chief Accountant, Macmillan Cancer Relief.
John Owens,	 Internal Auditor,	 Hanover Housing
Association. Former Secretary of the Housing Association
Internal Audit Forum.
Adrian Randall, Formerly Finance Director of the Cancer
Research Campaign and Chair of the Charity Finance
Directors Group, now Charities Director of Moores
Rowland, Charted Accountants.
John Flett, Finance Secretary, International Salvation
Army.
Peter Woods, Head of Internal Audit, International
Salvation Army.
Marian Lower, Senior Lecturer in Internal Auditing, South
Bank University.
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The primary data collection therefore involved a postal
survey, semi-structured interviews and participant
observation. Secondary data - defined as data that
already exists in an accessible form and has to be found
- involved a literature review and searching through
specialist libraries for original source material. The
literature review followed a systematic method using
computer search facilities at South Bank and City
Universities. Computer search packages were based on key
words charity, non-profit and control. On CD-Rom for
example there is now a Business and Management data base.
For specific charity research there is VOLNET - The
Community and Voluntary Sector Database, which is a
directory of voluntary action research. The British
Library Document supply centre was used extensively to
obtain specialist and 'milestone' papers and books.
Four refereed academic journals were scanned for
appropriate articles from their date of publication.
Three were charity Journals - Nonprofit and Voluntary
Sector Quarterly; Non-profit Management and Leadership
and Voluntas. The first two journals are North American
oriented but carry limited UK studies. The last two
journals have English joint editors of David Billis from
LSE and Martin Knapp from Kent University. Voluntas
jointly edited by Professor Knapp is published by
Manchester University Press and tends to be more European
in orientation. The fourth journal reviewed was Financial
Accountability and Management as it claims within its
scope charitable organisations. This journal has
published a number of useful articles on charity
accounting and audit, particularly focusing on the
limitations of the SORP. Its theoretical orientation is
towards the interpretative school of accounting, which is
to focus on the usefulness of accounting information to
the user. In addition a number of professional and
popular journals were consulted, notably Internal
Auditing and Managerial Auditing for control and an
internal audit perspective. For the charity sector NGO
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Finance and NCVO Newsletter were specifically used. The
first journal has established itself as the leading
charity magazine carrying specifically professional
charity finance and accounting articles. The NCVO
newsletter provides a wider overall coverage
of policy and management issues affecting the charity
sector. Other Charity journals monitored included
Charity, the long established journal of the Charities
Aid Foundation and more recent popular journals devoted
to the charity sector, Third Sector, Charity World and
Charity Management.
Original source material notably Hansard relating to
charity were consulted at the Charity Commission Library.
In addition a copy of every report of the Charity
Commissioners from their inception is available. A
comprehensive review of every report since 1959 was made
to cover events from the 1960 Charity Act. Unfortunately,
as the reports are an edited selection of events which
the commissioners wish to report on, rather than a
comprehensive yearly review of activities, it is
impossible to undertake a quantitative form analysis of
events that concern the Commission. At the Commission, in
the legal Commissioner's office are the Brougham
Commissioners records. These provide invaluable material
for historic analysis of past charity abuse.
There was attendance at international academic
conferences organised by the Association for Research on
Nonprofit Organisations and Voluntary Action(ARNOVA) and
the International Society for Third Sector
Research(ISTR). National conferences of the British
Academy of Management(BAM) and the British Accounting
Association(BA) and the ESRC seminars at LSE on the
Voluntary Sector. Working papers were either available or
were requested from these events. Presenting papers at
conferences and publication in professional journals
resulted in a number of papers being sent to me.
Organising a national symposium for English non-profit
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academics and an international conference on
contracting(both jointly with Perri 6 at NCVO) also
resulted in papers being available which are at the
forefront of study in the charity sector.
PART 2- RESEARCH METHODS - 1991 INTERNAL AUDIT SURVEY.
Once the decision to undertake some form of quantitative
research was made the question then became what type of
survey method to adopt. To answer this problem I attended
the post-graduate research programme at City University
Business School.
I concluded that a postal questionnaire survey was more
appropriate rather than other techniques such as
telephone or face to face interviews. This decision was
made following seminars provided by the Social Statistics
Research Unit at City University where the respective
advantages and disadvantages of postal, face to face and
telephone survey methods were discussed. As the following
table illustrates:
Comparison of Postal, Face to Face and Telephone Survey
Methods.
Factor	 Postal	 Face to Face	 Telephone
Administration
Cost	 1	 4	 2
Personnel
	
na	 4	 3
Supervision	 2	 3	 4
Implementation time	 4	 4	 1
Sampling
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Sample coverage 3 1 1
Response rate 4 2 2
Refusal rate dk 3 3
Non-contact rate 2 3 2
Response from elites 4 1 2
Correct respondent 4 2 2
Data Ouality
Interviewer control na 3 1
Socially desirable
response
1 4 3
Item non-response 3 2 3
Questionnaire length 3 1 2
Confidentiality 4 4 4
Sensitive questions 2 1 2
Probing 4 1 2
Clarification 4 1 2
Complex questions 3 1 3
Open-ended questions 3 1 2
Visual aids 2 1 4
Consultation with others 4 1 1
Key: 1 = Major advantage 	 2 = Minor advantage
3 = Minor disadvantage	 4 = Major disadvantage
dk = Unknown	 na = Not applicable
Source : Dr Peter Shepherd, Social Statistics Research
Unit, City University.
Hoinville, Jowell and Associates(1980) comment on postal
surveys:
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"...for factual surveys, simple behavioural studies and
for collecting limited attitudinal data, a postal survey
can be very reliable, and particularly useful when a
large sample is desirable and only a small budget is
available: Its limitations have to be recognised, but
they are not disqualifications."( Hoinville, Jowell and
Associates 1980, p127).
2.1 Administration.
A budget for the non-labour costs of a postal
questionnaire for the identified sample(see 4.8.2) was
estimated at £740 based on the following estimates:
a. Questionnaire design and production.	 200
b. Printing.	 350
c. Postage.	 100
d. Stamped addressed return envelope.	 90
Total	 £ 740
These in effect 'capita] costs' were agreed to be met by
the Institute of Internal Auditors.UK. The 'personal
costs' were my own with some additional help on data
input and mail out, for which the IIA.UK also assisted.
This method had to be compared against the other two
methods both of which would be time consuming as no staff
would be employed, while the amount of data collected,
which obviously in the case of 'face to face' interviews
would be more qualitative in nature, would not be of the
quantity that was required to answer the questions that
were determined as being more important( this issue
against the overall objective of the thesis is discussed
in section 4.9).
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The pilot study ascertained that to complete the
questionnaire fully would take about an hour. As some of
the information required would have to be compiled,
notably the quantitative information on finance and
staff, the timing and information constraint ruled out a
telephone survey. For, assuming five per day could be
arranged with the quantitative information pre-assembled,
an estimated forty six days would be required to survey
the entire sample.
Implementation time, which was considered a disadvantage
for postal surveys was discounted in this study as the
following time scale illustrates:
Activity:	 Date:
Attend City University Research Methods course.
January - April 1991
Prepare questionnaire draft 1, discuss with supervisor
and revise.
April - May 1991
Send draft 2 to IIA.UK Research Committee meet with
chairman. Prepare draft 3 and review with supervisor.
May - June 1991
Draft 3 goes out to 'expert' group and pilot study group.
June -July 1991
Final draft is printed and mailed out
Follow up to non-responses
Data Input
15 July 1991
2 September 1991
September 1991
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While the survey questionnaire went out during
July/August which is generally not considered
appropriate. As Moser and Kalton(1977) comment:
"In general it is better not to conduct the fieldwork in
the holiday season when many people may be away from
their homes." (Moser 1977,p46).
This problem was discounted for two reasons. The first
being my own availability, particularly to deal with any
enquiries. As a University Lecturer there was no teaching
commitments during the summer vacation so my full
attention could be given to the survey. Secondly, and
most importantly for methodological reasons, the time
scale was not considered harmful to the survey sample
which was not the general public but a specialist sample.
Other discounting factors were that holiday entitlements
are now taken throughout the year and the survey had a
built in follow up. The questionnaires as advised(Moser
1979; Hoinville and Jowell 1980; SCPR 1982) were sent out
on a Monday.
2.2 The Survey Sample.
A problem for all surveys is to determine who are to be
surveyed and why? What sampling techniques to apply to
achieve a representative group:
" It has been emphasised that a decision about the survey
population stems more from the purpose of the survey than
from the sampling considerations, though these may
influence it."(Hoinville, Jowell and Associates
1980,p56).
It would be clearly impossible given the resources to
mail out to all the estimated 170,000 registered
charities. It would also be unnecessary as the
information being sought was only applicable to larger
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charities with employed staff. The issue in 1991, with
the inadequacy of the Charity Commission register and the
computer database not estimated to be live until at the
earliest 1994; was how to identify such charities and how
would you compile a representative sample, once such
charities were identified? As the research officer of
the Charities Aid Foundation(CAF) had noted a year
earlier:
" Our experience is that consulting the current register
is a difficult and arduous task. We have identified three
major shortcomings. In the first place the information
that is found on registration slips is often outdated,
misleading and incorrect. Secondly the archaic way
information is formatted complicates access to
information and considerable time can be wasted tracing
files. Surely a central register should be the first port
of call? Access is made difficult because not more than
40 files may be drawn out (special permission is needed
to do this). When it is done the files often lack the
date of the latest accounts or any available financial
details of the charity"( Saxon-Harrold 1989 p43).
Using the Charity Commission's database with some form of
picbability method, for example simple random sampling or
systematic sampling was therefore not feasible(This
limitation is discussed in section 4.8.3).
A second source would be to use the CAF database of
charities from their annual statistical trends. The
problem with this course of action is that only the top
400 charities - fund raisers and grant givers are
supplied. CAF also relies on charities voluntarily
sending their accounts to them. For as CAF themselves
declare:
" This sample is certainly not representative of the
whole charitable sector, but then it has never been
promoted as such." (CAF 1990,p5).
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The response rate achieved by the 1985 IIA.UK survey was
only 10% when it wrote twice to the top two hundred
charities. To use the CAF lists would mean that as well
as not having a representative sample of the charitable
sector, the response rate could be disappointing.
As a former charity finance director I had access to one
other potential sample - the Charity Finance Directors
Group(CFDG) and of course to the members of the IIA.UK
Charities Discussion Group.
The CFDG had been formed in February 1988:
"...to provide an opportunity for the exchange of views
and discussion of and potential resolution of common
problems across the whole spectrum of issues which face
charity finance executives."(Randall 1991, p3).
Discussions with the then Chairman, Adrian Randall, led
to the agreement of the CFDG to support the research by
providing a list of their members and addresses. As
Chairman, Mr Randall also supplied on the CFDGs headed
notepaper an introductory letter of support, assuring
'confidentiality' and a second follow-up letter.
A high response rate was therefore hoped for given the
topicality of the control issue and the high level of
endorsement to motivate the respondents to return the
questionnaire. CAF had been achieving a response rate of
88% to their annual trends survey(CAF 1990,p5). The
Charity Commission had recently been sending out
questionnaires and had achieved a 65% response rate. This
was clearly much higher than the 10% achieved by the 1985
IIA.UK survey.
Reviewing the membership list of the CFDG gave a total of
211 charities.( Some charities had more than one member
and there are non charity members). This was compared and
34
analyzed against the 1990 CAF statistical profile. The
CFDG member charities were represented as follows:
a. CAF top 400 fund raising charities:
.CAE	 CFDG Members 
Top 20	 19	 95
21-100	 38	 47.5
101-200	 24	 24
201-300	 14	 14
301-400	 10	 10
400	 105	 26.25
b. CAF top 400 grant making trusts:
CAF
	
CFDG Members 
Top 20	 4	 20
21-100	 5	 6.25
101-200	 2	 2
201-300	 1	 1
301-400	 0	 0
400	 12	 3
A further 94 CFDG member charity organisations did not
feature in either of the CAF groupings. These 94
organisations were composed of professional associations,
independent education and research institutions,
charitable housing associations and charities whose
income primarily came from government grants and fees. It
is on this last group that the following comment was made
by the ACCA research report on the SORP in 1990:
" SORP 2 and many other current proposals for charities
seem to be addressed to the traditional image of a
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charity: staffed by volunteers, financed from uncertain
sources such as flag days, appeals, legacies etc., run on
a 'shoe string' and administration expenses kept to a
base minimum. There is no doubt about the continuing
importance of these charities. However, there is a new
phenomenon that is not addressed by SORP 2 : the 'modern'
charity created by the not-for-profit privatisation of
the welfare state, in which control is exercised by the
'benefactors' (central government, non-departmental public
bodies, health authorities and local authorities) through
a system of budgets and reports to which the 'annual
report' of the charity as a whole adds little as a
control device. Further research into the accounting
requirements of these 'modern' charities seems
necessary." (Gambling, Jones , Kunz and Pendlebury 1990 , pvi) .
While making no claims for the sample being
representative of the charity sector as a whole there
seemed to be a fair spread of large down to medium sized
charities. Given that in 1991 it was impossible to
develop any objective sampling frame of the charity
sector the proposed target population was as good as any
other. More importantly for the purposes of the research
which was to gain a wider impression of what sort of
control function activity was occurring in the charity
sector the sample was ideally placed. I had made the not
unreasonable assumption that members of the CFDG would be
the most progressive and active of finance staff in the
charity sector. If these charities did not have an
awareness of control functions then how more likely would
the rest of the charity sector? Secondly, Billis and
Harris(1987a;1987b) had raised the issue of resistance to
internal audit functions perhaps coming from traditional
finance and accounting departments. Again the sample
would prove an ideal bench-mark to not disprove the
Billis and Harris observation but to see if among
'progressive' finance directors such an opinion existed.
The IIA.UK Charities Discussion Group was also identified
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for survey purposes. The rationale for surveying the
group was that it would enable a more 'qualitative'
questionnaire to be sent out. This should be able to
establish actual internal audit and control practice in
charities. Given the 'niggling' problems issue this would
hopefully provide some form of objective assessment.
Against the CAF classification:
16 were in the top 20 fund raising charities;
3 were in the next top 10
4 charities while being of considerable size(multi-
million) were neither trusts nor had substantial
voluntary donations.
The absence of an internal auditor in a trust gave
substantive backing to comments that had been made to me
on the likelihood of control functions existing in
charitable trusts. Although large in income, primarily
from investments, their organisational expenditure was
extremely small. The existence of internal audit
functions in these organisations was therefore limited.
As a member of the IIA.UK Charities Discussion Group
since 1988 and having been elected to the chairmanship,
I had explained the purpose of the questionnaire to the
group at a meeting and also sent a letter with the
questionnaire. A high return rate was expected.
2.3 Critique of the Internal Audit Survey Sample.
A simple definition of sampling is provided by
Hedges (1980)
" A sample is a small scale representation - a kind of
miniature model - of the population from which it was
selected" (Hedges 1980,p57).
Sampling as a technique was developed in the 20th century
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(Moser and Kalton 1977;Kalton 1983) as an alternative to
a complete enumeration of a population. In areas of cost,
labour and time:
"The advantages of sampling, as against complete
coverage, have become obvious in recent years." (Moser and
Kalton 1977,p57).
Moser and Kalton describe the prime factors of sample
design as:
" Two major principles underlie all sample design. The
first is the desire to avoid bias in the selection
procedure, the second broadly to achieve maximum
precision for given outlay of resources." (Moser and
Kalton 1977,p79).
To avoid these problems the preferred methods of sampling
are those based on probability as opposed to non-
probability:
" A probability sample is one in which each person in the
population has an equal chance(Probability) of being
selected while in a non-probability sample some people
have a greater chance than others of selection."( de Vaus
1986, p52).
The advantages of probability sampling over non-
probability are explained by Kalton:
"The major strength of probability sampling is that the
probability selection mechanism permits the development
of statistical theory to examine the properties of sample
estimators. Thus estimators with little or no bias can be
used, and estimates of the precision of sample estimates
can be made. The weakness of all non-probability methods
is that no such theoretical development is possible; as
a consequence, non-probability samples can be assessed
only by subjective evaluation." (Kalton 1983,p90).
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Hedges further criticises non-probability samples:
" There is plenty of empirical evidence to show that when
selections are made by non-probability methods results
are liable to distortion that may be serious."( Hedges
1980,p57).
However, for charity research until 1995 using a
probability method to select from the only comprehensive
charity database, the Charity Commission's was not
possible. As de Vaus argues:
" There are often situations where probability sampling
techniques are either impractical or unnecessary. In such
situations the much cheaper non-probability techniques
are used. These techniques are appropriate when sampling
frames are unavailable or the population so widely
dispersed that cluster sampling would be too
inefficient."( de Vaus 1986, p67).
In defence of the sample used, we have identified that
there was a spread of charities by income. The charities
are all large but these are the bodies to which the
pressures of legislation will be applied. An early
indication of this selective policy, which has
subsequently been enacted(as discussed in chapter 3) was
given by Woodfield:
" However, we do not think it is appropriate for every
charity to submit full detailed accounts each year. There
are many thousands of small local charities for whom this
would be an unnecessary burden."( Woodfield 1987,p23).
The sample was also not identified by some of the more
questionable methods of non-probability sampling which
have led to the criticism of this method, for example
haphazard sampling or availability sampling. A more
damaging criticism can perhaps be made not of the
charities but the questionnaire completers - the charity
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finance directors.
As Shaw (1978) writes on sampling methods:
"...there should be no other significant group of clients
whose opinions or attitudes and behaviours differ from
the sample." (Shaw 1978,p132).
The very strength of the sample was also its weakness
being finance directors who perhaps could be regarded as
an elite as CFDG members.
To conclude, we accept that there are methodological
flaws in the survey. However, for the reasons described,
at the time the survey was undertaken there was no
practical alternative. More importantly for the value of
the findings the purpose of the research was not to
represent an accurate portrayal of control functions in
charity but instead to focus on what could be reasonably
claimed to be best practice in the charity sector.
2.4 Questionnaire Design.
The formulation of the questionnaire is thought to be the
easiest part of the design of surveys - so that all too
often, little effort is expended on it•"(Sudman, 1982
pi).
Classic research by Horde in the 1930s, (quoted in Payne
1951) in this area provides evidence that a principal
defect is the improperly worded questionnaire, instead of
viewing the questionnaire as a vital scientific tool in
the research process, it is seen as just a form to be
filled in. Payne(1951) points out that a difference in
wording can, on occasions, yield results that vary by 20%
or more. While Moser and Kalton claim:
" It is said that 'no survey can be better than its
questionnaire', a cliche which well expresses the truth
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that, no matter how efficient the sample design or
sophisticated the analysis, ambiguous questions will
produce non-comparable answers, leading questions biased
answers and vague questions vague answers." (Moser and
Kalton 1977,p308).
Principal writers in this area(Payne 1951; Moser and
Kalton 1977;Sudman 1982) all suggest that there are a
number of basic principles to questionnaires. As Moser
and Kalton, who are less keen of the concept of the
questionnaire as a scientific tool, comment:
It There are admittedly a number of general principles
guiding questionnaire design and some pitfalls to be
aware of."( Moser and Kalton 1977, p308).
Guidelines based on previous practice are available on
question wording, length of individual questions and
questionnaires as a whole, avoiding 'double barrel'
questions, ranking orders, non-threatening questions
through to questionnaire presentation to make it
attractive (Sudman 1982). Further advice goes against all
the 'rules' of academic life:
II Plagiarize, Plagiarize
let no one else's work evade your eyes
Remember why the good lord made your eyes
So don't shade your eyes
But Plagiarize, Plagiarize, Plagiarize
Only be sure always to call it,please- Research"(Sudman
1982,p14).
Sudman, however, does qualify this song by advising that
you only do so with good questions. In addition to
reviewing questionnaire examples, three surveys were
examined in detail to see if they could provide
questions(IIA-UK 1985; Cooper,Leung and Chau 1989;
D'Silva 1991). The survey by Cooper,Leung and Chau (1989)
consisted of two elements: A smaller survey aimed at
41
Chief Executives and the other at Internal Auditors. The
survey had four specific aims:
"(a) To determine the current state of practice of
internal audit in Hong Kong. Such knowledge helps us
better appreciate the emerging role of internal audit in
Hong Kong;
(b) To determine the qualifications of individuals
currently engaged in the practice of internal auditing
and to evaluate the impact of formal education and
training on their careers. Such data will be used to
determine the body of knowledge and training facilities
required to meet the needs of the profession;
(c) To review and forecast the internal audit manpower
situation in Hong Kong. Such information can be used to
project the demand for internal auditors in future years;
and
(d)To ascertain the level of professionalism of internal
auditors in Hong Kong.
This survey supplied me with the concept of undertaking
two surveys. A larger survey(Finance Directors) for
attitude and scope and the smaller survey(internal
auditors) for investigation of practice.
The second survey by D'Silva, was on 'External Auditors
Independence'. A (successful) doctoral candidate at City
University Business School, he surveyed external
auditors, bankers, credit managers and internal auditors.
The 'mail' survey to the last two groups gave a response
rate of just over 50%. This survey provided a number of
clear methodological stages to be followed.
The third survey was the last major survey undertaken in
the UK on internal audit. The project team was led by Dr
G Selim of City University Business School, the field
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work was undertaken by Marplan. This survey gave an
example of a large professional questionnaire as well as
description of internal audit practice in the private and
public sectors.
Original questions, however, also had to be developed.
These were on specific aspects of charity and were in
three main areas.
1. Information to find out about the type of voluntary
organisation - what it does, financial size, sources of
income, incorporation, staff and volunteers.
2. Information to follow up the Billis and
Harris(1987a;1987b) research on why internal audit had
been introduced into the charity and did it have problems
unique to the charitable sector.
3. Information to evaluate internal audit functions in
charities.
In drafting these questions, we returned to one of the
basic principles:
" Early questions should be easy, salient and non-
threatening."(Sudman 1982, p228).
The first question on both surveys 'What category best
describes your organisation' was supplied with an
appendix. This incorporated another 'basic principle' of
making the questionnaire look professional. The appendix
supplied and categories used was that of CAF, who had
given permission to use their classification of voluntary
organisations. CAF is well known in the charity sector
and its use enhanced the image of the questionnaire.
The second group of 'original' questions related
specifically to the areas raised by Billis and
Harris(1987a;1987b). To enable a consistent evaluation
43
actual phrases were taken from their text and put into
attitude questions (Q30 and Q40 of the Finance Directors
Questionnaire and Q17 and Q47 in the Internal Audit
Managers Questionnaire). Both these questions were also
'ranked'. As Sudman(1982) explains:
"Sometimes you may be interested not in respondent's
agreement or disagreement with particular opinions but,
rather in the relative ranking of attributes or the rank
ordering or preferences among different policy
positions."(Sudman 1982,p158).
Moser and Kalton(1977) describe a number of different
types of rating scales. The method chosen for this survey
was based on 'Likert' scales:
" In Likert scaling the respondent is not asked to decide
just whether he agrees or disagrees with an item, but
rather to choose between several response categories,
indicating various strengths of agreement and
disagreement." (Moser and Kalton 1977,p361-2).
Five categories were employed as recommended and a number
scoring was used with the number 1 being of least
importance to 5 being of most importance as opposed to a
strongly agree to disagree scale, which is more common.
The reason for adopting 'numbers' reflected the aim of
the 'ranked' questions to obtain an opinion on
'importance' rather than emotion. For example 'Why
Internal Audit had been introduced'.
There have been a number of problems using 'likert'
scales, primarily associated with 'emotion', which we
attempted to avoid,however:
" In forming the item pool,three considerations should be
borne in mind. First, since the aim is to spread the
respondents over the response categories, no purpose is
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served by extreme items to which nearly everyone in the
population under study will respond in the same way.
Secondly, it has been found that neutral items do not
work well in likert scales. Thirdly, it is advisable to
have a roughly equal number of positive and negative
worded items in the scale. Variation between positive and
negative items forces the respondent to consider each
item carefully, rather than to respond automatically to
them all in the same way."( Moser and Kalton 1977, p361-
2) .
These considerations were considered with the choice of
wording from the Billis and Harris(1987a;1987b) research.
Other questions using 'ranking' namely preferred
qualifications could not be applied. The list of
qualifications, however, was varied to avoid only the
first few being answered. Some ranking was also applied
to the third category of original questions which aimed
to discover the level of professionalism in the internal
audit function in charities. The approach chosen.here was
to use the actual standards of the IIA.UK . For example
Q35 of the Internal Audit Managers Survey used General
Standard 300.
As the survey sample were finance directois and internal
auditors, this allowed specialist questions to be asked.
Even so, to avoid pitfalls on knowledge, (for example
Payne(1951) explains how in one survey, one third did not
know what profit meant), a telephone number was given for
enquiries. This was actually used by three finance
directors to clarify internal audit and controls. In
addition to this defensive action, one of the surest ways
to avoid such problems is by 'pilot testing':
" Once the initial questions have been developed each
question must be rigorously evaluated before being
included in the final questionnaire. Normally these
initial questions will be given a trial sample to try
them out. This is called 'pilot testing'( de Vaus
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1986,p77).
Moser and Kalton endorse the use of pilot testing:
" To the problems of questionnaire design in general
there is no easy solution. Even if one follows all the
accepted principles, there usually remains a choice of
several question forms, each of which seems satisfactory.
Every surveyor tries to phrase his questions in simple,
everyday language, to avoid vagueness and ambiguity and
to use neutral wording. His difficulty lies in judging
whether, with any particular question, he has succeeded
in these aims. He may appreciate perfectly that leading
questions are to be avoided, but how can he know for sure
which words will be 'leading' with the particular
questions, survey and population that confront him,
perhaps for the first time?
The answer to this question lies in detailed pre-tests
and pilot studies: more than anything else, they are the
essence of a good questionnaire." ( Moser and Kalton
1977, p348).
Pre-testing was undertaken with two groups. A pilot test
involving the questionnaires being sent to ten finance
directors and internal auditors for them to complete and
to give their comments on ease of completion, format and
time taken to complete. A second group of 'experts'
comprising academics and professionals in internal audit
and charity.
The feedback from the respective groups led to a number
of changes from flow order ie: Q13 on the finance
directors questionnaire had originally been placed at
position 16. This had resulted in Finance Directors who
did not have an internal audit function having to read
unnecessary questions - this could have resulted in this
question being missed; through to question wording,ie:
Q25 on the Internal Audit Managers Questionnaire - 'To
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whom do you report'- lacked originally the qualification
- (please state position) - I wonder if this small error
had not been detected how many Alan's and Brenda's we
would have received as working in management positions in
charities.
The first pilot group consisted of six finance directors
and four internal auditors. Two of the internal auditors
were of the same charity as the Finance Director. Eight
of the ten responded to the pilot test within the time
scale - five finance directors and three internal
auditors. The second pilot group consisted of three
academics, two internal auditors with experience of
research, an employee of the Charity Commission in a
personal capacity. Two members of the South Bank
University staff from computing and design respectively.
The involvement of a 'computing' adviser accorded with
another 'basic principle' to ensure that aspects of
computer analysis and measurement were not looked at
after the questionnaire was sent out, but were an active
part of the planning process.
2.5 Data Definition and Management.
The decision to use the computer statistical analysis
programme SPSSX was made in consultation with John
Shanks, Computing Adviser, at South Bank University
Computer Unit. The decision was based upon the choice of
either using 'SPSS' or 'Minitab'. Minitab was not used as
it was considered not to have sufficient analytical and
reporting facilities for the scale of the project.
Once the decision to use 'SPSS' was made the process of
interpreting the questionnaire for analysing the data,
involved design aspects and preparing a number of
preparation files. On design, for example, questions that
required only one single response were open bracketed,
while those allowing a multi-response were closed boxed.
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For file preparation we had to identify what questions
needed to be given a single variable and possibly a value
list. For example, Q1 on both surveys became 'Org Def'
with 14 possible values, as SPSS variables are limited to
eight characters.
We also codified costs, for example, Q6 on sources of
finance on both questionnaires had the following numbers
field for each source of finance:
Option
1 1 -	 249,999
2 250,000 -	 499,999
3 500,000 -	 999,999
4 1,000,000 -	 4,999,999
5 5,000,000 -	 9,999,999
6 10,000,000 -	 19,999,999
7 20,000,000	 - 49,999,999
8 50,000,000+
eg if value was £400,000, option 2 was chosen.
Number fields were developed for staff and volunteer
functions, also for the forms of incorporation: Q5 on
boLh questionnaires
5a) Forms of Incorporation for main charity
1. Company limited by Guarantee.
2. Charitable Trust.
3. Industrial and Provident Society.
4. Royal Charter.
5. Other.
5b) Group size of charity
1. Main charity only
2. Main charity plus trading company
3. Main charity plus trust
48
4. Main charity plus trading company plus trust
5. Charity greater than three organisations.
For questions requiring 'tick as many as apply' we
created one variable for each potential answer.
Once all the variables were defined, we then defined the
structure of the file to hold the results of the survey.
A 'dummy' file was then created to check the file format
specification. The following errors were identified:
1. Five variables were too long at nine characters.
2. A spelling error in one field.
3. A layout error involving variable levels which should
have been indented.
These were corrected. The programme was run through again
with no errors detected. A visual scan was also
undertaken. Prior to the questionnaire data being entered
a 'data entry programme' was written by John Shanks and
with him a trial entry run was undertaken.
2.6 Confidentiality.
The issue of confidentiality was dealt with by the
introductory letter from the respective chairs of CFDG
and IIA.UK and the front page of the questionnaire
explaining that no individual or individual charity would
be named. Only aggregate statistical summaries would be
published. Serial numbers on the front and last page were
used to identify who the questionnaires had been sent to
and for reminders to be sent out to those not returned in
the first mail out.
2.7 The Physical Mail Out.
A set of address labels was obtained from the CFDG. A
pre-paid return envelope coded for identification by the
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University post room was also enclosed with each
questionnaire and letter. All the questionnaires were
posted out on Monday 15 July to catch the mid-day post -
in accordance with the 'basic principle' that it is best
to mail out at the beginning of the week. The same
process was undertaken for issuing reminders, which was
scheduled for Monday 2 September.
Each questionnaire was coded with a letter and number on
the front and last page to identify them. The respective
codes were 'a' for finance directors followed by three
digits, ie: a023, a156. For internal auditors 'c'
followed by three digits. The codes were applied with the
charities who were in both surveys being numbered first.
The remaining finance director charities were then
numbered sequentially according to the alphabetical list
provided by the CFDG. The name of the charity and its
code was kept on A4 lined paper with respective columns
drawn to record the receipt, reminder, receipt progress
of the individual questionnaire.
On the questionnaire was a direct telephone number to
Paul Palmer at the University for enquiries and
classification. The telephone had an answerphone
attached.
2.7 Problems and Response.
Three telephone enquiries were dealt with in July, all
related to question 4 "What is the size of your total
organisation in terms of annual voluntary or budget
allocation for the current financial year? Please state
The question they all asked was the same, do you want
total income or just voluntary? Despite pilot testing
this was clearly an error. A number of completed
questionnaires also raised this as an issue but all gave
total income. To a certain extent question 6 which asked
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sources of finance giving a list of eleven sources with
other as twelve and asking 'enter amounts to total as per
question '4' helped to resolve this omission. The effect
on the survey results would be to depress the total
income of the charity. Due to the cross reference with
Q6, we do not believe this occurred.
By September 2, 105 finance director's questionnaires and
9 internal auditor's questionnaires had been received.
This represented a 49.7% and 47.3% response rate
respectively. A second mail out was undertaken on Tuesday
3 September following the same procedure as the first. By
7 October a further 39 finance director's questionnaires
and 5 internal auditor's questionnaires had been
received: 18.4% and 26% respectively. With less than a
20% response rate from the second mail out from finance
directors, it was considered that a third mail out would
not be cost and time effective. A further two finance
directors questionnaires were received in the next two
weeks.
Seven finance directors and one internal auditor returned
questionnaires which were not able to be used. This
rangcd from reasons of time to a direct refusal to be
involved in the research. Allowing for these
questionnaires the total response rates were 69% for
finance directors and 79% for internal auditors. The
total number of usable completed questionnaires were 139
finance director's(66%) and 14 internal auditor's(73%).
The finance directors charities profile against the CAF
classification and size were:
CAF Fund Raisers Survey Response	 CFDG Members
No %	 No %
Top 20	 12	 60	 19	 95
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21-100	 28	 35	 38	 47.5
101-200	 20	 20	 24	 24
201-300	 8	 8	 14	 14
301-400	 1	 1	 10	 10
The percentage of CAF Fund Raising charities against the
response as a whole was 49.6%.(69 charities).
CAF Grant Makers	 Survey Response	 CFDG Members
No	 96	 No	 96-
Top 20	 3	 15	 4	 20
21-100	 1	 3.75	 5	 6.25
101-200	 1	 1	 2	 2
201-300	 1	 1	 1	 1
301-400	 0	 0	 0	 0
The percentage of CAF Grant making charities against the
response as a whole was 5.75%(8 charities)
2.8 Data Input and Analysis.
The questionnaires was entered into the SPSS programme in
batches as they came in. The access programme to the
respective SPSS files were designed to ensure that where
only a single answer was required only a single response
could be inserted. The questionnaire was replicated
exactly on the screen with a numerical code to enter the
answer. The size of chartered accountancy firm was the
only question that required reference to another source.
The questionnaire had asked for the name of firm to be
given. This name was checked against the Top 100 firms
list provided by Accountancy Age in May 1991.
The code number on the questionnaire was the same code
number for the individual file on SPSS. Access to the
SPSS files was achieved only by knowledge of two
passwords. One of which was invisible on the screen.
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Questionnaires took between 5-20 minutes to enter into
the computer package. A final year undergraduate student
studying professional accountancy, whose project was on
internal audit, assisted with the data entry.
Once all the questionnaires from both surveys had been
fully entered, the SPSS programme printed out the
consolidated totals. The SPSS programme automatically
gives numbers and percentages of the answers to the
questions. The print out from the finance directors gave
29 charities as having an internal audit function. The
SPSS programme was asked to provide a complete response
from just that 29. The results and analysis of the
surveys comprise the next appendix.
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CHAPTER TWO. - THE DEFINITION DEBATE.
In this chapter we review the respective definitions of
charity, the current legal limitations, and the adoption
of other definitions. We evaluate the respective debates
on political activity, convergence thesis and religious
influence. We critically question the Salamon and Anheier
hypothesis that the lack of a definition has been the
primary cause for the non-advancement of non-profit
studies. We evaluate the problem which the lack of a
precise definition has meant for statistical analysis.
Finally, we conclude that a number of initiatives offer
the prospect of resolving the problems we have reviewed.
2.1 THE PROBLEM.
The definition of 'Charity', applied to a legal
classification, relates to the estimated two hundred
thousand charities registered respectively with the
Charity Commission in England and Wales, (170,000) the
Scottish Claims Branch of the Inland Revenue, (20,000) and
an estimated 8,000 organisations in Northern Ireland
(Aston, 1994). This definition, however, fails to
encompass the estimated 400,000 voluntary bodies (Lane,
1994) in this country, which, while not being registered
charities, are viewed by the public and their supporters
and members as belonging to the 'Charity Family'.
Moreover, these 'non-registered' charities can equally
enjoy the exemption from corporation tax that a registered
charity normally exercises. Prominent voluntary
organisations such as 'Greenpeace' and 'Amnesty' are not
charities. These organisations are not registered with the
Charity Commission owing to their political activities.
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As Quint explains:
"The word 'Charity' has a general meaning in ordinary
speech and a special meaning in English law" ( Quint,1994
pl).
In this study we are primarily interested in registered
charities, however, we use this terminology as a generic
phrase to include other organisations which we define in
the following debate. The problem of a clear definition
to encompass these organisations and activity has led to
a number of problems. For example, without a clear
definition, how do you quantify this sector of the
economy? How important is it? How does government
determine a regulatory regime? The lack of a definition
has engendered, particularly in the last ten years (6,
Perri, 1991), an active debate on the need for and
attempts to formulate a definition to encompass activities
and organisations that do not fall into categories of
profit-making or public organisations. A recent
contention (Salamon and Anheier 1994,) which we debate in
section 1.9, has been that the absence of a precise and
conceptual definition is a principal reason for the
relative deficiency of academic studies and a distinct
body of literature on this sector of activity.
The lack of a precise definition is not an exclusively
British problem. Within the European Union a Working Party
was established after 1987, by the European Commission in
Commission Department DG23, to attempt to provide a legal
personality based on the French concept of the 'economie
sociale', which refers to associations, co-operatives,
mutual and other voluntary organisations.
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"However, after recognition of the difficulties
involved three separate statutes were produced
at the end of 1991. These cover co-operatives,
mutuals and associations.
Even now, it is recognised that it is hard to
treat 'associations' in particular as a
homogenous group of organisations. In the
associations statute the Commission has
attempted to provide a Europe-wide legal
personality for not-for-profit organisations
that is based on existing laws in member states
rather than providing a brand new law which
would have to be negotiated by all the member
states". (NCVO, 1992 p3)
The lack of a precise definition has also applied to the
United States, where Weisbrod argues:
"The wide diversity in the non-profit sector is both what
makes it difficult to formulate consistent and appropriate
public policy and an effect of existing public policy".
(Weisbrod, 1988 p162)
The lack of a definition for the 'Charity Family' has
exercised and been debated in the majority of books
written in this area since the end of the second world war
(Bourdillon 1945;Brenton 1985; Butler and Wilson 1990;
Gerard 1983; Gladstone 1979; Handy 1988; Hatch 1980; Hatch
and Moorcroft 1983; Knight 1993; Mellor 1985; Murray 1969;
Rooff 1957; Wolfenden 1978) as well as subjected to debate
in a number of academic papers (Billis 1989; Deakin 1991;
Knapp and Kendall 1991; Paton 1993; Warburton 1993; Perri
6 1991). An even more extensive debate has been exercised
in the United States(Powell 1987; Young 1993; Stone 1993),
and, from the evidence of papers submitted at recent
conferences of the European 'third sector' at Barcelona in
1993 and Hungary 1994, throughout the rest of Europe.
2.2 LEGAL DEFINITIONS.
From the English perspective the debate in Charity Law can
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really be said to begin in 1601 with the 'Preamble' to the
Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses (Gerard 1983; Owen
1965), however, as the Nathan Committee reported:
" That there should be a good deal of pressure
for a definition of charity in modern terms is
not surprising in view of the fact that no
attempt has been made for over three hundred
years to set out its legal scope by statute, and
even in 1601 as we have shown no definition was
attempted". (Nathan, 1952 p29)
The 1601 preamble provided a series of headings which were
classified as charitable activity. The tradition of
defining charity law in this way, it has been argued by
Warburton (1993), is due to the influence of 'Chancery
lawyers', who belong to the 'black letter law tradition',
which is:
"concerned with the exposition of the law rather than
detailed consideration of its effect beyond the actual
imposition of duties and obligations on institutions and
individuals".( Warburton, 1993 p5)
Indeed, Warburton argues it was not until 1979, with
Chesterman's 'Charities, Trust and Social Welfare', that
a different approach was effected by a lawyer. In his book
Chesterman places the 1601 Act in an historical context,
reviewing the law against the political and economic
crisis of the Tudor period. While this may have been the
first attempt within the legal academic community to
review charity law, critical analysis had already been
undertaken (Beveridge 1948; Bourdillon 1945; Cole 1945;
Owen 1965; Nightingale 1973) on the pragmatic nature of
charity to serve the interests of the state.
The absence of lawyers questioning the definition as
opposed to the interpretation of charity is probably
responsible as to why Quint can state:
64
"There is no exhaustive list of charitable
purposes, and no strict legal definition of
charity, but charitable purposes have been
classified as:
1 the relief of poverty;
2 the advancement of education;
3 the advancement of religion; and
4 other purposes beneficial to the community.
Every charitable purpose will come within one
(or more) of these four categories, but not
every purpose which is within those categories
is necessarily charitable. Deciding whether a
given purpose is charitable depends on legal
precedent and analogy from legal precedent.
Sometimes, a purpose which was not regarded as
charitable in the past will be accepted as
charitable as times change. An example of this
is the promotion of racial harmony, which was
accepted as a charitable purpose only during the
1980s. The opposite can also occur". (Quint,
1994 pl)
The problem with the definition provided by the fourth
category, 'other purposes beneficial to the community', is
that its very flexibility as an understanding of community
is not static. This is discussed later (section 1.3) with
political activity and shifting definitions of the charity
sector in its relation and role to the state. For
example, the Anti-slavery Society founded in the
eighteenth century is a charity, while Amnesty
International is not, and this has often been cited as an
illustration of the inconsistencies of Charity Law. The
Charity Commissioners in their 1973 Annual Report gave
their rationale for why such anomalies existed, explaining
that Parliament, in framing the 1960 Charities Act, was
sympathetic to the continuation of charitable status for
then existing charities.
" The most basic criticism is that of the absence of a
statutory definition of charity. The lack of a definition,
it is said, results in apparently arbitrary decisions by
the commissioners. ."(Charity Commission, 1973 p5);
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" Once an organisation has been registered we
would not strike it off without positive
evidence that its purposes have ceased to be
charitable and we would think that the
institutions should have the benefit of any
doubt there might be in such a case"(Charity
Commission, 1973 p7).
The practical problem of the 'community object' is that it
is open to an individual judge's interpretation at that
time. In their capacity as a 'court of law', a similar
charge can also be levelled at the Charity Commission
itself. For example, in the early 1960s an implied
antithesis to overseas charities and a focus on home
charities. Their respective Annual Reports for 1962 and
1963 questioned overseas aid but supported the old 'dole'
charity individual payments:
1962- " that it was the taxpayer in the country overseas
who was being relieved"
1963 - " happier about dole charities than aid in depth'
(Nightingale, 1973 p223)
This is not to suggest that the Charity Commissioners are
inherently conservative and follow a particular government
social policy. In 1991 the Charity Commission issued a
leaflet to Charity Trustees, 'Charities for the relief of
the poor', which gave guidance to trustees:
" to take care not to use the charity's funds simply to
replace the States Assistance received by a person because
the charity would in effect be relieving the state, not
the beneficiary" (Blake Bromley, 1993 p10)
The four headings quoted by Quint derive from the Pemsel
case of 1891 and the judgement by Lord MacNaghten.
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The MacNaghten judgement in the tradition of English
Common Law was in turn based on an earlier judgement by
the then Master of the Rolls, Sir Samuel Romilly, in 1804.
The MacNaghten judgement is still in force and represents
for the Charity Commissioners the litmus test as to
whether they will register a new charity. Its importance
was endorsed by the Nathan Committee whose recommendations
led directly to the 1960 Charities Act:
"We consider that a rewording of the
"definition" of charity is needed and we favour
a definition which would allow flexibility in
interpretation. We recommend that the existing
"definition" of charity by reference to the
Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses
should be repealed and that in its stead there
should be put on the statute book a "definition"
based on Lord MacNaghten's classification, but
preserving case law as it stands". (Nathan, 1952
p36)
This was also the conclusion of the Goodman Committee
which in the mid 1970's, under the auspices of the now
National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO)
(Goodman 1976), undertook a major review of Charity Law.
There was, however, dissension from this view with a
radical suggestion from the Charity Law Reform Committee
who:
n 
...sought to make charitable status irrelevant
by creating a new class of voluntary
organisation, entitled to all the advantages of
charitable status but without the attendant
restrictions on their activities, and open to
all organisations which did not exist to make or
distribute profit". (Gerard, 1983 p58)
A not surprising distinction observed by the Nathan
Committee twenty five years earlier:
" Broadly speaking, the witnesses who were lawyers were
against, and those not lawyers began by being in favour of
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a new definition". (Nathan, 1952 p32)
A minority report by Ben Whitaker did propose a modern
definition of charity:
"I would recommend that the essential ingredient
of the modern definition of charity - which
should be as simple and clear as possible, yet
sufficiently broad and flexible to take account
of the changing needs of society - should focus
primarily on the prevention and relief of
deprivation (whether physical, mental or
social), provided always any resultant benefit
is equally accessible to all relevant members of
the community who wish to avail themselves of
it (irrespective of race, sex, religion, politics
or social class)." Goodman, 1976 p145. [bold in
original]).
To avoid the problem of case law, Whitaker proposed
creating a tribunal that would be responsible for the
interpretation of any new definition. Whitaker's tribunal
would be made up in the majority by laymen and women, not
lawyers, to avoid:
"If the legal tail is not to wag the Charitable dog again
in the future". (Goodman, 1976 p144)
This tribunal would also meet one of the recommendations
of the Nathan Committee for an expert lay advisory
committee. However, Whitaker controversially recommended
that his committee would also have a binding power on the
Charity Commission regarding registration.
Another attempt at a modern definition of charity presaged
the Goodman Committee by sixteen years. This was proposed
by Lord Silkin in the House of Lords debate in 1960.
Following an acrimonious debate in the second reading, the
Lord Chancellor challenged Lord Silkin to provide a
definition that was modern and did not conflict with case
law:
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"I would just ask the noble Lord, Lord Silkin,
to go with an unbiased mind, and to read that
part of Lord MacNaghten's speech about the
fourth category. I will then set him a short
examination in that fourth category alone and
will ask him to reduce it into legislative form.
If he does that, my immensely high opinion of
him will have increased even more" ( Charities
Bill, Lords February 1960 36 641).
Lord Silkin responded a month later in the committee stage
of the Bill proposing the following new clause:
"For the purpose of this Act a charitable
purpose is either-
(i) one which exists for
(a) the advancement of religion; or
(b) the advancement of education, learning,
science or research; or
(c) the relief of poverty ; or
(d) the promotion and advancement of social
welfare, including public recreation and sport.
(ii) one which otherwise than in paragraph (i)
of this section benefits the public generally,
whether with or without reference to or
limitation within a locality, or within some
group or section of the community.
Provided that where the beneficiaries of a trust
for any of the objects specified in paragraphs
(i) and (ii) of this section are identified by
the tie of blood relationship the trust will not
be one for a charitable purpose ; and where the
beneficiaries of a trust for any of the objects
specified in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this
section are identified by some contractual or
similar bond of a continuing character, whether
as members of an association or as employees of
a limited company or other similar organisation,
the trust will be one for a charitable purpose;
and provided further that the promotion of
public recreation and sport shall not be for a
charitable purpose unless it is for the benefit
of persons who participate in it without
financial remuneration". ( Charities Bill, March
1960 Lords 222 no.56 5).
Supporting his clause, Silkin made reference to the often
quoted Nathan Report that finally concluded that no
definition should be made, by pointing out that earlier
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they had considered a rewording of the 'definition' of
charity was needed. He admitted that there were problems
with his definition but they could be overcome. His
definition was based on Lord MacNaghten's classification
but preserved case law. In defence, the Government
pointed out problems that Silkin had omitted, for example,
Lord Saltoun criticised the legal meaning of the words:
" identified by the tie of blood relationships"
(Charities Bill, March 1960, Lords 222, no 56 15).
The Lord Chancellor's response was to argue that the
definitions supplied in the English language changed over
time as well as purpose and would be problematic. As an
example he quoted the origins of the Elizabethan Preamble:
... the list which blossoms in the Preamble to
the statute of Elizabeth 1 can be traced back to
Piers Plowman, which I think I am right in
saying is 14 Century:
" and amend mesondioux therewith:and miseased
fol helpe:
and wicked ways wighthy amend:
and do boke to bridge that to-broke were:
marry maidens, or make them nuns:
Poor people and prisioners-find then their food:
And set scholars to school, or to some other
crafts:
Relieve (mem of) religion and rent them better"
(Charities Bill, March 1960, Lords 222, no. 56
20).
Silkin's clause received considerable support and the Lord
Chancellor agreed to look at it and the problem of solving
it. On this consideration Silkin withdrew his amendment.
At the Charities Bill report stage in April 1960, Lord
Silkin was reported absent through illness and it was
agreed to defer discussion on his amendment until the
third reading.
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At the third reading Silkin was present and had corrected
his clause to incorporate sickness and poverty. (Charities
Bill, April 1960 222 no. 69 966). He also added a
provision that:
" this act shall not affect the validity of
instruments executed before the coming into
operation of this act "(966) and
"Any charity that was accepted as a charity
before this came into operation will remain a
charity, but in future charity will be dealt
with on the basis of this definition" (966)
The Government, however, had clearly decided not to
include a definition, Viscount Simonds presenting the
judicial argument against:
... a definition of legal charity was
impossible and that an attempt to do it could
cause nothing but confusion" (967)... I do not
want to be unduly critical, but I venture to
think that in almost every line of it there is
some hole; in almost every line of it there is
some word which will cause confusion in the
courts when they have to interpret it" (968).
Viscount Simonds speaking with the authority of a law lord
who five years earlier in a tax case had stated:
" No comprehensive definition of legal charity has been
given either by the legislature or in judicial utterance."
(Picarda, 1977, p7)
The Lord Chancellor delivered the final blow when he
stated that Lord MacNaghten on Pemsel:
" was not attempting a definition of charities; he was
making a classification, and nothing more." (971)
Silkin withdrew his amendment, noting that if he had
presented the 'Ten Commandments' for approval it would
have been changed but also concluding:
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" I certainly do not accept that it is impossible to find
a definition, and I do not believe that the noble and
learned Viscount has satisfied the House that it is
impossible to do so." (973)
Subsequent reference to the two learned law texts on
charity - Maurice (Tudor, 1984) and Picarda (1977) find
that their sections on definition do not mention Silkin's
clause or even the debate. Lord Nathan's book on the 1960
Charities Act equally has no reference.
I subsequently wrote to Jean Warburton and Francesca Quint
as to their opinions for the absence of comment. They both
replied and their letters are attached as Appendix 1.
Jean Warburton noted that the proposed definition was
narrow and therefore as we comment later from our
interview with Mr Peach, the Chief Charity Commissioner
1982-87, it would have actually been detrimental for new
charities who are responding to new problems. Francesca
Quint, from a Barrister's perspective, believed the
definition would not have resolved borderline cases and
therefore case law would still have to be relied upon.
For this research both Quint and Warburton acknowledged
that neither had seen the definition before, which
supports Warburton's own thesis on 'black letter' law.
Quint suggests a future research project to actually
collate all the various attempts both in England and the
Commonwealth countries. Lindsay Driscoll(1994) , the legal
advisor to the National Council for Voluntary
Organisations (NCVO), was also unaware of the Silkin
debate.
The 1992 Charities Act has not attempted a new definition,
as the 1989 Government White Paper 'Charities: A framework
For the Future', explained:
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"In considering the question of charitable
status the Government have taken note of the
deliberations of the Nathan and Goodman
Committees, both of which went into the subject
in some depth. They have also taken into account
the views expressed more recently at seminars
which have been held by the Home Secretary and
the Charity Commission. These seminars were
designed to test opinion in the legal and
charitable worlds and were attended, amongst
others, by Chancery judges.
The view of the legal experts and of others who
were present on these occasions was not, as
might be expected, unanimous on all points, but
was quite clearly against any substantive change
in the present law. The Government incline to
agree with this view.." (Home Office, 1988 p5)
Due to the force of argument of existing case law, it is
unlikely that a 'new' legal definition of charity will be
derived this century. Although two recent developments
may lead to revision. The first is the setting up by the
NCVO of a commission to review the future of the voluntary
sector, part of whose brief will be a definition of
charity. Secondly, charity lawyers at Liverpool
University who have formed a new 'Charity Law Unit', are
attempting to formulate a new legal incorporation
structure for charities as opposed to company law
(Driscoll 1994). The movement for reform seems to have
taken heart from an International Charity Law Conference
held in London in September 1994.
In particular, the incompatibility of the concept of trust
with the proposed European Association (Sievers and
Lowndes 1994), gives a strong possibility that a legal
definition may come from the European Union. Knowledge of
other European Union laws on their 'charitable sectors'
has only recently emerged, beginning with the Fontaine
Report in 1987 (NCVO, 1992), which recommended
harmonisation of laws throughout the Union for
associations. In a major research study of the respective
legislation of European Union members to their 'charitable
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organisations', by the NCVO in 1992 (6, Perri, 1992), it
was discovered that many of the member states did not
discriminate their tax concessions on •the basis of
political activity. Political activities by charities was
one of the two areas debated at length in the White Paper,
the other being religion. Charity lawyers (Bromley 1994)
have raised the issue, that as the European Court of
Justice begins to rule more frequently on English
Legislation, whether the current restrictions on political
activities will be able to be maintained.
2.3 THE POLITICAL ISSUE.
The White Paper (Home Office 1989) was clear in restating
that political activity was not a charitable objective,
however, in furtherance of their purposes, charities could
campaign and present reasoned argument to government. The
White Paper laid great stress on cases in the High Court,
and in particular, the guidance issued by the Charity
Commission on political activities from court cases.
There have been numerous pronouncements on political
activities by the Charity Commission, an early statement
was in its 1969 Annual Report. In 1989, following the
Amnesty International Trust Case, the Charity Commission
issued a booklet " Political Activities by Charities" (CC
9 1989) as a guidance for trustees. Following an inquiry
into political activity by the charity Oxfam during 1993
and a complaint by a conservative MP on the housing
charity Shelter in 1994, the Charity Commission has issued
new guidelines. It is instructive to compare the two
documents as a guide to the changing attitude of the
Commissioners, it is also indicative of the changing
nature of charitable activity in such a short period of
time.
The new guide, for example, begins with a personal
introduction from the Chief Charity Commissioner and ends
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with a request to send comments to the Commission. It is
in stark contrast to the previous document which went
without an introduction into what political activity
meant. As we explore in chapter three, the historical lack
of a 'user friendly public profile' of the Commission, has
been suggested, as may be having contributed to some of
its problems. (Goodman 1976,p117) The new introduction
begins with a liberal social policy sentence that could
have graced any social policy lecture on charity:
" Charities in England and Wales have a long and
distinguished history of contributing to social reform."
(CC9, 1994 p2)
Critics who would like to see no political constraints
would argue that this is but a public relations exercise.
A detailed examination of the guidelines shows a concision
on political activities, with specific guidance
instructing charities what they cannot do:
... must not conduct publicity campaigns indicating how
individual Members of Parliament have voted on a
particular issue as a means of applying public pressure on
those members or the government." ( CC9, 1994 p10)
The language being more directive than in the previous
guidance note:
".. care should be taken not to overstep..."(CC9, 1989 p9)
ACENVO (Association of Chief Executives of National
Voluntary Organisations) has criticised the Charity
Commission guidance claiming it is defective for five
reasons:
"* it is not clear whether it is a code of good practice
or a set of legally-enforceable rules;
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* the document seems to address recent problems rather
than to take a longer perspective;
* it does not offer a sufficiently robust defence and
explanation of the 'political' tasks of charities,
understandable to all;
* it deals with extraneous issues such as research, bias,
and balance, which are not really germane to the issue;
and
* it is still too restrictive: " had these revised notes
been in operation in past years, many of our most valued
charities would never have got off the ground in the first
place." (Donoghue,1994 p4).
The character of much charity activity is synonymous with
campaigning for change, which inevitably is political.
There has long been recognition of the place of charity as
a force for questioning government policy and to campaign
for change as endorsed by the Chief Charity Commissioner
in Political Activities by Charities (CC9 1994). In 1952,
the Nathan Committee believed that an active questioning
charitable sector was one of the guarantees of democracy:
" Government democracy without voluntary exertion and
voluntary idealism loses its soul." (Nathan, 1952 p12)
Rooff in 1957, citing the problem of mental deficiency at
the outset of the first world war, gives an early
indication of the legitimacy of campaigning activities
with the founding of the charity MIND:
"When public opinion was not sufficiently strong to press
for action; a period when war and post-war difficulties
absorbed much of the attention of administrators in the
public services." ( Rooff, 1957 p103)
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Cole in 1945, writing a history of voluntary social
service, described a third origin of charity as being
agitation of campaigning for the state • to legislate
against a particular wrong. On international issues, for
example the slave trade, and on domestic issues, the 'ten
hours league' on factory legislation. (Cole, 1945 p 11-30)
More recent studies on politics and charities also argue
there is a legitimate role for charities in political
affairs (Wolfenden 1978; Gerard 1983; Brenton 1985; Butler
and Wilson 1990;Deakin 1994a,1994b). Quoting a variety of
politicians as diverse as Ennals and Blair (Labour) to
Finsburg, Jenkin, Patten (Conservative) that voluntary
organisations have a valuable role to play in observing
and influencing legislation. It is important to note,
however, that all the politicians define the legitimate
role within the particular lawful objects of the charity.
The term lawful is problematic, as it can be determined by
the government of the day as to what is lawful? Henry
VIII, for example, had a statute declared in 1532 that
Chantries, which were endowments for saying masses for the
dead, were unlawful. As we explore in chapter 2, this was
the pretest for the subsequent seizure of the monasteries
by removing them from the law of charity. The Elizabethan
statute subsequently excluded religion. Such inconsistency
can also record individual discrimination. Blake Bromley
illustrates a case in the 18th Century, when the Jewish
religion was still a 'superstitious' use and therefore
illegal. A wealthy Jew, Elias de pas, left a bequest to
instruct Jews in their religion, this was deemed unlawful
and his money was used instead to support Christian
purposes. (Bromley, 1994 p27)
The legal proposition that charities are prohibited from
having political purposes is relatively new in the history
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Peach believed that vigorous campaigning was inherent in
the work of some charities and sought to help them to keep
within the guidelines on 'political' activity as defined
from time to time by the High Court. He tried to be
liberal in his interpretation. He believes that the even-
handed criticism from the political left and right of
the Commission's handling of complaints of 'political'
activity by charities was evidence that the Commission had
broadly got it right. Both left and right charities were
rebuked - or more formal action taken - in his time. But
a good deal could be achieved by informal advice, to avert
breaches of the 'political' guidelines. (Earlier Oxfam
problems on political campaigning had been resolved by
informal discussion.)
Mr Peach gave other examples of how the Commission could
help in this area. In the case of Amnesty, for example,
he had advised them after the High Court ruling, to
separate and register as a charity their properly
charitable activities such as the welfare of prisoners and
their families, and objective research, while leaving
their campaigning activities free.
The case of the "Moonies" was an example where the
Commission's independence of Government had to be
asserted. There was public and government pressure (from
the then Attorney General) to 'ban' the Moonies - a matter
for Government and Parliament, not the Commissioners.
There were over 90 organisations - schools, trading
companies, publishers, etc - connected with the Moonies.
Only two were registered charities - for the advancement
of religion; and both the High Court and the Court of
Appeal had held that they were in law religious charities
within the broad spectrum of Christianity. None of the
many and various complaints about the Moonies' activities
went to these two registered charities; there was no legal
justification to de-register them and indeed it would have
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been an abuse of power to seek to do so.
Mr Peach also commented on the lack of a single statutory
definition for charity. He believed the absence of a
strict definition was to charity's advantage, particularly
in dealing with new or unpopular causes and extending the
bounds of charity law. He gave as an example
organisations giving counsel and advice to the homosexual
community. The Commission had been reluctant to recognise
them as charitable. But the homosexual element was a
sufficiently large section of the community to qualify
under the fourth head of charity: and it was right to
recognise counselling and support for homosexuals - e.g.
help and advise to those bereaved by the death of long-
standing partners - just as it was right for
heterosexuals.
He also encouraged the registration of intermediary bodies
- organisations not directly working at the sharp end, but
giving advice or services to other charities.
The principal problem, however, is the philosophy of the
approach. By providing guidelines there is the implied
intention that some political activity is not appropriate.
Inevitably the issue is where the line is drawn. As the
Goodman Committee(1976) noted, the independent line of the
Charity Commission to date has been respected by
successive Home Secretaries, however, there is nothing
legislatively to stop a future Home Secretary intervening.
There is also the perception from the Charities themselves
as Burnell(1993) comments on the Charity Commission's 1991
inquiry into Oxfam. Charities see major problems resolving
their charity status with the need to campaign. In
France, this issue has been resolved by guaranteeing
voluntary associations a legitimate right to criticise the
government in the French Constitution (6, Perri, 1992).
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2.4 VOLUNTARY ACTION TO VOLUNTARY SECTOR.
In the absence of a legal definition for charitable
activity, alternative definitions of 'charitable activity'
have arisen, which also have the advantage of encompassing
the whole sphere of economic activity that is not in
either the private or public area. From post 1945
academia, the starting point is that provided by Lord
Beveridge in 1948 in his book, Voluntary Action, which he
defines as:
"The term 'Voluntary Action'as used here, means private
action, that is to say action not under the directions of
any authority wielding the power of the state."
(Beveridge, 1948 p8).
The problem of the use of the word 'voluntary' is that it
fails to recognise that many charities employ paid staff.
The Nathan Committee, in the introduction to their report,
borrowed heavily on Beveridge's definition in describing
the rationale for their appointment:
"The essence of voluntary action is that it is
not directed or controlled by the state and that
in the main it is financed by private, in
contradistinction to public funds. It embodies
the sense of responsibility of private persons
towards the welfare of their fellows; it is the
meeting by private enterprise of a public need."
(Nathan, 1952 p1)
The consensus to the Beveridge use of the term 'voluntary
action' was beginning to be challenged in the late 1950's,
illustrated by Madeleine Rooff's definition, which instead
used the term 'voluntary organisation' but retaining the
concepts of independence of policy direction, as well as
some finance not coming from statutory sources:
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"The terms 'voluntary organisations', voluntary
society, voluntary agency or voluntary
association in the context of the social
services are used interchangeably to cover those
bodies which provide some form of social
service, which control their own policy, and
which depend in part at least, upon financial
support from voluntary sources." (Roof f, 1957 p
xiii)
• Perri 6, suggests that the change in the use of the term
'voluntary action' to' voluntary organisation' is in part
due to the shift in the nature of government relations to
voluntary organisations, with an increase in grant aid,
and the advent of contracting:
"As late as 1979, the National Council for
Social Service (NCSS, predecessor to NCVO) was
using the term 'voluntary sector' sparingly,
preferring 'voluntary action'....By the time
Brenton was writing in 1985, voluntary sector'
was in common use, but voluntary action' was
falling into disuse, perhaps because it had
begun to sound stilted. This suggests that the
concept of a voluntary sector may have come into
currency during the late 1970s and early 1980s
when there emerged a much sharper distinction
between public and private sectors of the
economy: it then became important to see
voluntary organisations as another sector rather
than as another form of 'action'." (6, Perri,
1991 p3-4)
It is interesting to note that Knight used the term
'Voluntary Action' as the title for his 1993 study.
Knight does undertake a detailed attempt to define the
synthesis of the term 'voluntary action'. However, his
other motive may have also been a misanthropic view of the
definitions to date and particularly 'voluntary
organisations' such as the NCVO. In Knight's proposals for
the future of the charity sector, such intermediaries will
have no role (Knight, 1993 p305).
The term 'non-profit' has also acquired a degree of
currency in attempts to define voluntary organisations.
This has primarily derived from American economists
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(Hansmann 1980, 1987; Weisbrod 1988, Steinberg 1993) and
has become the wholesale definition in use in the United
States. Weisbrod defines the term non-profit as:
" restrictions on what an organisation may do with any
surplus(profit) it generates." (Weisbrod, 1988 pl).
This concept of 'nondistribution constraint' ie that any
surplus or profit generated can not be distributed to
those in control of the organisation was characterised by
Hansmann in 1980, and according to Steinberg:
" have been cited over 150 times by articles indexed in
the Social Science Citation Index...a definition that has
become standard in the ensuing literature" ( Steinberg,
1993 p297).
The term 'non-profit' has not, however, become widespread
in the United Kingdom. A recognition of the different
national traditions that have conceptualised the
respective UK and US voluntary sectors. Recognising these
cultural difficulties, there has been a concerted attempt
in the United States to widen out the definition by adding
additional characteristics, notably by Salamon and Anheier
(Salamon and Anheier 1992, 1993, 1994). For the Johns
Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector International Study,
they have used a definition that encompasses not only non-
profit distributing but also encompasses concepts of
independence and voluntarism.
Termed the Structural/Operational Definition, it comprises
five key features:
Formal - Institutionalised to some extent, for example
legal incorporation or if not, having regular meetings or
rules of procedure;
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Private - Institutionally separate from government,
fundamentally private institutions in basic structure;
Non-profit distributing - not returning profits generated
to their owners or directors, whereby the profits are
ploughed back into the organisation;
Self-governing - equipped to control their own activities;
Voluntary - involving some degree of meaningful voluntary
participation. The presence of some voluntary input, even
if only a voluntary board of directors suffices to qualify
an organisation as in some sense 'voluntary'.
As Salamon and Anheier clarify:
"Needless to say, the five conditions identified
in this structural/operational definition will
vary in degrees, and some organisations may
qualify more easily on one criterion than
another. To be considered part of the non-profit
sector under this definition, however, an
organisation must make a reasonable showing on
all five of these criteria." (Salamon and
Anheier, 1993 p184)
Different cultural traditions can partly explain the usage
of the term 'non-statutory' that has also been suggested
in the United Kingdom. The usage of 'non-statutory' as a
definition can probably be primarily attributed to the
post 1945 development of the British welfare state,
supported by a political philosophy formulated by the
Webbs and prevalent until the 1980's, that services should
ideally be provided by statutory authorities(Webb and
Wistow 1987). In this philosophy, the role of the
voluntary sector is to pioneer developments until, as a
'natural process', the state takes over. The 1960 Charity
Commissioners Report illustrates this view:
"After the post-war social legislation the
traditional objects of charity were largely
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overtaken by the statutory services, new and
old, which now provides for the welfare of the
individual from the cradle to the grave; and the
basic question confronting the committee was
what remained for charities to do. The answer in
broad terms, was that while charity should not
withdraw from a field where it is performing a
useful service, its peculiar function is to
pioneer..." ( Charity Commission, 1960 p5)
Similarly, the Commission's 1991 report reflected the
change in the role voluntary organisations are now
expected to perform:
"As a major part of the voluntary sector, charities are
now recognised as essential contributors to the well-being
of our society, meeting needs which neither the state nor
the commercial sector can fully address." (Charity
Commission, 1991 pl)
A critique of this position has come from Salamon(Salamon
and Anheier 1992b) in the United States who regards this
historic obsession as damaging a positive relationship
that can be developed for the voluntary sector. The United
States experience being of course very different from the
British, where the political philosophy of a universal
welfare state after the end of the second world war was
not an issue(Flynn 1994).
The primary non-usage of 'non-statutory' by British
academics can be explained by the damning rejection of the
term by Wolfenden in 1979:
"(a)it defines the 'voluntary' in too negative
a way; (b) it suggests a rigid antithesis
between the statutory and the voluntary; (c) since
the boundaries of statutory provision are
continually moving as legislation is enacted,
the distinction as so expressed depends less on
a difference of substance than on an accident of
time and date; (d) 'non-statutory' does not
exclude commercial provision, as we wish to do."
(Wolfenden, 1978 p11)
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A definition in conjunction with the Johns Hopkins
comparative study of the non-profit sector project, has
been developed (Salamon and Anheier 1992, 1993, 1994) in
the United Kingdom by Knapp and Kendall(1991,1993), which
encompasses a multi-dimensional model incorporating, a
formal organisation that is self governing, independent of
government, with finance and labour support from some form
of philanthropy and/or voluntary input that produces some
external benefits and is constrained by profit
nondistribution. The Knapp-Kendall model provides the
current paradigm limit of a definition of organisations
that otherwise are negatively described as being in
neither private nor public spheres. The problem with the
definition is of course its complexity and by its very
nature, each of the five separate components that comprise
the definition have to be defined in turn.
The origin of the Knapp and Kendall definition can be
directly traced through Brenton(1985) to Hatch(1980) as
representing from the late 1970s the renewed interest in
the voluntary sector. The definition debate has been
rather like the search for the 'Holy Grail'. There is an
implied accord of 'we all know what we mean' but there is
still sought a short easily recognised word or group of
words that can define and distinguish this form of
activity from private and public activity. When Perri 6
described the change in the usage from 'voluntary action'
to 'voluntary organisations' he expressed a recognition
of:
" The focus shifted gradually from voluntary social
practice to, finally, a sector of voluntary institutions."
(Perri 6, 1991 p3)
2.5 THE THIRD SECTOR.
The concept of a separate sector in the economy has led to
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the adoption and widespread usage of the term 'Third
Sector', particularly by economists in the United States
(Rasul, 1993). The concept of an economy being made up of
various sectors rejects a narrow economic view that
economies have only two sectors. The expression 'Third
Sector' endorses the concept that there are other sectors
in the economy, for example, what is often referred to as
the 'black economy' or the now more politically correct
title against its obvious racist inference, the 'informal
economy'. The origin of the term has been chronicled by
Anheier and Seibel:
"The term 'third sector' was first used by
several US scholars( Etzioni 1973;Levitt
1973;Nielsen 1979;) and the influential Filer
Commission(1975) and it is now increasingly
applied by European Researchers(Douglas 1983;
Reese 1987; Reese et al 1989; Reichard 1988;
Ronge 1988). The term has both normative and
strategic roots. For Etzioni(1973) the term
'third sector' suggested elements of the then
widely discussed convergence thesis. 'Third
Sector' was intended to express an alternative
to the disadvantages associated with both profit
maximization and bureaucracy by combining the
flexibility and efficiency of markets with the
equity and predictability of public
bureaucracy." ( Anheier and Seibel 1990)
Whether the term 'third sector' becomes the common
currency term remains to be seen. It certainly has
attracted endorsement with the recently formed
'International Society for Third-Sector Research' (ISTR)
which at the end of 1993 had two hundred and twenty-nine
members in forty two different countries. The ISTR is a
multi disciplinary group of academics who have joined to-
gether to enhance research in 'a new, international, and
interdisciplinary field of study' (Gidron, 1993 p2). The
organisers count among them the leading non-profit
academics including Gidron, Anheier, Knapp, and Salamon,
with support from the Johns Hopkins University in the
United States. In England, a popular journal on the
charity sector has titled itself 'Third Sector'. The Head
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of Research of the Charities Aid Foundation, in her
article in the second newsletter of the ISTR, was happy to
describe herself as:
" a Third Sector researcher." (Saxon-Harrold, 1993 p4)
Another key supporter has been Barry Knight, who is keen
to promote the term third sector for his own revised
definition of voluntary activities and organisations:
"The new economy would be regulated, controlled and
promoted in various ways, and a key feature of it would be
that there would be sufficient coherence to call it the
'third sector'."( Knight, 1993 p303)
This nomenclature certainly has the advantage of removing
'voluntary', a phrase used in the establishment of the
first international academic grouping of researchers, the
Association of Voluntary Action Scholars', which became
the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organisations
and Voluntary Action. However, it does suffer the
disadvantage of incorporating within its grouping economic
activities such as non-profit 'co-operatives'. In
Beveridge's 'Voluntary Action' (1948) the friendly
societies were incorporated, which Wolf enden attempted to
omit in determining a more refined 'voluntary sector'.
This may be a minor and historical criticism, given the
trading activities of charities, such as Oxfam, Cancer
Research and other top charities which would be included
in the Wolf enden pure grouping.
2.6 SECTOR CONVERGENCE.
A criticism of the use of the term 'third sector' derives
from the conceptual assumption that there are distinctive
divisions in the economy and thereby in the
characteristics of organisations between the sectors.
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Providing a historic, managerialist perspective,
Vinten(1993) suggests that distinctive sectors emerged
with the evolution of industrial society. The public
sector provided an infrastructure of utilities and
services for the benefit of industry and commerce which
paid taxes; the voluntary sector filling the gaps between
the two. Each sector, having very different roles,
developed independently of each other separate
characteristics and practices. Notably in the public v
private sector, the emphasis on the role of the
'professional'	 over organisational and managerial
authority (Flynn 1993).
There has developed an alternative proposition to the
'distinct voluntary sector' school. The antithesis to the
views of Billis and Harris(Billis 1993) is that the
distinctions between the public, private and voluntary
sectors are now conceptually indistinct and have become
blurred(Leat 1993). As Leat comments:
n 
...there is an increasing convergence of non-
profit and for-profit organisations. The reasons
for this apparent convergence are complex. On
the non-profit side, convergence is related to
the growth of contracting (discussed in chapter
2), to new resource dependencies and to
institutional isomorphism. On the for-profit
side, convergence may stem from growing
disenchantment with existing management
practices and a new emphasis on quality and
other less tangible values both inside and
'outside' the organisation."(Leat, 1993 p49-50)
Leat(1993) still believes that despite these convergence
arguments there remain differences between the sectors.
She suggests that the key difference in the visibility of
for-profit and non-profit organisations may lie at the
level of theory rather than practice and that what is
needed is a radically different approach focusing on
similarities and differences between organisations within
and between sectors. For example, she argues within the
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non-profit sector the constituent subcategories function
with little or no commonality. What have the following in
common?
* statutory bodies and quangos;
* foundations and grant making trusts;
* service providing non-profits;
* fund-raising non-profits;
* trade associations and societies;
* sports, social, community associations and clubs.
Instead, Leat(1993) suggests:
n ...it may be more fruitful to compare
management needs and tasks in for-profit and
non-profit organisations with intangible goals
and/or a preponderance of
professionals/knowledge workers requiring high
degrees of autonomy; or the problems of managing
non-profit and for-profit organisations with
strong traditions of egalitarianism might be
considered." (Leat, 1993 p50)
Billis (1993), after reviewing what he describes as the
'impressive' case for blurring, develops a series of
arguments from the British perspective against the
convergence perspective. He first argues that the British
voluntary sector was not invented a feature of the US
convergence thesis. The 'deep roots' of the British
voluntary sector can draw on a "variety of organisational
forms stretching back to medieval times" (Billis, 1993
p245). While government has encouraged the growth of
intermediate organisations, so has spontaneously the
sector itself developed such organisations. Billis claims
that there is an illusion of a unified sector with common
views, the reality, however, "is substantially different."
The problem he claims is using the word 'sector' to
describe an homogeneous group of organisations. Clearly
the voluntary sector is not homogeneous, but equally the
same can be applied to the respective private and public
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sectors which have diversity and competition in them.
Billis, however, rejects abandoning the notion of sectors
as concepts, believing the metaphor still has utility.
Billis poses and answers three questions for the concept
of a sector.
i) What does the Voluntary sector do? - Traditionally, he
argues this has focused on its unique role of identifying
and pioneering new responses to need. Others have focused
on the process of democracy, sensitivity to need while
economic arguments have focused on cost effectiveness and,
more recently, as part of the government initiative to
bring competition to welfare services.
ii) Why does the sector exist? - Negative theories,
primarily from US economists have tried to explain the
sector. Billis in turn questions that the failure has been
in economic theory itself. For the UK, he argues, the
terminology does not apply as such negative definitions
have never been used.
iii) What is the fundamental nature - the essence - of the
social phenomenon under consideration? - While legal
definitions have been used, Billis prefers to cite the
substantial literature that describes its distinctive
features and attributes. For example, the absence of
precise market value, voluntarism, distinct resources and
service systems, special constituency, legal status and
distinctive social character.
Billis turns to the Johns Hopkins Project definition as
providing a basis for international comparative
perspectives and notes Kendall and Knapp's mission
statement of discovering the juxtaposition to entities in
other sectors and to 'hybrids' on the border. For Billis,
whose own admitted search is for a theory that would
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Thus the phenomena of sector blurring can be explained, as
the size of these worlds can vary in size and significance
in different countries and at different times as a result
of political, economic, cultural and social forces. In
addition, there may well according to such conditions be
crowded zones.
The future avenue for research, Billis suggests, is to
define for the core of each sector its membership and
parentage. In addition, this should lead on to questions
of who can ultimately close the organisation down or sell
it off?
Leat (1993) in her study unfortunately does not review the
Billis hypothesis, nor to date has there been comment in
the voluntary sector journals. The lack of review to-date
can of course imply a number of reasons, however, the most
damaging is the lack of debate itself, and to date an
alternative perspective. In the absence of such comment,
the Billis hypothesis does offer an attractive counter
perspective to the blurring position for those who support
the concept of independent sectors.
2.7 RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES.
Harking back to a definition of charity that would have
found recognition in the nineteenth century rather than
the debates of the second half of the twentieth, Mullin
(1995) defines a charity as:
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"an agency which exists solely to make an adequate and
relevant response to need within the community". (Mullin,
1995 p18)
Perhaps it is the 'secular' nature of academics interested
in the voluntary sector that has ignored the body of
religious literature as to the meaning of charity. Since
1945, there seems to be little academic comment.
Beveridge, himself in his final volume on 'voluntary
action' - 'The Evidence for Voluntary Action', while
listing activities carried out by religious organisations
(ie: Church Army p315, Salvation Army p316), does not head
any section to religion, though he took evidence from many
religious organisations( Beveridge and Wells, 1949 p317-
327). Beveridge did, however, give a heading to "Women's
Organisations" (p307), and the observation reports have a
chapter on Holidays and specific notes on Cinema
Attendances (p217).
There is a modest modern literature with the work of Ware
(1989) and the Gresham Lecture by Professor Ken Young
(Lloyd 1993) and two relatively recent doctorates
featuring the voluntary sector and religion (Ashcroft
1984, Eyre 1988). However, this is a very limited modern
UK religion and charity literature, when the size of the
voluntary income of religious charities is considered,
estimated in 1991 at £80 million (CAF, 1993 p10) or
approximately 5% of the total voluntary income of the
charitable sector. Equally the importance of religion in
charity as recognised by the 1989 Government White Paper:
the very concept of charity is essentially religious
in origin" (Home Office, 1989).
One of the few current British academics to consider
religious origins has been Vinten, who describes St Thomas
Aquinas exposition on virtue:
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"Charity is the form of all the virtues" (Vinten 1989 p2)
An alternative explanation as to why religion has not
influenced terminology was suggested by Vinten, being the
diminishing jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts.
Beyond statements of the goodness of philanthropy, which
tends to be described more in terms of great figures of
history theory (Nightingale 1973, Owen 1965), rather than
economic and political movements, there does not seem to
be much of a literature of definition from religious
sources.
The absence of a substantive religious contribution to the
definition debate can perhaps be best understood if it is
placed in a historical power debate. Blake Bromley (1973)
has attempted such an analysis:
" Understanding the societal and historic context in which
the legal concept of charity evolved requires that
considerable attention be devoted to the attitude of
society to the poor in any particular era." (Blake
Bromley, 1993 p3).
Bromley describes four phases of philanthropy, each of
which has had a different level of emphasis in different
historical periods. These are Religious Philanthropy,
Reformation Philanthropy, Remedial Philanthropy and
Renaissance Philanthropy. The dissolution of the
monasteries and the subsequent economic problems of the
Elizabethan era, Bromley argues, led to the end of the
direction of charity activity by the church and its
replacement by the state.The changes in the delivery of
welfare services and thereby the regulation of such
organisations, was explained in the 1960 House of Commons
debate of the 1960 Charities Act by the then Home
Secretary, R A Butler. Introducing the Bill, Butler gave
an historical account of society needs and the changing
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pattern of welfare delivery, explaining the replacement of
the Church by the State and therefore, as Vinten cites,
the need to replace the authority of the ecclesiastical
courts as the regulatory authority:
"In the middle ages the church laid stress on
giving by the rich for the benefit of the poor
as a christian duty and means of salvation.
Indeed, the church undertook to distribute
benefits on behalf of those who could not do so
in person because they had left this world for
another....
In Tudor times the state took over from the
Church the enforcement of the founders
intentions" (Butler, 1960 409-410)
Another reason is how the church itself reacts and changes
to wider movements, as a PhD thesis on Church and State
Welfare in Liverpool(Eyre 1988) suggests:
n ... the Christian approach to the poor has been
variously defined and applied at different times
and in different social and political contexts.
A historical overview of the development of the
welfare state and the evolution of church
welfare in Liverpool shows how the Churches'
approach to social welfare has changed from an
emphasis on individual charity and private
morality to to-days corporate welfare programmes
stressing	 the	 Christian	 concepts
	 of
community(Koinonia) 	 and service(diakonia)."
(Eyre, 1988 p2)
This, of course, has to be understood in a United Kingdom
context. As the ISTR research forum develops it may well
transpire that predominantly catholic countries have a
different tradition. A recent review of the American
literature offers another explanation for the absence,
until relatively recently, of a distinct religious
contribution:
"However, in many parts of the scholarly
mainstream, religion has ceased to be of central
interest.	 In many ways,	 the heralded
96
"privatization" of American religion was
reflected in scholarship; religion was relegated
to the private sphere, a matter of personal
values, psychological motivations, and family
life. As a result, the study of churches and
religious institutions had largely fallen into
the hands of researchers who took little
interest in the kinds of organisational and
public policy questions that would illuminate
the significance of religion to the nonprofit
sector.
While many scholars, particularly sociologists
of religion, studied religious organisations,
their focus was typically on congregations,
denominational bureaucracies, or marginal
religious movements. The internal dynamics of
faith and polity framed most inquiries into
religious organisations.
On the other hand, nonprofit researchers, who
are just now moving into the scholarly centre,
often approached issues of public policy and
organizational form with economistic and
legalistic perspectives; these researchers
seldom acknowledge religious factors. This
trend, however, recently began to change;" (Hall
and Williams, 1994 p87)."
Hall and Williams cite a number of major studies published
since 1988 and the "major commitment" of the Yale
University Program on Non-profit Organisations to
supporting research on religious dimensions to
philanthropy, voluntarism and non-profit organisations.
An entire issue of 'Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector
Quarterly in 1994(summer) was devoted to studies of
religion and the non-profit sector, a number of the
contributions exploring the relationship between religious
organisations and welfare service delivery agencies.
There is an absence of similar studies in Britain which we
can only hope will be remedied as research activity in
non-profit studies increases.Margaret Harris at the Centre
for Voluntary Organisations in the London School of
Economics, for example, is undertaking research into
religious groups (Harris 1994).
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2.8 THE SOCIAL ECONOMY.
The phrase that has been developed to define economic
activity that encompasses not only 'social service', but
also not-for-profit organisations like co-operatives,
trade unions and associations, is the 'Social Economy' and
originates from the french 'economie sociale'. This
expression incorporates itself naturally into the
hierarchical third sector classification and provides a
conceptual definition of what should be in the third
sector. It has the merit of not incorporating 'voluntary'.
It is meritorious equally, because it does not define, as
Charles Handy has described, by what it is not rather than
what it is:
" There is in fact a sense in which the voluntary sector
is defined negatively - by what it is not, rather than by
what it is. It is not profit seeking, it is not
government-run, it is not owned by anyone." (Handy, 1988
p10)
Paton (1992a, 1992b) describes the 'social economy' in a
six sector model based upon the provision of goods and
services they offer to society:
THE CORPORATE SECTOR	 THE PUBLIC SECTOR
large mutual societies (1) 	 large non-statutory agencies
small state care units (2)
SMALL AND MEDIUM-	 THE SOCIAL ECONOMY
SIZED ENTERPRISES independent schools 	 (value based
and care providers(3) organisations)
informal mutual aid networks (4)
THE SUBMERGED ECONOMY	 THE NATURAL ECONOMY
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Notes
1) eg building societies, retail co-ops, the Automobile
Association;
2) eg Large Housing Associations, Barnardos, local
authority family centre, a cottage hospital;
3) eg charitable public schools, nursing homes (private
but professionally run);
4) eg baby-sitting circles, mothers and toddlers clubs.
Paton at least is not dismissed by Knight, who has
described the previous respective definition contributions
as:
"There never has been a good definition. The main writers
of the Twentieth century ( Bourdillon, Beveridge,
Wolfenden, Gladstone and Brenton) all fudged it" ( Knight,
1993 p5)
Back to Voluntary Action? 
Knight's own contribution to the definition debate is to
evaluate what the term voluntary action means, from
initially the perspective of 'linguistics' and then he
compares it with the sample of voluntary organisations in
his study to see its applicability. As such he has
returned to Beveridge and begins from the Bourdillon
definition. His own definition of voluntary action is
finally summarised as:
"a form of energy, stemming from free will, having a moral
purpose, and undertaken in a spirit of independence."
(Knight, 1993 p81)
Knight then lists the criteria against which he has
compared his sample and concludes:
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"In recognising voluntary bodies, seven criteria were
used:
independent beginnings
self governing structures
independence from other agencies
independent financing
use of volunteers
distribution of surpluses not for profit
worthwhile purposes
In analysing a sample of organisations commonly thought to
be voluntary, the organisations matched up well to the
criteria. But there was one exception. Statutory funding
made many voluntary organisations grant-dependent and it
was doubtful whether they could call themselves truly
voluntary" ( Knight 1993 p81)
Unfortunately Knight does not then provide a conceptual
answer as to how he would resolve this problem, instead
relying on providing a revised taxonomy of what should be
in his third sector.
The active debate on definitions in recent years has been
characterised by (Kazi,Paton and Thomas 1992) into three
distinctive approaches:
* the residual, or negative approach represented by (Ware
1989) explicitly defines the sector in terms of what it is
not.
* the categorical approach, based on particular
principles, attempts to define the sector in terms of
organizations that meet particular criteria. Knapp (1990)
and various US writers reviewed by van Til (1988)
exemplify this quasi-legal approach.
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* the aggregational approach, which enumerates the sector
in terms of accepted sub-categories, using various
consensual or implicit criteria. The continental
definition of the social economy (in terms of co-
operatives, mutual societies, and associations)
exemplifies this approach.
The debate of an appropriate definition continues. We are
not at the stage as described by J S Mill on value:
"happily there is nothing in the laws of value which
remains (1848) for the present or any future writer to
clear up; the theory of the subject is complete."
(Freidman, 1953 p34)
As the definition debate continues, far from a definitive
solution being achieved, more questions and problems are
'discovered'. Indeed, it is questionable whether any
definition can demarcate the voluntary sector. This is
because the sector is never unchanging, continuing to move
and have moved its boundaries in the economy as defined by
its relationship with the state.
Could a theoretical paradigm of a definition be eventually
developed as identified by Kuhn(Kuhn 1962; Chua 1986) for
the charity;voluntary; not for profit;non-profit; third
sector; 'social economy'? Bourdillon, who started the
modern debate stated:
"Definition is a perpetual state of growth" ( Bourdillon
1945 p8)
One approach to definition not identified by Kazi and his
colleagues(1992), would be based on a 'dialectic method'
(Stace 1955;Arato and Gebhardt 1978; Marcuse
1978;Connerton 1978; Habermas 1979;Chua 1986; Lyon 1994).
For example, the application of Adorno's(1978) work on
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subject and order:
"The subject and object are irreducible to each
other for Adorno. A theory can never fully
assimilate its reality because the object(the
social worlds in which the subject is located)
and the subject are unequal. The object
surpasses absolute comprehension, and for this
reason, there can never be an absolute,
complete, sovereign truth or theory. Thus there
was no universal history, and the general can
only be found in close study of the particular
[Buck-Morse 1977]. By giving priority to the
particular in empirical work, Adorno sought to
break the vise of conceptual systems that strove
to freeze the object. Identity is not frozen for
Adorno, but it is in a permanent state of
becoming, and, in this sense, meaning and
identity are dynamically related in that they
are both permanent, yet changing. Thus a
dialectical and deconstructionist view of
meaning is a process of defining that produces
fixed meanings at a moment in time, yet through
time, generates an on-going unravelling of
meaning, transmitted through traces to an
infinity of associations." (Okcabol and Tinker,
1990 p76)
There is an absence of critical philosophical enquiry of
the voluntary sector which vividly contrasts with
developments in other areas of the social sciences.
Application of a critical theory perspective has been
described by Cheryl Lehman on the nature of accounting and
the accounting profession:
"By theorising about accounting practice in a
social and political vacuum, controversies
involving stockholders, managers, pension
holders, employers, consumers, the state and
others have been misapprehended, silenced, or
given anomalous meaning. To balance the debate
and to devise policies that are worthy of the
professions public mandate, we must move beyond
posturing about 'objectivity' and 'efficiency'
and	 examine	 the	 social	 genesis	 of
accounting 	  our claim is a more dynamic,
interactive, socially constituted view of the
subject, one that we call dialectic. (Lehman,
1992 pl&3)
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Lehman describes developments in accounting theory, of a
tradition of critical theory developed from the late
1970s, that contrasts with the primarily 'descriptive'
profession dominated literature (Whittington 1986) and the
respective positivist(Watts and Zimmerman 1978,1979,1986)
and 'interpretative' schools (Chua 1986, Hopwood 1984,
1985).
The work of Gerard(1983), particularly Brenton(1985) and
certainly Ware(1989) suggested that the application of
critical theory to voluntary sector studies was in an
early stage of development. However, to date neither of
these writers nor other scholars have developed such work.
We have, as identified by Paton(1993), considerable
research developing and, in particular, the work of
Billis(1992)and colleagues at LSE on distinctive
characteristics, are valuable contributions. But we still
do not have, from a critical theory perspective, a body of
knowledge on the voluntary sector.
One aspect a critical theoretical perspective would adopt
would be an analysis of power and independence of
voluntary sector agencies to state policy. In appendix 2
an illustration of a theoretical fiscal accountability
grid provides an illustration of such a perspective.
Developed jointly with Kumar, it offers an analysis for
evaluating the portfolio of finance available to the
voluntary organisation. The more advanced the organisation
is on the grid's 'Y' axis, the greater the independence of
the voluntary organisation. The grid also allows for
movements over time as the portfolio of income sources
changes. I am in no way claiming that this hypothetical
formulation fills the vacuum of critical theory
perspectives to the voluntary sector. It does, however,
provide an illustration of the contribution such a
perspective can bring to this complex debate.
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We may be accused of presenting too much of a dismal
picture on the definition debate. The recognition of a
serious deficiency has been identified by the leaders of
the Johns Hopkins University comparative study(Salamon and
Anheier, 1992, 1993, 1994). The research potential of
this study is immense in being able to stimulate future
debate. The international forums are now in place for
such discussion to flourish.
2.9 THE SALAMON AND ANHEIER PROPOSITION.
The importance of a definition and why in recent years it
has caused so much interest can perhaps be attributed to
two contentions. Why in the last twenty years has there
been a growth of academic interest in the third sector?
and therefore the question, why was there not interest
before? Secondly, with the growth of interest there has
been a concerted attempt in both academia and government
to quantify the sector, but without a clear workable
definition, how do you achieve that objective?
It has been suggested (Salamon and Anheier 1994) that the
very absence of a definition has been the paramount reason
why there has not been the same degree of academic
interest in the 'third sector' that has occurred in the
other two sectors:
it is the argument here that one of the most
important has been the absence of a sufficiently
clear and workable definition of what this
sector really encompasses. In other words, we
suggest that the lack of attention to the third
sector is a function less of the weakness of the
sector than of the weakness and limitations of
the concepts that have so far been used to
comprehend and define it. Put somewhat
differently, the non-profit sector has not
become what Zerubal(1991) calls an 'island of
meaning', a cognitive device which groups
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together similar objects to facilitate
recognition and communication."
(Salamon and Anheier, 1994 p149)
Salamon and Anheier explore and then reject the arguments
that the historic lack of academic interest is due
respectively to its diversity, and therefore the
difficulty to comprehend it, or to its perception of
importance as against the rise of large firms and public
institutions.
Salamon and Anheier dismiss the diversity argument by
asking how much similarity is there between a hot dog
stand and IBM? There are clear differences between small
and large firms, as recognised by a whole stream of
government reports and academic studies in the United
Kingdom from the Macmillan Committee in the 1930s through
to Bolton in the 1970s (Samuels and Wilkes 1990), in the
same way that a local self help group is different to the
Cancer Research Campaign. Their argument against the
attention is two fold. First, they argue that the
economic significance of the third sector is not
insignificant, citing the German non-profit sector as
contributing more to the German gross domestic product
than agriculture, mining and quarrying combined. Their
argument for political and social significance is the
challenge third sector institutions have made against the
market and the state with the consumer and civil rights
movement.
The Salamon and Anheier supposition will be partly tested
in the next few years depending on the success or not of
the Johns Hopkins University Comparative Non-profit Sector
project in twelve countries.
2.10 SECTOR STATISTICS.
A primary question arising from the definitional debate
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is, in the absence of a clear definition, how do you
quantify the sector?
In 1994, we still do not have an authoritative source of
the total income and breakdown of the charitable sector.
As we describe in chapter three, a condition that has
existed since the completion of the Brougham Commissioners
report in 1837. A malady that has been commented on by
every single UK report and book we have reviewed on the
charity sector. The current sources used to compile
financial statistics comprise the latest Charity Trends
published by the Charities Aid Foundation ( CAF 16th
edition 1993), the Henderson Top 2000 Charities 1994 and
the initial findings from the Central Statistical
Office(CSO) of their survey of Income and Expenditure of
Charitable Organisations in the United Kingdom.
This last source probably offers the best long term hope
for reliable statistics, unfortunately, however, the CSO's
initial charter into Charity Income is a pilot study
conducted by Aston University. Aston were asked to review
only 1990 and 1991 and were limited in their terms of
reference. This was to limit their scope to charities
which are classified to the personal sector for national
accounts purposes. This therefore excludes some charities
which are classified to general government or to the
corporate sector (examples include the British Museum and
industrial research organisations). A comprehensive
survey for 1995 is currently in pilot stage. This pilot
study, interestingly, sees a unique partnership of the
four National Councils for Voluntary Organisations with
four Universities working together. In addition, another
development has been the intention of the Charities Aid
Foundation to reorganise their research department into a
broader statistical unit to provide information about the
sector. These two developments, jointly, should facilitate
a more knowledgeable debate about the charity sector.
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The limitations of the first CSO survey allowed for, their
survey has started to raise some interesting debates on
the true income size of the sector.
The first statistics on the charity sector were compiled
by CAF and are based on 500 charities randomly chosen for
survey by Sheffield University in 1980. There have been
subsequent studies, updating the original, by Dr John
Posnett of York University in 1985 and again for 1990/91.
This last survey was based on the Charity Commission's
register, with 649 charities chosen at random with the 800
largest charities on the CAF database. (Posnett,1987,1992,
1993). The CAF research team were able to write at the
beginning of 1994:
"The best global picture we have of what has
happened to the resources of charities in
England and Wales in the last five years is a
study of the total income of over 171,000
charities registered with the Charity Commission
for England and Wales. This shows that total
income in 1990 amounted to over £16 billion."
(Lane, 1994 p3)
Components of income of registered charities in England
and Wales (1990)
Total
(Em)
Percent
°.
Donations (including donations
from individuals and companies) 3,224.31 19.9
Government Grants 996.52 6.2
Sales 2,454.10 15.2
Fees 6,196.66 38.3
Investment Income 2,485.75 15.4
Other Income 817.93 5.0
Total Income 16,175.27 100
This study for CAF, undertaken by John Posnett at York
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University, gives a very different picture from that of the
CSO for the same year. The CSO survey found that the sector
income in 1990 was £8,427 million and increased by 8% to
£9,094 million in 1991. This difference of nearly £8 billion
is approximately two thirds explained by the exclusion and
inclusion factors of the two surveys and definitions,
primarily relating to Housing Associations and Schools which
were included in the CAF study. However, that still leaves
a difference. It is believed that the CAF survey, which
John Posnett had heavily qualified as to its
representativeness, is an over estimate. Les Hems, the
research officer at Aston who undertook the CSO survey and
is now Head of Research at NCVO and co-ordinating the
current survey, believes the overestimate was caused by the
inclusion of many moribund charities on the Charity
Commission data base. Hems' current estimate based now on
120,000 active charities is that the income of the
charitable sector is £12 billion (Hems 1994).
According to the CSO survey, the total number of active and
independent charitable organisations has been greatly
overestimated. The 170,000 charities registered with the
English Charity Commission was found to have over 27,000
bodies which were subsidiaries of larger charities, while
one in five were moribund. The survey identified a
'revised' population of 97,500 charitable organisations,
including respective limiting numbers of the 20,000 Scottish
and 8,000 Northern Ireland organisations, with charitable
status for the UK as a whole.
The CSO survey did, however, confirm that the size profile
(based on income) of charitable organisations is heavily
skewed to the largest organisations. In 1990 only 9% of all
charities had incomes of £100,000 or more, but this minority
accounted for 89% of total income. Legacy income was, as has
often been speculated, primarily the preserve of some well
known large charities.
108
The Income Profile according to the CSO survey of the
Charity Sector was distributed as follows:
Income 1990 1991
% 96
Sales of Goods & Services to: 39.0 40.4
Non-charitable companies 4.8 5.0
Voluntary bodies 1.5 1.7
Government 10.9 11.1
Persons 21.8 22.5
Grants, Donations & Core &
General Funding: 37.7 36.3
Non-charitable companies 4.1 3.8
Charities' trading companies 0.9 1.3
Voluntary bodies 6.4 5.5
Government 13.0 13.2
Payments from overseas 0.9 1.0
persons 12.2 11.5
Legacies 6.2 6.6
Investment Income 16.0 15.4
Disposals 1.2 1.4
Total 100 100
The CAF statistics, however, do provide a very clear picture
of the larger charities and most importantly, as they are
into their sixteenth year, trends of the sector. With the
arrival of the Henderson Guide, there is also the ability
to cross check. Though as both use different analytical
methods, financial years etc, comparison does require some
re-working of figures. The definitional problem as evidenced
by their respective listings of the top ten charities by
income for 1992/93, is still the major problem.
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According to CAF the ten charities with the highest total
income were:
Charity
National Trust
Nuffield Nursing Homes Trust
Save the Children Fund
Barnardos
Oxfam
Salvation Army
RNLI
British Red Cross Society
Spastics Society
Imperial Cancer Research Fund
Total Income
132,355
106,580
99,603
75,540
73,296
64,495
63,206
60,702
56,039
53,039
£000
Excluded from this list, as CAF assembles this table from
fund raisers, is the Wellcome Foundation, which had a total
income of £124.7 million and therefore would rank second.
The CAF income for Wellcome is for 1992 whereas the
Henderson figure below is for 1993. On Nuffield, the two
have the same year end of 1992 and agree. The next highest
grant maker was the Tudor Trust, with an income, of
£21,695,000, and therefore is well down both organisation's
lists.
However, according to Henderson the top ten charities by
income were:
Charity	 Total Income £m
British Council	 414
Church Commissioners for England 	 257
Arts Council of Great Britain 	 223
Wellcome Trust	 199
National Trust	 120
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Save the Children Fund 	 113
Nuffield Nursing Homes Trust 	 107
Construction Industry Training Board	 105
British Library 	 96.4
Independent Living Fund 	 92.1
Oxfam and Barnardos appear as 11 and 12 respectively in the
Henderson Guide. The discrepancy of the two guides further
illustrates the dilemma of a lack of a consistent definition
of the sector. Therefore, great care must be taken in using
statistics to understand the sector.
2.11 CONCLUSION.
The absence of a clear definition has multiple implications
both in understanding the sector and for the purposes of
this study. How do you develop appropriate policies for
regulation if you can not define or estimate the size of the
sector and institutions you wish to regulate? We have
reviewed the major definitional contributions and concluded
that the current Johns Hopkins University comparative study
provides the most comprehensive description that accounts
for international cultural differences to date. The absence
of a relative body of philosophical knowledge of the sector
is particularly highlighted by the absence of any major
critical theorists attention to the voluntary sector and the
lack of comment on the Billis (1993) ambiguity hypothesis.
We may be seen to have portrayed a dismissive portrait of
charity study. There is, however, some clear indications
that this area of study neglected for so long will see
change. Internationally, the development of the ISTR and the
Johns Hopkins study. In the UK, the commissioning by the CSO
of surveys on the sector. The CSO interest is of paramount
importance in recognition by government of a separate sector
for its economic statistics. The failure of international
governments ( Salamon 1993, Knapp 1993) to record the sector
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as a distinct sphere of economic activity has undoubtedly
been one of the major disadvantages the sector has had as
a field for research with a lack of official statistics.
Academically there is a growing interest in the sector by
senior professors (Deakin 1991,1993,1994a,1994b, Gambling
and Jones 1990,1993). The possibility of an ESRC funded
'collegiate' forum for voluntary sector studies, which would
interact the current contributors with the impact of new
centres devoted to voluntary sector studies ( Aston, City
and South Bank Universities), offer exciting prospects for
University based study of the voluntary sector to move
mainstream. As this activity increases the number of
academics interested in the voluntary sector, which has
already seen dramatic growth, should further increase. The
development of 'voluntary sector' scholars as the masters
and doctorate programmes of the LSE, Aston, City, Leeds,
East London and South Bank mature will begin to counter the
lost years of academic study on the voluntary sector.
The NCVO's new commission on the future of charity, includes
as part of its brief, to review charity law. This stimulus
for reform to have a proper modern legal definition of
charity must be welcomed but also it must be ambitious. Such
reform must address issues of political freedom and tax
privileges. The lawyer, E Blake Bromley, imaginatively
describes what that outcome must be, noting that the
determination of such a law must not just be left to the
lawyers, he writes:
"A combination of the best of the common law and
civilian legal systems is necessary to overcome
the cultural, legal and fiscal challenges in
establishing a brave new legal infrastructure for
the third sector. The civil code needs to recover
some of its inductive legal heritage found in
Roman law. It will be necessary to have a new
interpretative body to shape and guide its
further evolution. Common lawyers can bring a
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rich heritage of case law and precedent which
should inform the development of the law; but
should not allow any outdated and narrow
traditions to hamper creative initiatives in new
directions. Civilians can bring the simple
elegant expression of noble principles which
should articulate the law; but should not let
deductive interpretations deny the potential of
inductive reasoning to produce a law more
responsive to indigenous realities and values.
Tax authorities can bring harsh fiscal realities
into the process; but should not allow economic
considerations to suffocate or supplant the
altruistic impulse. Religious and public policy
authorities can speak to values issues; but must
not let their proclivity towards excessively
sectarian or politically correct positions
distort policy." (Blake Bromley, 1994 p38)
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CHAPTER 3. - SETTING THE SCENE
In this chapter we review the 'spirit of charity' (Cole
1945b) and its relationship to the state as a separate
sector in society. This involves a multi-disciplinary
analysis incorporating aspects of social policy through
historical,
theoretical
proposition
of action
development
political,	 economic and sociological
perspectives. We explore and reject the
that charity is naturally a conservative form
(Gerard 1983). We critically review the
of the welfare state and the consensus of
statutory delivery. Finally, we assess the development of
the 'mixed economy' of welfare to 1994 and the current
problems of the voluntary sector.
3.1 RELIGIOUS BEGINNINGS.
In chapter one we discussed religious contributions to
our understanding of a definition of a charity. We
established the importance of religion to charity both
historically and statistically in terms of economic size.
We also alluded to the political importance that religion
still has on charity, by the reference to it in the
Government White Paper of 1989 (Home Office 1989) which
led to the 1992 Charities Act. A review of the
parliamentary debates for the 1960 Charity Act reveals
the concerns for religion - of the nine sittings of the
House of Lords Committee, all mention religion; the third
sitting on the 31 May 1960, debates the independence of
religion from state regulation. It is also interesting to
note in contrast that in their Lordships sittings in
1960, accounts were never mentioned.
The debate in the House of Commons in 1960 opened by the
Home Secretary R A Butler, gives a very clear picture of
the decline of the church and in particular the authority
of the ecclesiastical courts as a regulatory body.
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"In the Middle Ages the Church laid stress on
giving by the rich for the benefit of the poor
as a christian duty and means of salvation.
Indeed, the church undertook to distribute
benefits on behalf of those who could not do so
in person because they had left this world for
another....In Tudor times the state took over
from the Church the enforcement of the founders
intentions." (Butler 1960 409/410)
A more forthright announcement was made in the 1992
Charity Act debate by Lord Houghton on describing the
origin of what he termed the 'charity industry':
" It began with Henry V111 when he dissolved the
monasteries.., the relief of the poor moved from churches
to the charities and that is the origin of our charitable
movement" (Houghton 1992 371).
Tigar (1977 p204) describes the seizure of the
monasteries by the Tudor Monarchy, which was in serious
financial trouble following the collapse of the wool
trade. The annual income from ecclesiastical property was
estimated at £200,000 by the commission established by
the Tudor Monarch. The commission also listed scandals
and maladministration leading Simon Fish to urge for the
seizure of all church property, which was then estimated
to be worth a third of the Kingdoms wealth. In response
Thomas Moore echoed a plea for the poor, that was to be
an accurate foresight of what was to come and establish
Lord Houghton's industry:
"But now to the poor beggars: what remedy
findeth their proctor for them? To make
hospitals? Nay, ware of that! Thereof he will
none in no wise. For thereof, he saith, the
more the worse, because they be profitable to
priests. What remedy then? Give them any money?
Nay, nay, not a groat. What other things
then?...[L]et him give nothing to them, but
look what the clergy hath, and take all that
from them. Is not this a royal feast, to leave
these beggars meatless, and then send more to
dinner to them?" (Tigar, 1977 p207)
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As Tigar explains, the assumption by the radical anti-
Catholics had assumed that the Church-maintained schools,
hospitals and other charitable institutions would
continue under royal auspices. Church lands would be re-
distributed or let at reasonable rents. This did not
happen, instead:
"The lands, as we have seen, passed into the
hands of the bourgeoisie. The
Hospitals and other institutions were replaced
by jails and workhouses designed to encourage
the peasantry, driven off the land, to enter
the force of wage-labourers." (Tigar, 1977
p208)
Morton's Utopia (1969), which describes the development
of English literature, social and political thought from
a Marxist perspective portrays these times within the
context of momentous changes in economic ownership and
social relations:
"The breaking up of the medieval village
commune emancipated the serf, but it also
destroyed the very basis of his security: in
freeing him from his attachment to the soil it
created the conditions under which he could be
driven off the soil altogether. The creation of
a free peasantry implies the development of an
economy based on simple commodity production,
and this in turn implies the creation of a new
kind of landowner, whose power was not based on
the multitude of his dependents but on the
amount of cash profit he could extract from his
estates." (Morton 1969 p47)
Sir Thomas Moore's work 'Utopia' provides the clearest
description of the suffering which resulted:
"Therefore that one covetous and unsatiable
cormaurante and very plague of his native
contrey maye compasse about and inclose many
thousand of akers of grounde together within
one pale or hedge, the husband be thrust owte
of their owne, or else either by coveyne and
fraude, or violent oppression they are put
besydes it... by one meanes therefore or by
another, either by hooke or crooke they must
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needes depart awaye, poore, silly, wretched
soules, men, women, husbands, wives, fatherless
children, widows, woefull mothers, with their
yonge babes...Away they trudge, I say, out of
their knowen and accustomed houses, fyndynge no
place to rest in...And when they have wandered
abroad tyll [all] all be spent, what then can
they else doo but steale, and then justly pardy
be hanged, or els go about a-beggyng" (Morton,
1969 p48).
A suffering that Moore predicted would not be relieved
with the dissolution of the monasteries, left a vacuum in
the provision of relief. It is the filling of this vacuum
that led to the respective passing of the poor law and
the emergence of charity through the Statute of
Charitable Uses in 1601. As Kendall and Knapp depict:
"The formalization of philanthropy began in
earnest with the Elizabethan Statute of
Charitable Uses in 1601. Passed in the wake of
the religious upheaval of the Reformation, it
marked the beginnings of the secularization of
philanthropy(Ware 1989), but in common with the
Poor Law passed in the same year, it was also
a response to the economic and social upheaval
of the period, including the emergence of a
class of landless and indigent people." (Kendall
and Knapp, 1993 p2)
3.2 STATE ENCOURAGEMENT OF CHARITY.
Ware (1989) argues that the reformation marks the point
in time from which charity effectively became an agent of
the state in social policy:
...for centuries, charities in Britain have
been used as agents of public policy. Until the
Reformation charity was largely administered by
organisations of the Roman Catholic Church(a
Church which claimed a governmental as well as
spiritual role), but in later-Tudor England the
state bolstered charities as a way of
ameliorating the impact of extensive upheaval
in the economy. The statute of 1601 was the
culmination of these developments. As is argued
in Chapter 9, the purpose of this legislation
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was to grant privileges to certain kinds of
charities, and to provide a means of
supervising them, to ensure the effective
implementation of the state's social policy,
particularly in relation to Poor Laws enacted
several years earlier." (Ware, 1989 p16)
Benedict Nightingale is more forthright on the use of
charity by the Tudor Monarchs. Using Jordan's (Jordan
1958) monumental work - Philanthropy in England 1480-1660
as his principal source - he writes:
"The Tudor monarchs, well aware that poverty
and vagabondage could create civil disorder,
encouraged charity in order to buy off trouble.
The merchants and gentry were made to
understand what was expected of them, in church
as well as outside. From about 1540 there was
a 'drumfire of exhortation' in contemporary
sermons:	 formal reminder became fierce
injunction, social irresponsibility was
denounced, and men were urged to shame Rome by
showing how generous a reformed Church could
be. The good opinion of his peers, enduring
good works and(of course) treasure in heaven
was promised to the rich merchants who gave
well." (Nightingale 1973 p107)
Professor Jordan's work since publication in 1958 is the
authoritative work on the period from 1480 to 1660. The
book's 387 pages, including detailed appendices of
charitable giving from 1490 to 1660 (p367), combines
meticulous statistics of the period culled from parish
registers to a political and economic analysis of the
middle ages. Jordan was President of Radcliffe College
and Professor of History at Harvard University. His
Colleague as Gurney Professor of History and Political
Science at Harvard was David Owen whose own monumental
study of 610 pages 'English Philanthropy 1660-1960',
begins where Jordan ends and continues to the 1960
Charity Act. Both Professors undertook their studies on
sabbatical leave in the 1950s and it is an illustration
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of the impoverishment of British historical academic
study of the charitable sector since the 1960s, that they
were the only two authoritative historical texts until
1994 saw the publication of Findlayson's(1994) book with
a focus on charity from 1839 -1990. The principal British
books on the charitable sector from Nightingale in the
1970s, through Gerard(1983), Brenton(1985), Ware (1989)
to Knight (1993), provide some form of historical
perspective, all use Jordan and particularly Owen's work
as their principal sources.
Stimulated by the 'Voluntary Action History Society'
there is now emerging a rediscovery by British Historians
of charity history. However, with the exception of
Findlayson (1994) for the latter period no modern
authoritative charity texts have been published. I have,
therefore, used Jordan and particularly Owen as my
primary historical sources for the overall perspective.
For specific events I have either gone to the original
reference for example the Hansard, the Brougham
Commissioners Reports at the Charity Commission, the
Nathan Report (1952); used references that pre-date
Jordan and Owen notably Beveridge (1948,1949), Cole
(1945), Rooff(1957); academic works that have not used
these sources, notably North American academics
Tigar(1977), and Lloyd (1986).
The lack of a contemporary British historical charity
literature is perhaps a reflection of the image of the
voluntary sector as being unimportant until recently
(Smith 1993). A tragedy when there was until the 1940s a
grouping of university voluntary action academics
(Bourdillon 1945). In my opinion, it is Lord Beveridge
(1948) pre-dating Jordan by ten years, who best
encapsulates the Tudor period, linking changes in social
policy with a political and economic analysis of the
time, as the following extract from his chapter on
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charitable trusts illustrates:
"The Elizabethan Statute on Charitable Uses is
a starting-point because it marks a turning
point in national policy. Til the Reformation
was felt to be secure there had been a division
of views as to charitable endowments.
Parliament had feared such endowments as
tending to get land into the dead hand of
institutions, some of which might be openly or
secretly devoted to "superstitious" that is to
say Catholic,uses. The Ecclesiastical Courts,
on the other hand, which then dealt with wills,
favoured bequests for charitable objects, which
in many cases put money into the hands of
religious foundations. By the forty-third year
of Elizabeth, the Reformation was felt to be
safe. At the same time the great economic and
social changes of the sixteenth century and the
threats of war from abroad made it desirable to
encourage charity. The Statute of Elizabeth on
Charitable Uses was passed at practically the
same moment as the Statute for Relief of the
Poor and formed part of a concerted social
programme for dealing with urgent problems of
transition. In future the rich were to be
encouraged to give of their superfluity, and so
to relieve the payers of rates and taxes."
(Beveridge 1948 p187-8)
In 1985, a more generous view of Elizabethan philanthropy
was offered by the then Chief Charity Commissioner, Denis
Peach:
"The need for increasing state intervention to
stem the rising poverty led the Elizabethan
middle class of urban merchants and rural
gentry to devote a greater proportion of money
to socially useful causes, particularly
education and the provision of accommodation
for the aged poor, rather than the purely
ecclesiastical endowments and chantry chapels
of earlier times." (Davis, 1985 p41)
3.3 MOTIVES FOR GIVING.
Undoubtedly there were those who fit the philanthropy
model of giving perhaps best described in the twentieth
century by Richard Titmuss (1970) in the Gift
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Relationship:
"In 'The Gift Relationship' Titmuss sought to
demonstrate the inter-relationship of social
structure, human nature and moral behaviour. He
argued that in industrial societies there was
a far greater scope for gift relationships than
had previously been recognised and that
citizens possess considerable potentialities
for altruistic behaviour of that kind which can
be either natured or destroyed under the
influence of the dominant values of their
society. Titmuss chose blood donorship as his
test case because it goes beyond the
limitations of family, community and class to
encompass the universal stranger, and it is in
our treatment of the universal stranger that
altruism finds its true and fullest
expression."( Reisman, 1977 pix)
Others, however, are not so well motivated, requiring
encouragement or a more complex motive, which Owen
describes as:
"the tradition of noblesse oblige, a notion, however
rudimentary, of richness oblige.., what the age expected
of them." (Owen 1965 p16).
A complexity of philanthropy which can be illustrated by
the motives of Thomas Coram, the founder of the Foundling
Hospital in the seventeenth century:
"Captain Coram, himself a former sea captain who had
caught the vision of a great overseas empire, saw his
Foundling Hospital as a potential source of artisans for
the colonies." (Owen 1965 p15).
However, one must be careful in applying such nonchalant
motives to the understanding of philanthropy. The Fund
Raiser Redmond Mullin (1995) has recently completed a
book with a section on the history of Fund Raising from
early Christian times, and provides different criteria:
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"my positive point is that, for most funders,
their financial backing of a cause is the only
way they can participate in service, share in
the vision, ideals and mission of the service-
provider. Fundraising entails a sharing of
values." (Mullin, 1995 p35)
The exhortations to give to charity by prominent persons
today - royalty, politicians, business people and show
business personalities combined with various fiscal
incentives provided by the Conservative Government from
the 1980s, can be directly compared to the similar
pleadings of the Tudors and Stuarts:
"Before the opening of the period with which
this book has to do, English charity had
already taken on the dignity of a national
tradition. To the formation of this tradition,
Jordan suggests, a good many factors had
contributed - among them the Protestant social
ethic, a new sense of national consciousness
and national obligation, a pervasive desire to
emulate the charitable acts of others... To
give or leave something to the community...
came to be expected of the more prosperous
Englishman. By the early seventeenth century,
Professor Jordan asserts, "the failure of a
London merchant to settle some substantial and
conspicuous charitable trust or gift was
generally regarded as little short of shocking
unless there had been a grievous wasting of the
estate because of age, ill-health, or
commercial misfortune." (Owen, 1965 p2)
A profile of public giving problems in the 1700's and the
1990's would seem very similar. For example, the
popularity of some charitable causes over others (Mullin
1995), problems of fund raising events (Bruce 1994) and
whether the public give enough, (Brophy 1989). Concerns
over fund raising events and financial problems in the
1700s, which lead to contraction of activities are all
chronicled by Owen (1965). Hospitals for example were
declining in popularity, while donations for those caught
by the barbary states were extremely fashionable:
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"Apparently hospitals had lost some of the
appeal they had held for charitable donors
earlier in the century....when the new London
Hospital building in Whitechapel opened its
doors in 1757, it contained only 161 beds
instead of the 350 originally planned, and by
1785 financial pressure was such that six wards
with sixty five beds had to be closed" (Owen,
. 1965 p49)
The financial problems of domestic charities in contrast
to the popularity for victims of foreign problems. In
1721, after a treaty with Morocco some 280 persons were
returned to England. A ceremony to raise funds for them
was held at St Pauls, which Owen (1965 p65) chronicles
was so popular that the collection became a disaster and
only a small amount of funds were raised.
The principal instrument of donations from the Tudor
period was the Charitable Trust (Jordan 1958). While the
Trust organisational format was well established, its
popularity was encouraged as a means of giving by
Elizabeth, who by clarifying its legal status was able to
facilitate giving by the wealthy, thus providing the
legislative element to its social policy:
"No doubt, by clarifying the legal status of
disposition to charity and by stressing the
benevolent interests of the public authorities,
Elizabeth had something to do with the amazing
outpouring of wealth for public purposes that
marked the first four decades of the century."
(Owen, 1965 p71)
In reviewing the preamble to the Statute of Charitable
Uses, 1601 it is illustrative to note some of the causes
that were deemed as charitable, for example 'maimed
soldiers and mariners' clearly reflected the problems
following constant wars with Catholic Spain. As Gerard
writes:
"In summary, the 1601 statute reflected the
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preoccupations of the draftsman of the social
legislation of the Tudor period with social
unrest, vagrancy and potential disorder.It
followed a decade fraught with violence, famine
and food riots, and coincided with the
comprehensive new Poor Law legislation."
(Gerard, 1983 p51-52)
To conclude this section, the establishment of 'modern
charity' was primarily due to positive action by the
State (Jordan 1958 p98-108). In the absence of any
conceivable alternative, after the dissolution of the
Catholic Church, the state encouraged charity to meet a
crisis which had arisen. A crisis precipitated by the
change from a feudal economic system to an emerging
capitalist system.
It would be misleading, however, to portray this period
as an unfettered rise of charity. In 1736, the passing of
the 'Mortmain Act' demonstrated that charity was not
entirely popular and the state had a preferred cause over
charity - the retention of private wealth through
inheritance. The Mortmain Act of 1736 concerned the
rights of protecting legal airs. As a Magazine of that
year explained:
" the mistaken Charity of men, who, in such circumstances
are apt to hope to compound for the faults of their past
life by a fine to be paid by their heirs to some use
which they call a religious one."( Owen, 1965 p87)
3.4 THE STATE'S ROLE.
While the Tudors had encouraged charity to provide a
whole host of services, they had not left it completely
to charity. Lord Beveridge (1948) saw the statutes of
Elizabeth in 1601 being a co-ordinated programme, as he
footnoted:
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"The Poor Law is cited officially as 43 Eliz.,
c2; the Statute of Charitable Uses is 43 Eliz.,
C4. The one intervening Statute, 43 Eliz., c.3,
was part of the same programme. It provided for
the necessary relief of soldiers and mariners
left stranded out of the wars." (Beveridge,
1948 p188)
As Rooff (1957) explains:
"...the Elizabethan Statute of Poor Relief
issued together with the Statute of Charitable
Uses in 1601,to see that, while statutory
responsibility was accepted for the relief of
the poor, charity continued to offer assistance
to 'aged impotent and poor people'. There was
no clear distinction between public and private
sources of help. The difference was largely one
of range and scope, the voluntary funds serving
a greater variety of purposes, whether meeting
disastrous situations,providing dowries for
poor maids or promoting the education of
scholars." (Rooff, 1957 p3)
From the commencement of 'modern charity' a binary system
for social welfare was developed, partly as Jordan (1958)
explains because it was seen as a form of insurance
against social unrest:
"The law, the use of the taxing power, was
regarded, so to speak, as a kind of co-
insurance against social disaster in the event
the economy was overwhelmed by forces too
powerful and too abrupt for private charity to
master. It was the lively fear that such a
period of disaster might be at hand which
evoked the legislation of 1597 and which was to
result in its first considerable enforcement
about a generation later. But there remained
the confidence that private charity, with its
rapidly mounting resources, could not only bear
the burdens of the society in normal times but
could raise the level of opportunity throughout
the realm so that poverty itself might be
prevented. Accordingly, every encouragement was
lent by the state through the whole course of
the century to properly defined almsgiving, and
a second great mechanism of social progress was
gradually evolved in the shape of the
charitable trust. It is most significant that
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the statute codifying and extending the legal
meaning of charitable trusts was passed in the
same year as the poor law. They were conjoined
in the thinking of the legislature just as they
were in the thinking of the community of the
realm." ( Jordan, 1958 p108)
The respective relationship between state and charity
from the onset was established as the state providing the
absolute minimum, with charity intended as the principal
focus of services. This was to be the pattern of
delivery until the advent of the 20th century, and
particularly after the second world war to 1979 when this
hegemony was seriously challenged. The Nathan Committee,
as we explore later in this chapter, observed that the
19th Century was the last great attempt to establish a
universal system of welfare based on charities (Nathan
1952 par 44). The role of the respective relationship
of state to charity is of course part of a much wider
philosophical debate of the role of the state to the
individual. A debate that is not unique to Britain, as
Young articulates:
"Since de Tocqueville's time, the vitality of
the American democracy and economy has been
seen to lie in the diversity of its economic
and political system, owing in part to the
ability of citizens to organize themselves on
a private, voluntary basis."( Young, 1983 p14)
The very nature of the charitable sector is therefore
inextricably linked to how much of a role should the
state play. As Rooff(1957) articulates on the dilemma for
individualists who wish to see a minimum of state action:
"The two conflicting forces, a political theory
which seemed to support the natural inclination
of men to busy themselves with their own
affairs and let others be and the stress of
circumstances which called for spontaneous
activity on behalf of those in need, had a
strong influence on the development of
voluntary organisations and social policy in
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the 19th Century and on the relation between
private and public action in the 20th." (Roof f,
1957 p4)
The impact of a minimalist role for the state was
articulated notably by Thomas Malthus. His theory on
population growth was published in 1798. The authority
of Malthus at the beginning of the nineteenth century was
immense as his population theory was widely accepted
(Harvey 1983 p503). Owen portrays Malthus' importance on
what should be the role of charity in the early 19th
Century:
"..the views of Malthus are instructive and influential.
His proposal for the gradual abolition of statutory
provision for the poor assumed a substantial flow of
private charity for their relief" (Owen, 1965 p98).
An importance which Rooff describes as shifting the focus
of charity and what the purpose of state relief should
be:
"..humanists and philanthropists were caught up
in controversy, when charity was uncertain of
its aims, and the Poor Law, dominated by the
Malthusian theory of population was
administered as a disciplinary measure rather
than as an instrument for relief." (Rooff, 1957
p3)
The subsequent misgiving charity held by some socialists,
notably articulated by Aneurin Bevan (Foot 1972), the
advent of a welfare state and the subsequent social
policy of the Thatcher Government are moulded by the
debates of the 19th Century. A debate between laissez-
faire minimalists at one extreme, through to liberals and
the emergence of a socialist philosophy committed to
state intervention and universal services. Nor are these
debates historic. The debate was articulated in the UK in
the mid 1970's between the 'right reformists' led
politically by Margaret Thatcher and the 'left
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reformists' led politically by Tony Benn, with a
programme:
n ... for large scale nationalisations, compulsory
planning agreements and import controls." (Harrison, 1978
p151)
Or as Brenton states on the 'new right's' view of the
voluntary sector:
"It can be seen as human a-political small in
scale and cheap alternative to our over-
developed social services as a means of
returning responsibility and freedom to the
individual and the community who have become
over dependent on the Nanny state." (Brenton,
1985 p2)
The Webbs' v Charity Organisation Society (COS) debates
of the late 19th Century have been well chronicled
(Brenton 1985,Cole 1945, Fraser 1976, Nightingale 1973,
Owen 1965). The COS represented the minimalist role of
the state but promoted an efficient network of services,
to be provided by Charities. The Webbs on the other
side, proposed a universal welfare of services funded and
provided by the state, with a supportive role for the
charity sector. It is an ironical misinterpretation of
the Webbs' view that they were opposed to charity. They
were not, what they opposed was the current operation of
the 'Poor Law'. The irony was that the poor law was, and
had always been, a statutory service. The Webb's
antithesis to charity was as long as charity was placed
in a hierarchy above the poor law then no reform of the
poor law could take place. The personalities of the time
should be considered as well. In the 1990s, given the
size of academic communities where one sometimes does not
know the names of colleagues in the same University, the
Webbs and their opponents knew each other personally.
The force of such strong individual personalities and
convictions would not have facilitated an objective
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debate. Cole succinctly summarises both the micro debate
on the role of the voluntary sector with the wider
political issues:
"The immediate issue between the contestants
can be summed up unemotionally as involving the
scope and limit of state action on the one hand
and voluntary charity on the other. But behind
it lay of course, the wider issue between the
two conceptions of society. The socialists
wanted to destroy the class system; the Charity
Organisers, however, benevolent wanted to
preserve it. The question between them was not
really limited to one of state versus private
social services, it involved the wider issue of
socialism versus capitalism fought out in a
particular field. While the combatants were in
this mood the question whether certain things
could be best done by the state, and certain
others by voluntary societies could never be
faced in any objective spirit. It was all or
nothing, for both sides; and any sort of
accommodation would have been regarded as
treason to the one or other cause." ( Cole,
1945a p20)
To conclude, charity cannot be divorced from the state
and social policy. The advent of modern charity was in
response to a serious economic and political crisis which
required the state to take action. Its response was a
'mixed economy of care' with the state providing a
minimum level to avoid starvation. The role of charity
was widened and developed to provide a multiplicity of
services that would enable specific groups in society to
improve themselves and specific problems to be met. In
the latter part of the 19th Century the efficiency of
charity to deliver welfare was questioned. This
efficiency debate polarised into two distinct camps. One
side was for charity to be the major service provider,
the other for greater intervention by the state. The
latter camp led by the Fabian socialists we contend has
led to the false impression that charity is a
conservative philosophy for welfare.
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3.5 CHARITY AS A CONSERVATIVE PHILOSOPHY?
Professor Cole's (1945a) statement that neither side in
the latter half of the 19th century would not consider
the others argument, is still relevant today. As long as
socialists believe charity is a politically conservative
form of social welfare delivery, there can be no
constructive debate on what should be the role for
charity. We present a discussion in this section which
argues that the 'conservative' image of charity is
mistaken. While there is a historical foundation to the
conservative image, this has been a 'hijacking' of what
Cole (1945b) has termed the 'spirit of charity'. Charity
or voluntary action can be equally an expression of
working class solidarity and self help.
Gerard (1983) provides a conceptual framework to
understand voluntary organisations. He classifies two
models which he calls 'social order' and 'social change'.
The 'order' group he suggests is characterised by a
consensus view of society. Order organisations will be
conservative in outlook and will emphasise:
..authority, hierarchy, equity, compassion and
freedom". (Gerard 1983 p35)
Organisations who fit into his model based on 'change'
will be characterised by:
"moral relativism, viewing 'good' as dependent
on circumstances and will favour change,
pluralism and differentiation. It will
emphasise secular and material, rather than
spiritual,values and will be concerned to
identify with those in need. It will be
reformist or radical in its view of society
and more likely to emphasise democracy,
participation,	 equality,
	
tolerance	 and
individual rights." (Gerard, 1983 p35)
Gerard has produced a useful model to understand the
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respective dynamics of voluntary organisations. A paragon
which can be extremely useful when applied to
understanding the distinctive management problems of the
voluntary sector, for example the differences between
managing 'War on Want' a relatively small charity with a
high profile, centrally controlled politically left and
the British Red Cross, a very large charity, with
numerous branches throughout the country trying to
maintain an independence of politics.
Unfortunately, Gerard goes on to classify his respective
organisations in relation to legislative forms instead of
applying them to a segmented hypothesis of the charitable
sector. He postulates:
"The law of charity, however, being developed
to operationalism the norm of benefice is
particularly appropriate to the social-order
model of organisations. It recognises and
sustains the religious and moral values
associated with the model and the conservative
view-of-society which accompanies it. It finds
it difficult to accommodate the social-change
model of organisation based on the norm of
solidarity and the reformist, activist method
of operation associated with it. Hence, the
problems of agencies devoted to social-change
which seek to qualify for the privileges of
charity whilst rejecting the operational
restrictions and perspectives which accompany
the definition of charity in law." (Gerard,
1983 p37)
Gerard's image of charity as an inherently conservative
concept, we believe is mistaken. We have dealt with his
reference to the discomfiture of agencies devoted to
social change in the first chapter on political
activities. We examined the enshrined freedom of charity
to be involved in political activity. From our interview
with the 1980s Chief Charity Commissioner, Denis Peach
(1994) we noted his view that the lack of a legal
definition for charity has to date facilitated 'social
change' organisations. This perception of conservatism,
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derives primarily from the 19th Century abuses, rather
than in Cole's(1945b) spirit of charity:
"The working class movement has... in particular painful
memories of the abuse of the spirit of charity." (Cole
1945b,p131)
The abuse of charity was developed in the 19th Century,
against a background of terrible social deprivation. In
his monumental history of the English working class, the
historian E P Thompson, chides his fellow historians for
tending to ignore this awful chapter of English domestic
history by their reference to improvements in overall
wealth of the nation and excusing poverty with reference
to wars. The reality, Thompson suggests was devastating
misery caused by exploitation by unscrupulous factory
owners and landlords(Thompson,1974).
Direct intervention by the state was seen as the only
alternative both by those who supported the emergence of
a new political philosophy challenging the whole basis of
that society and those who while rejecting the
revolutionary aspects of Marxism wished to see radical
reform (Pelling, 1965):
"Many from Dickens to Bagehot, from Spencer to
the Webbs, were sceptical about charity and the
charitable, for their different reasons. On the
one hand, there was wasteful management by
well-meaning do-gooders; and hence the need for
a Charity Organisation Society. On the other,
the Charity Organisation Society itself became
synonymous with much that was grudging,
callous, dogmatic and reactionary. Its support
was wide; but it may perhaps be seen as the
protestant capitalist's compromise with a
conscience that told him that, alas, charity
could not be rejected with impunity. It was
charity made businesslike; the businessman's
attempt to impose middle-class ethics on the
working class, and make its members as
industrious and thrifty as he.
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The emergent socialists, in turn, mistrusted
both this utilitarian, quasi-scientific
approach and its sentimental opponents, the
'soft-hearted people', in Canon Barnett's
words, by whose generosity 'a state of things
to make one's heart bleed is perpetuated'.
Charity delayed social progress; it was the
expression of an unjust society,an attempt to
conceal its real nature. Beatrice Webb thought
it 'twice cursed, it curseth him that gives and
him that takes'; Shaw declared that 'he who
gives money he has not earned is generous with
other people's labour; and even Wilde argued in
his under-rated 'Soul of Man Under Socialism'
that it was 'immoral to use private property to
alleviate the horrible evils that result from
the	 institution of private property'."
(Nightingale 1973 p111)
It is our contention that there is another origin in the
19th Century of charitable and voluntary sector activity.
Based in self help activity by the working class, women
and disabled people that can be directly correlated to
what Knight refers to as 'New horizons' describing the
developments in the 1960's and to date of voluntary
action re-energised based on self help and determination
(Knight, 1993 p23). We review this additional tress of
charity in section 2.8 'Rediscovering Charity'.
Cole's (1945b) 'spirit of charity' based upon
philanthropic motives has no link with respective party
politics. A 'Philanthropic motive' for Lord Beveridge
was a:
"desire by one's personal action to make life happier for
others." (Beveridge, 1948 p121).
Tudor interprets charity as:
"In its widest sense, the word charity denotes all the
good affections that men ought to bear towards each
other." (Maurice and Parker, 1984 p1)
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Blake Bromley(1994) describes Charity:
"Charity is a universal voluntary expression of a human
being's compassion for another who is less fortunate and
a citizen's desire to build a better society." (Blake
Bromley, 1994 p6).
Actions and affections that were raised by Titmuss (1970)
in his book on blood donation:
"Men are not born to give;as newcomers they
face none of the dilemmas of altruism and self-
love. How can they and how do they learn to
give - and give to unnamed strangers
irrespective of race, religion or colour - not
in circumstances of shared misery but in
societies continually multiplying new desires
and syndicalist private wants concerned with
property, status and power?" (Titmuss, 1970
p12)
The donation of one's blood, unpaid to the British Blood
Bank is probably the ultimate altruistic behaviour -
there is no gain and the ultimate recipient is unknown.
Ware (1989,p14) draws a distinction between two different
types of altruism. One type he calls 'personal' and with
this, an obligation is formed between the recipient and
the donor. It is this 'personal' altruism that was
adopted by the COS and which has led to many of the image
problems of charity. For it can create a dependency and
thereby power by the donor over the recipient. The other
type of altruism is referred to as 'impersonal' and
subscribes to Titmuss's blood donor.
There are of course other more base reasons for
philanthropy, whether to avoid eternal damnation to
pragmatic political and personal considerations. The
challenge of Titmuss's paper was the very questioning of:
"Why should men not contract out of the social and act to
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their own immediate advantage?" (Titmuss 1970 p11) - a
question that has been termed 'the paradox of giving'
(Forder and Kenda11,1993,p6). Another example Titmuss
could have used would be the rationale of people who
volunteer in the Lifeboat service. The volunteers, who in
all weathers and irrespective of who is on the ship they
are going out to rescue, risk their lives.
This problem challenges the fundamental economic theory
of wealth maximisation and has led to the generation of
considerable debate by economists who have interested
themselves in non-profits (Steinberg and Gray 1993; Rose-
Ackerman 1990; James 1990; Knapp 1990; Weisbrod 1988;
Hansmann 1980, 1987). Some economists have attempted to
explain this paradox by explanation of rationality, that
most people do not try to maximise their income or
assets, as they have a substitution satisfaction. Other
rational explanations have focused on a theory of
'utility' or private benefit incentives, particularly
giving by companies. A third and probably the most
authoritative approach has been an explanation by
Hansmann of nondistribution constraint. Steinberg and
Gray(1993) noting that Hansmann's 'The Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise' (1980) has been cited over 150 times in the
Social Science Citation Index. This market information
efficiency perspective has been favourably commented on
by two of the most authoritative figures in American
finance Fama and Jensen (James 1990; Archer and
D'Ambrosio 1983).
Hansmann's(1980) hypothesis is the lack of information
about a product will lead consumers who cannot
objectively evaluate, to place their trust in
organisations which are non-profitmaking. Similarly trust
is more likely with staff and managers in non-profit than
for-profits. A problem for Hansmann is to accommodate the
existence of voluntary non-profits when the government
147
provides services. Weisbrod(1988) accommodates this
problem by his own hypothesis for non-profits existence
which he argues have arisen as a consequence of
unsatisfied demands(Young 1983). Certain activities are
not profitable and the public would not trust for-profit
organisations to undertake them:
"Private sector cannot be relied upon to undertake
activities such as pollution control, consumer health and
safety protection." (Weisbrod, 1988 p5)
The problem for economists however, is how to explain
non-selfish behaviour. It is in this arena where the
importance of Titmuss's paper in the US particularly by
economists has been noted by Weisbrod(1988). Weisbrod
further registers that the attitude of US policy makers
to for-profit bloodbanks changed to legislation to
curtail their activities.
Margolis (1982), suggests that individuals have not one
but two 'utility functions'. One is the conventional
selfish own needs, the other is for 'group ends'. A
rational distribution process occurs with The 'G'
focusing on guilt after the 'S' - self needs have been
allocated. A variation of this theme has been developed
around a sense of duty to give. Based on the Kantian
theme of duty, maxims of action and the moral law (Korner
1955,pp130-142). This perspective allows for both
individuality of action and an expectation of how others
will behave. A moral duty to give as facilitated by
church or state.
While these two theories attempt to offer an explanation
within economic theory of altruistic behaviour there is
yet, according to Forder and Kendall(1993), no
substantive empirical evidence to substitute or refute
these various hypotheses. They also suggest that
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economic theories still appear to be in an early stage
of development on why people give. An interesting and
still speculative hypothesis has been developed by Knapp
and Kendall of some possible links between giving
behaviour and proximity to social cohesion (Forder and
Kendall, 1993 p13).
Owen (1965, p166) from his analysis on the complexity of
Victorian philanthropy describes five very different
motives - sympathy and compassion; religion; concern for
the stability of society; social pressures and own
ambition.
The expression for such action for the Victorians to the
present day has been the formation of charitable
societies as opposed to charitable trusts to advance a
cause(Owen, 1965,p5). The formation of voluntary
societies is envisioned by Bourdillon(1945) as follows:
"The habit of forming voluntary organisations
for every sort of social purpose is widely
spread and deeply rooted in this country. Quite
naturally in Britain when a man has a new
enthusiasm he buys a twopenny notebook, prints
'Minute Book' carefully on the first page,
calls together some of his friends under the
name of a committee -and behold a new voluntary
society is launched." (Bourdillon, 1945 pl)
The formation of voluntary societies, the obtaining of
charitable status where appropriate is in itself neither
revolutionary or conservative. It is the purpose to which
the founders of such societies determine, which gives
them a political flavour. Many of the charitable
societies founded in the first half of the 19th Century
were there to agitate for change, for intervention by the
state for example the Anti-Slavery Society and the 'Ten
Hours league'.
The leader of this last organisation, Lord Shaftesbury is
149
an example of how one individual can be described in
relation to charity from different perspectives. Knight
describes Shaftesbury as "the greatest of the reformers",
apologises for him being an aristocrat by adding "though
not a wealthy one" and lists his substantial contribution
to factory reform and other issues such as mental health
and working class housing. The motive for Shaftesbury's
good work? Knight quotes Shaftesbury himself:
n ...do what I would, I was called to another
career, and now I find myself at the end of a
long life, not a philosopher, not an author,
but simply an old man who has endeavoured to do
his duty in that state of life to which it has
pleased God to call him." (Knight 1993 p9-10)
Lord Beveridge's own substantial section on Shaftesbury
from which Knight above culled most of his segment, cites
the campaigning aspect of Shaftesbury:
"Shaftesbury was continuously associated with legislative
action for the improvement of the conditions of the
working class." (Beveridge, 1948 p158)
Compare this image of a campaigning philanthropist for
the poor against the same Shaftesbury who, as Beveridge
also refers, stood as a candidate for the anti-reform
party in 1831. Or, as Roof f, who again after praising
Shaftesbury, exclaims:
"Shaftesbury stands apart from his contemporaries,
however, both in the breadth of his interest and the
narrowness of his vision.... He remained to the end an
opponent of democracy."(Rooff, 1957 p10)
Shaftesbury was opposed to the reforms requested by the
Charity Commission in 1881 and his leadership of the
'Ragged Schools' movement which was paternalistic and
kept working class education at the most primary level:
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"No one could find much distinction in the
education offered by the Ragged Schools. Their
problem, as they and some of their critics saw
it, was not that of achieving scholastic
excellence. It was rather to resist the
temptation to social-climbing that has been
more or less characteristic of educational
institutions. "Stick to the gutter",
Shaftesbury exhorted them, and on the whole the
Ragged Schools kept the faith. When Children
seemed to be rising above the most primitive
educational or social level, they were
encouraged to transfer to a pay school or to
enter some such trade as shoeblacking. Nothing
must be allowed to interfere with the
missionary and religious purposes of the Union
Schools, not even education, as Shaftesbury
repeatedly stressed. This was Christian
indoctrination of an elementary sort, and it
was, in Shaftesbury's view, far preferable to
secular learning. In 1870, while the Education
Bill was passing through Parliament, he
lamented that "the godless, non-Bible system is
at hand; and the Ragged Schools, with all their
Divine polity, with all their burning and
fruitful love for the poor, with all their
prayers and harvest for the temporal and
eternal welfare of forsaken, heathenish,
destitute, sorrowful, and yet innocent
children, must perish under this all-conquering
march of intellectual power". Conscience of the
Victorian Age that he was, friend of the
outcast and the downtrodden, Shaftesbury's
humanitarianism was unmarred by any democratic
taint." (Owen, 1965 p149-150)
The 1870 Education Act which created 'Universal'
elementary education is seen by the socialist movement as
one of the milestones in the development of the working
class. As Cole (1945) describes the paternalism of
philanthropy, was never more exemplified than by the
ability to learn to read and write. Shaftesbury
epitomised the movement that supported literacy only for
the purpose of reading the bible and for nothing more.
Once the ability to read was provided universally to the
working class, the opportunity for organised working
class voluntary organisations was increased:
"But now we have reached the point at which
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these inferiors begin to play a significant
part in looking after themselves and creating
associations of their own instead of receiving
passively and as individuals the benefactions
of the well-to-do." (Cole, 1945 p16)
Shaftesbury also suffers from another misdemeanour in the
make-up of the early socialist hatred of the charity
philanthropists. The 'bible' for most 'young socialists'
is Karl Marx's 'Capital'. Shaftesbury has the dubious
honour of being personally vilified by Marx for his
opposition to the repeal of the corn laws and his
rationale for factory reform:
"The time just before the repeal of the Corn
Laws threw new light on the conditions of the
agricultural labourers. On the one hand, it was
to the interest of the middle-class agitators
to prove how little the Corn Laws protected the
actual producers of the corn. On the other
hand, the industrial bourgeoisie foamed with
sullen rage at the denunciations of the factory
system by the landed aristocracy, at the
pretended sympathy with the woes of the factory
operatives, of those utterly corrupt,
heartless, and genteel loafers and at their
"diplomatic zeal" for factory legislation. It
is an old English proverb that "when thieves
fall out, honest men come by their own", and,
in fact, the noisy, passionate quarrel between
the two fractions of the ruling class about the
question, which of the two exploited the
labourers the more shamefully, was on each hand
the midwife of the truth. Earl Shaftesbury, then
Lord Ashley,was commander-in-chief in the
aristocratic, philanthropic, anti-factory
campaign. He was, therefore, in 1845, a
favourite subject in the revelations of the
'Morning Chronicle' on the condition of the
agricultural labourers. This journal, then the
most important liberal organ, sent special
commissioners into the agricultural districts,
who did not content themselves with mere
general descriptions and statistics, but
published the names both of the labouring
families examined and of their landlords. The
following list gives the wages paid in three
villages in the neighbourhood of Blandford,
Wimborne, and Poole. The villages are the
property of Mr G Bankes and of the Earl of
Shaftesbury. It will be noted that, just like
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Bankes, this "low church pope" this head of
English pietists, pockets a great part of the
miserable wages of the labourers under the
pretext of house-rent." (Marx, 1974 p632)
The above sources all portray a different view of
Shaftesbury and by the nature of their divergence also
display the problem of understanding philanthropy, which
is the heart of charity:
"To classify men's charitable acts into neat categories
according to the impulses assumed to have prompted them
would be dangerous and absurd. Human behaviour rarely
exhibits such helpful sightedness of motive." (Owen, 1965
p36)
To dismiss the motives of Shaftesbury and other
philanthropists as being driven by some belief of self
interest or preservation is too simplistic. They were
few and completely estranged from the dominant philosophy
of the day of Utilitarianism and Self Help as portrayed
by Jeremy Bentham and Samuel Smiles:
"Until the 1870's individualism dominated
thought and Laissez-Faire was widely accepted
as the proper role of the state....The
indifference of a society dominated by laissez-
faire was broken into by the vigorous and the
persistent enterprise of the few." (Roof f, 1957
P6)
The origin of suspicion to down right hostility of
charity from the labour movement can be dated from the
19th century with the emergence of an urban working
class.
"Nevertheless, when every caution has been made, the
outstanding fact of the period between 1790 and 1830 is
the formation of 'the working class'."(Thompson
1974,p212)
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A number of different themes against charity developed.
We have from Marx a rejection of the whole capitalist
system, his empirical research on the condition of the
working class both highlighted the inhuman nature of
capitalism and to demonstrate that working class
agitation in alliances could obtain some social progress.
Such alliances the working class needed to be aware were
single issues and were motivated by others own interest.
In the case of factory reform the alliance was clearly,
for Marx in the interests of the landed aristocracy
against those of the middle class. A battle between the
two that had been raging with the ending of the feudal
system (Jordan 1958; Tigar 1977; Mishra 1979). For a
Marxist analysis based on an historic critique of the
rise and fall of societies, charity is seen as a product
of a market society:
"the middle-class society is likely to develop
a 'residual' system of welfare. In the early
stages of industrialisation neither state nor
enterprise welfare is favoured. Instead,
friendly societies, voluntary organisations,
charities and market responses to the various
problems and needs are encouraged." (Mishra,
1979 p35)
A second theme has been developed by Cole (1945a) for the
antithesis of charity to socialists. This second theme is
the provision of universal services over ad-hoc services.
Universal provision being the nucleus of the traditional
left, Labour Party approach to welfare services. Michael
Foote's biography of Aneurin Bevan(Foote 1972) provides
a clear insight into the dismissing of charitable
services in favour of universal services 'as of right'
being the core of Bevan's belief. The debate for the
'labour side' was led by the Webbs, who had a major
influence on the 'social democratic' side of the labour
movement as Marx had for the socialists(Pelling 1965).
The debates in the latter half of the 19th Century were
divided between the Webbs arguing for a	 view of
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universal welfare services provided by the state and the
views of the Charity Organisation Society which stood:
"for a strongly individualistic gospel of self help and
for 'voluntaryism' as against the extension of state
aid." (Cole, 1945a p19)
The antithesis of the debate can now only be read in the
respective accounts of Beatrice Webb's autobiography, the
papers of the Charity Organisation Society (available
from the Director of the Family Welfare Association,
which the COS became in the late 1940s) and historical
accounts( Brenton 1985; Bourdillon 1945; Fraser 1976;
Gregg 1973; Lloyd 1986; Owen 1965; Rooff 1957). As we
noted earlier debates that took place in a limited
rarefied atmosphere of late 19th Century intellectual
society. The importance of the debate and its hostility
was noted by Cole writing in 1945:
"Social democrats and charity organisers hated one
another with a fury based on principle; and the echoes of
the conflict can be heard still." (Cole, 1945a p20)
The image of the role for charity as being for the
'deserving poor' while the state provided a bare minimum
through the 'poor law' for the 'undeserving' to avoid
starvation, was summarised in the famous Goschen minute
in 1869. The minute issued by George Goschen, President
of the Poor Law Board, authoritatively determined the
respective relationship of Charity and State for aid for
the poor:
"The oft-quoted Goschen minute ruled in effect,
that the Poor Law should be concerned with the
wholly destitute while charity should be
reserved for those who had some but
insufficient means...the relation between
charitable effort and public responsibility was
generally interpreted as a distinction between
the deserving and the undeserving, the
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reformable and the unrepentant or the helpable
and the hopeless." (Rooff, 1957 p19)
The minute provided the official endorsement of charity
for the deserving poor, a charter for middle class
philanthropists to impose their morals on the
'respectable unfortunates'. As we mentioned earlier,
motives for philanthropy are not simple but accounts of
the methods of housing pioneer Octavia Hill can be read
as imposing middle class values on her terms, as she
offered the only alternative to the 'poor law' and
unscrupulous private landlords. Her working class tenants
having no choice but, to follow her personal codes of
conduct imposed on them, to object would mean
eviction(Owen 1965 p389; Darke 1979 p15). Hill like
Shaftesbury, was an old fashioned individualist with her
opposition to the provision of universal old age pensions
proposed by Charles Booth. Her appearance at the Aberdare
Commission - a Royal Commission of 1893-4 on the issue of
the aged and poverty - provides a clear insight of the
'we know best', paternalistic image that socialists so
despise and correlate with the name of charity:
"A number of witnesses, of whom Octavia Hill
was the best known, held high the banner of
individualism...she was at her most offensively
doctrinaire, bristling with moral superiority
and censoriousness, more than ever the self
appointed school mistress of the lower classes.
She and her C.O.S. associates alone held the
key to the problems of the poor, young and
old." (Owen 1965,p508)
Not that Hill was alone in her attitude to the 'correct
way' to provide for the respectable working class:
"The management of Peabody dwellings was
equally paternalistic; tenants had to have an
employer's reference, had to be vaccinated, to
be in by 11pm., were not allowed to do various
types of work at home, including laundry and
various offensive trades, and were not allowed
to decorate their rooms. These rules, and the
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relatively high rents, effectively excluded the
poorest families." (Darke, 1979,p15)
A hundred years on, discussions on philanthropy should be
able to assimilate the complexity of motive and place
them within an historical social context, we should not
judge behaviour by 1994 standards with those of 1894. The
behaviour of prominent persons is important to understand
if an effective system of regulation is to be applied to
charity. A system of regulation which does not strangle
the innovation of the founders of many charities and
proponents of voluntary action today. It is therefore
disappointing to read Barry Knight's report on 'Voluntary
Action' who offers a description of Octavia Hill
introduced as:
"It is instructive to look at a sample of these
individuals to get an insight into how they thought, and
what voluntary action meant for them." (Knight 1993,p9)
and then proceeds with a nine line description that could
have come from the 'lady bird' series of famous
historical figures:
"Octavia Hill was the youngest daughter of a
corn merchant and banker. After her fathers
death, she lived with her mother and three
sisters in Marylebone, supporting themselves by
running a girls school, and at the same doing
various kinds of social service. Her main work
was in improving housing management with the
help of money from John Ruskin. She was also
associated with the beginnings of several other
forms of voluntary organisations, in particular
the Charity Organisation Society, the Commons
Preservation Society formed in 1865, and the
National Trust for the Preservation of Places
of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty founded
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in 1894." (Knight, 1973 p10)
A further testimony to this historical negative image of
charity has been its depiction in novels and plays
written by 'left' writers. One such work is the play 'An
Inspector Calls' by J B Priestley. The play depicts the
home of a prosperous manufacturer whose family is about
to enjoy a celebratory dinner on the announcement of the
forthcoming marriage of the daughter, when a 'Police
Inspector' calls. The play unfolds a tale of the
respective involvement of each member of the family with
a young woman, who made pregnant by the son and unable to
find help, commits suicide. In one of the most moving
and final scenes of the play the young women has sought
the help of 'The Brumley Women's Charity Organisation'.
She is denied help by the chair, the mother, Mrs Birling
on the grounds of her 'gross impertinence'. The young
woman's crime being to give herself the same name as Mrs
Birling. This depiction of a decision made by personal
whim is as damaging to charity's image as the political
debates highlighted above. The absence of accountability
of the charitable organisation, its manipulation by an
individual and the absence of any alternative to charity.
The play was published in 1947, the same time as the
advent of an alternative to charity, a statutory welfare
state. The importance of this work has been its exposure
not just as a play, still running in the London 'west
end' in 1994, but its adoption as a 'set book' by school
examination boards, a feature film and adaptation for
television.
The image created by one generation of charity workers
often becomes the 'liability baggage' of the next as
reflected by Rooff's book published ten years later in
1957:
"What remains of hostility to voluntaryism in some
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quarters today, owes much to the false values which
attended the misuse of charity in the past." (Roof f, 1957
p25)
An image can change as Hatch and Mocroft(1983,p31) in
their study of social services and politics discovered.
In Islington they found that the 'new left' which did not
have a political base in the trade unions looked to the
voluntary sector for support. However, it was probably
citing a better known past, that Brenton can comment in
1985:
"Support for charity and philanthropy as a
principle of social action has a long history
in the Conservative Party. The formation and
running of voluntary organisations have been a
characteristic response to social need and a
badge of social responsibility, particularly
for underemployed conservative women."
(Brenton, 1985 p140)
Of more importance is Brenton's assertion that it is the
respectable middle class led charities who receive the
greatest proportion of funding. This has implications for
the whole question of 'who benefits from Charity?' which
we discuss later. Heginbotham(1990 p82)) has attempted
to depoliticise the image of charity from party politics.
He calls for Labour to reject its old statist notions
while he also argues that people do not want for-profit
organisations providing care. Instead he calls for a
serious dialogue to take place, where the voluntary
sector can assist in devising a new shared morality. To
support his arguments, he characterises a view of the
voluntary sector from respective leading theorists of the
left and the right:
"The 'new right' view is that voluntarism is
the 'true' expression of Welfare. Hayek(1960)
suggested that volunteering is the only
legitimate form of welfare. The left, as
exemplified by Tawney, would probably argue
that the only 'true' welfare is egalitarian
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social organisation. Tawney described socialism
as 'a community of responsible men and women
working without fear in comradeship for common
ends all of who can grow to their full
stature .....That will mean voluntary action to
help each other." (Heginbotham,1990,p30)
To conclude the 'negative' image of charity was developed
in the 19th Century. In part self-inflicted, the other
by its perceived inability to meet the problems of an
emerging industrial society. For non-Marxist socialists
and liberal social reformers, intervention by the state,
directly providing services was the answer to meet the
terrible poverty and social deprivation identified by
both public health officers and later the social surveys
by Booth. Through universal services notably sanitation
for public health; education for social improvement; old
age pensions and national insurance for poverty could
such problems be eradicated on the scale that a 'modern
industrial society' had produced. For orthodox Marxists,
charity was and always will be part of capitalist society
and therefore the argument we have propounded will be
rejected. For other Marxists and socialists, the
supportive and emphatic characteristics associated with
the voluntary sector are aspects to be found in 'Utopia'.
3.6 THE WELFARE STATE AND THE ROLE FOR CHARITY.
A consensus existed on the welfare state from 1945 until
the late 1970 (Mellor 1985; Lloyd 1986; Webb and Wistow
1987; Deakin 1994a, Flynn 1994,). An assumption which
pervaded the natural order of social welfare in Britain
was the provision of welfare services, by the state with
a subsidiary role for the charity sector. This consensus
was adopted by professionals in social welfare (Rooff
1957, Brenton 1985, Webb and Wistow 1987; Flynn 1994) and
was justified by the 'scientists of society'(Cotgrove
1972) who developed a functionalist perspective to
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explain how institutions develop.
A theoretical legitimation provided by •the principal
functionalist theorists, who comprise some of the leading
figures in the development of sociology and social policy
- Durkheim influencing Parsons and Merton(Giddens 1972).
Further Rein(1976,p260) argues that all social scientists
use the theory of function, at least part of the time to
explain why institutions act as they do. Mishra(1979)
describes the functionalists view of the development of
welfare services from primitive societies to industrial
societies as a form of scientific development - the
decline of religious organisations, the proliferation of
voluntary organisations and then to meet increasing needs
the development of state social services.
The functionalists have also developed (Merton 1938) the
concept of 'dysfunction' to take into account any
unintended consequences of a particular social policy. An
example of this is the effect of a local authority
housing policy as identified in the classic studies by
Young and Wilmott (1957), where the improvement of
housing conditions for the working class also resulted in
the disruption of the extended family and kinship.
The importance of the functionalist philosophy in the UK
was its intellectual justification for the proposition
that there is a natural order of events for welfare
services to be provided by statutory services, a
perspective adopted by Owen in the 1960s:
"An underlying theme of the present study has
to do with this dual importance of private
charity - on the one hand, its role as a
pioneering force, pointing the way to action by
the state, and, on the other, its ultimate
inadequacy when measured against the
requirements of industrial urban-society."
(Owen 1965,p6)
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An historical analysis is developed to explain phases of
development that naturally flow into each other:
"In summarising the principal developments in
social provision over the last two hundred
years it is possible to identify four main
phases. The first which we will call 'the last
phase of paternalism', lasted until 1834. The
second which we will call 'the era of state
deterrence and voluntary expansion', covered
the years 1834-1905. The third, marked by the
emergence of statutory social services occupied
the next forty years. The final phase, which
runs from 1945 to the present day, we describe
as 'the consolidation of the welfare state".
(Wolfenden, 1978 p16)
A perspective that was given authority by Professor Cole
at the beginning of the welfare state:
"Evidently the historical tendency has
been for the state to take over the
material task providing either in cash or
in kind for basic physical needs, and for
the voluntary agencies, as this happens to
strike out along new lines of community
service on the educational and social
plane." (Cole, 1945a p27)
An official position is adopted that legitimates the
perspective that large scale welfare was beyond the scope
of voluntary organisations. The Nathan Committee (1952
par 44) described the attempt to create by private effort
a series of universal social services as one of the
magnificent failures of our history.
There is one very good example of a universal voluntary
service involving life and death which during this period
few seem to have considered - The Lifeboat service which
was founded in 1824. According to Owen (1965 p177) only
once, in the 1890s has there ever been consideration to
'nationalise' the RNLI which is a voluntary organisation.
It has received government financial support only between
the years 1854-69, otherwise all its expenses have been
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met by public subscription. As Lord Saltoun stated in
the 1960s House of Lords Charity Debate:
"The lowest point that the Royal National
Lifeboat Institute ever touched in its history
was in the third quarter of the 19th century
when it was receiving a government grant. When
that Institution repudiated the grant, refused
it and put it aside, the public took the
institution to its heart and it has never
failed since then." (Saltoun, 1960)
Lord Saltoun, however, did not go on to say that the
financial saving of the RNLI has been due, on numerous
occasions in their long history, to certain disasters
involving loss of life, to which the public generously
responded. The real irony, however, is that the US
equivalent is the Government coast guard service. Owen
(1965 p177), an American professor, said Americans could
not understand why semi- socialist Britain could leave
this important service entirely in the hands of a
charity. The United States from early beginnings had
supported a government service.
Beveridge (1948), the architect of the welfare state had
argued for a major role for the voluntary sector,
particularly for the use of the friendly societies and
national insurance (the opening chapter of his book
'Voluntary Action', being devoted to this cause). The
decision for a statutory welfare state was based on a
political philosophy and pragmatism which we have seen
was distrustful of the voluntary sector:
"A subsidiary but important part of the drive
towards statutory social services represented
a deliberate move away from voluntary provision
not least within the Labour Party. Faith was
invested in statutory services as a way of
guaranteeing provision that was comprehensive
and universal, professional and impartial, and
subject to democratic control. The immediate
post-war implementation of social policies
marked an attempt decisively to move away from
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social policies that was partial in scope,
socially divisive in action, and socially
controlling in intent. Voluntary organisations
were regarded with not a little suspicion in
the process." (Brenton, 1985 p20)
A political consensus was developed on the welfare state:
"By 1949 it was accepted that Britain was a
'Welfare State'. The phrase was widely used,
outside Britain as well as inside, and inside
Britain it was always used in tones of
approval; liberals and Conservatives pointed
out that their parties had also played a part
in building the Welfare State." (Lloyd, 1986
p288)
There is no 'scientific' rationale for why the state
should have became both a financier and deliverer of
welfare services. The welfare state evolved for a variety
of different reasons and it did not happen overnight:
"The balance did not shift abruptly or
conclusively, nor was there sudden and general
acceptance	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 state
responsibility for welfare 	  A more direct
influence in turning public opinion towards a
positive social policy was the growing
accumulation of data on the condition of life
of the lower classes." (Owen, 1965 p503)
The stimulus to the state taking the major role was
probably the result of the effects of war. The importance
of war in the development of direct intervention by the
state in welfare has recently been underscored in the US.
In her recent book, Skocopol(1993), has re-written the
assumption that state American welfare programmes began
in the mid 20th Century. Skocopol has researched the
government budget expenditure between 1880-1910 and noted
over a quarter of its expenditure was on pensions for
civil war veterans and their dependents. (Pollack, 1994
p74)
The importance of war as a stimulus to state intervention
is underlined by Rooff(1957) who remarks on the reforming
164
Liberal Government of 1906 which signified the beginning
of direct welfare service provision by the state:
"The role of the state as junior partner was
not acceptable to a vigorous liberal
government. The changing political theory, the
rising standards of living, the advance in
knowledge of social problems and their causes,
the vitality of some of the municipalities and,
perhaps most potent of all the shocks of the
Boer War had combined to make the demand for
statutory services more urgent." (Rooff, 1957
p20-21)
At the beginning of the 20th Century, the shock of the
Boer War had been the discovery of the poor health of the
nation (Lloyd 1986 p15). If England was to continue to be
a strong nation then social reform was required.
The sacrifice of the second world war involving rationing
and the conscription of women led to British society
becoming more egalitarian (Lloyd, 1986 p25). Social
interaction, comradeship during adversity, all led to a
spirit of not wishing to return to the pre-war years.
Acknowledging the importance of the second world war,
Hobsbawm (1969, p264) offers a further dimension to the
universal acceptance of a welfare state:
"By the middle 1930s Laissez-faire was
therefore dead even as an ideal, except for the
usual financial journalists, spokesmen for
small business, and the economists....Two
economic policies therefore faced each other,
both equally remote from John Stuart Mill. On
the one hand there was socialism, based
essentially on the aspirations of the working
class movement, but greatly strengthened by the
experience of the USSR, which impressed even
non-socialist observers by its apparent
immunity to the great slump. It contained
little by way of precise policy except the
ancient demand for the nationalization of the
means of production, distribution and exchange
and the slogan of 'planning' which the Soviet
Five-year Plans made extremely fashionable. On
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the other hand there were those-mainly
economists who came from Liberalism(like
J.A.Hobson) or who still remained Liberals
(like Keynes and Beveridge) - who wished to
save the essentials of a capitalist system, but
realised that this could now be done only
within the framework of a strong and
systematically interventionist state; or even
through a 'mixed economy'. In practice the
difference between these two trends was
sometimes hard to discern, especially as some
Keynesians abandoned the liberalism of their
inspirer for socialism, and as the Labour Party
tended to adopt the Keynesian policies as its
own, in preference to the more traditional
socialist slogans. Still, broadly speaking the
socialists favoured their proposals because
they were for social equality and justice, the
non-socialists theirs, because they were for
the efficiency of the British economy and
against social disruption. Both agreed that
only systematic state action (whatever its
nature) could rid of and avoid slumps and mass
unemployment."(Hobsbawm, 1969 p244-245)
The emergence of welfare services run by the state as
opposed to voluntary agencies was therefore not part of
some inevitable scientific process. As Brenton declares,
a different policy could have emerged:
"The state could have taken on a major role in the late
1940s by a conscious decision to assume responsibility
only for financing and regulating the social services,
leaving their actual delivery to non-governmental
bodies." (Brenton, 1985 p19)
This was the pattern of service delivery that had emerged
in the inter-war years as both Rooff and Beveridge
describe:
"The first world war marked the division
between the old philanthropy and the new. Lloyd
George's budget, 1914 made possible the first
extension of payments to voluntary
organisations providing certain services, but
the new pattern emerged after the war. After
1919, however, payments for services rendered
on an agency basis formed an increasing
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proportion of the grants to national
organisations." (Roof f, 19571p23)
"The state policy between the two world wars was to
encourage the formation of voluntary associations for
dealing with the housing shortage in co-operation with
public authorities." (Beveridge, 1948 p102)
An alternative stated policy, of the state providing
strategic direction and resources but not direct service
provision did not emerge. Instead charities as service
providers were seen to be unimportant, it was assumed
that they would wither away and were ignored by public
authorities who were more concerned with resourcing their
own services. (Brenton 1985; Webb and Wistow 1987). As
Murray, a senior civil servant in social services,
commented in 1968:
"It is salutary to recall that in the light of the
massive social legislation after 1945 many voluntary
organisations thought that they would no longer have a
place." (Murray 1968,p6)
To survive, charities it seemed would have to develop a
new approach to justify themselves and their continuing
existence. As the new Chief Charity Commissioner in the
Charity Commission Annual Report for 1960 commented:
"After the post-war social legislation the
traditional objects of charity were largely
overtaken by the statutory services, new and
old, which now provided for the welfare of the
individual from the cradle to the grave; and
the	 basic	 question	 confronting	 the
committee (Nathan) was what remained for
charities to do. The answer, in broad terms,
was that while charity should not withdraw from
a field where it is performing a useful
service, its peculiar function is to pioneer;
its resources should remain at the disposal of
the voluntary movement and in the view of the
government the necessary co-operation with the
statutory services should proceed on the basis
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of partnership not subordination" (Charity
Commission, 1960 p5).
The role for the voluntary sector was to be pioneering
and supplementary, and by 1960 it was defined as a partner
with statutory welfare services. The concept of the
voluntary sector having aspects of a pioneering and
innovative nature is not challenged. Clearly the history
we have reviewed to-date demonstrates this tradition.
Indeed given the minimalist aspect of the state until the
latter part of the 19th century, it would have been
impossible for parts of the voluntary sector not to have
been innovative. Equally other parts of the voluntary
sector were reactionary and against change.
Ascribing the voluntary sector these pioneering
characteristics has, 'become legendary' (Knapp, Robertson
and Thomason, 1990 p206), but how justified is this
portrayal?
Brenton (1985,p185) is far from convinced that the
voluntary sector is naturally innovative. She felt there
was a tendency to both rely on past glories as well as
individual voluntary organisations to 'over inflate'
their claims on innovation. Equally many statutory
organisations she cited use voluntary organisations to
undertake innovation. Knapp and colleagues(1990,p206)
develop this by correlating the theme of flexibility and
innovation. In their review of the literature they find
no evidence of either the statutory or voluntary sectors
exhibiting the respective less bureaucratic more
bureaucratized form. Instead Knapp and colleagues
postulate that the respective relationship of the
two, (citing Brenton above but also a US study by Kramer
of four different countries), may have been
complementary. A public agency not wishing to be locked
into long term delivery using an 'arms length'
relationship to innovate.
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For Knapp, Robertson and Thomason(1990), perhaps
signposting some future research studies, raise the
notion that statutory sector sources of funding may be
counterproductive to the innovations seen in the past.
They speculate that short term funding may incline
voluntary organisations to pursue traditional projects on
the other hand, security could remove the necessity and
impetus to innovate. Publishing at the same time
Krashinsky (1990) shares much of Knapp, Robertson and
Thomason pessimism, however, there are indications from
the Canadian experience that voluntary agencies "have
been quite aggressive in resisting government attempts to
dictate policy" (Krashinsky, 1990 p50).
The voluntary sector has actively maintained a dual
policy of presenting itself as an innovative provider of
services (Bielefeld 1992; Wilson 1992; Bruce 1994). Whilst
also arguing for the natural pattern of its work to
achieve some form of either statutory recognition or
takeover of services (Taylor 1988). The rationale for
many working in the voluntary sector is to see a
legitimate campaigning role to get the state to take over
or provide new services. For example, the Family Planning
Association's clinics, were incorporated, (after active
campaigning by the charity), into the National Health
Service in the 1970s. The following quotation provides a
historical description to date, which illustrates this
campaigning aspect, their innovative role and a
functional explanation of the role for voluntary
organisations:
"Five distinct phases can be seen in the nearly
sixty years of the Family Planning
Association's life. In our first decade, up to
World War 11, we were bravely pioneering the
availability of birth control with a small
staff paid to travel around the country
gathering local groups to start clinics. After
the war, in the 1945-55 decade, we were
building up the organisation to gain
recognition for services by then described as
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family planning. In 1955 the late great, Ian
Macleod, when Minister of Health, gave us that
recognition and started the third phase: there
followed twelve years of entrenchment and
steady growth in numbers of clinics, training,
clinical trials and information work. The
fourth phase began in 1967, the year of Edwin
Brooks MP's NHS (Family Planning) Act (as well
as David Steel's Abortion Act). The Brooks Act
set the scene for a seven year phase of
wildlife growth as hundreds of new FPA clinics
were established through an agency scheme
offered to local authorities by the then head
of the FPA, Casper Brook. In the same years we
were launching the parliamentary campaign for
full integration of family planning into the
NHS, which was victorious in 1973." (Service,
1988 p4)
As late as 1987, the seminars organised by NCVO and RIPA
on the voluntary sector discussion, still focused on:
"Once a voluntary organisation has demonstrated new ways
of providing service, should it not be trying to ensure
that the state takes on this responsibility."(Taylor
1988,p5)
The legitimation of the 'pioneering role' for the
voluntary sector was also incorporated into the
mainstream political thinking of the time. The 1949 House
of Lords Debate on 'Voluntary Action for Social Progress'
defined the Labour Party's attitude as accepting the
voluntary sector (Brenton, 1985 p22). In addition to
this pioneering role another part was awarded to the
voluntary sector. Voluntary organisations were accorded
an historic and continuing function in evolving the
'democratic character' of Britain. Lord Pakenham (now
Longford) who gave the official Labour Government
blessing to the voluntary sector in the 1949 debate
elaborated this 'mystic' nature of the voluntary sector
in the 1960 House of Lords Charity Bill debate
"1 would say now that the welfare state without voluntary
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action loses its chance of realising its vision of
national welfare in freedom." (Pakenham, 1960 col 639)
The role for the voluntary sector after 1945 can also be
understood by the economic position of Britain in the
post war years. After the war, the British economy was
characterised initially by relative austerity and high
taxation. Some food rationing was still in force in the
early 1950's while the standard rate of income tax did
not drop below 40 until the 1959 Budget (Lloyd, 1986
p356). The climate for giving to charity for welfare
services against the ideology of a universal welfare
state funded by high taxation was therefore not
favourable. This, however, can only be a macro economic
observation.
Unfortunately, we do not have the financial information
about the voluntary sector in the 1950's that we have to-
day. The Charity Commission reports only provide a social
and financial policy overview from 1960, when a register
was established. The financial statistics of the
Charities Aid Foundation were started only in 1977.
There is therefore considerable opportunity for further
research. For example, the accounts of some of the older
charities, and those emerging since 1945 are available.
Despite the accounts not being in the proposed modern
SORP format which will facilitate comparison, they should
be able to offer some insight into patterns of individual
giving as well as sources variation. The charity Income
and Expenditure Account will show whether income was
rising, falling or static by source and also expenditure
decisions. The charity Balance Sheet can indicate whether
the charitable reserves were increasing or declining and
how these reserves were constituted. From my own research
of the leading charities in 1991, professional accounts
of these charities were being compiled despite the
absence of a legal compulsory audit:
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"One surprising and reassuring finding was that
100 9s of those who answered the survey had
external auditors (98.6 being chartered firms)
even though only 57 96 of the sample • required
this because they were incorporated charities."
(Palmer, 1992 p6)
3.7 WELFARE STATE PROFESSIONALS AND CHARITY.
Another reason for the voluntary sector being
rationalised as having a secondary role for service
delivery may be due to the increasing professionalism of
welfare workers in the 1960s. Brenton (1985, p22)
suggests that one of the reasons for the 1945 Labour
Government willingness to accommodate voluntary
organisations was their expertise and the relatively low
esteem that welfare work had.
The rediscovery of poverty, meant the universal welfare
state was failing,( Coates and Silburn 1973, Townsend
1979), new policies had to be developed to explain what
could not happen:
"To assert that there remained a widespread
problem of poverty was to challenge an
integrated set of myths and pieties which had
become so widely accepted as to be taken by
many people, as axiomatic. Poverty among
substantial sections of the working class was
supposed to be non-existent." (Coates and
Silburn, 1973 p179)
Labour and then Conservative Governments from the 1960s
to the mid 1970s, adopted a strategy of increased
funding for personal social services, though as Webb and
Wistow(1987) point out from a very low base. Respective
governments also supported a professional model of social
administration. There was the emergence of the
professional training of social workers as developed by
higher education and social administration as a
discipline distinct from sociology (Brown, 1977 p18). The
focus for the 1966 Labour Government and enacted by the
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1970 Conservative Government, was an extended role for
larger and more professional local authorities, with new
Social Service Departments providing a universal system
of personal social services (Webb and Wistow 1987).
The Younghusband (1959)and Seebohm (1968) reports on
social services and in particular the training of social
workers, acknowledged a role for the voluntary sector but
recommended professional training and co-ordinated
statutory social services. The expanded training of
social workers and their employment in large Social
Service Departments followed local government re-
organisation. (Byrne, 1981 p154). These reports,
unintentionally contributed to a statutory service
professional ethos that looked down on 'amateurish'
voluntary organisations.
The concept of the voluntary sector having a pioneering
role was taught as part of the new social administration
degrees and in the textbooks that accompanied them at the
time:
"Many new and fascinating approaches to care
and treatment can be worked out in the
voluntary setting and provide a base for
constructive criticism of statutory provision
and a fund of enthusiasm for change. In this as
in so many fields of social service the
voluntary contribution can be great both in a
pioneering sense and in the steady provision of
research, public education and good
facilities." (Brown, 1977 p200)
An earlier commentator on voluntary organisations had
noted this trend for social administration in the late
1960s:
"Too often they are considered only as an appendix to
other important statutory activities. They tend to be
tacked on to the end of descriptive chapters of books on
social administration." (Murray, 1969 pv)
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What can also not be ignored, in addition to professional
indifference, was downright hostility by some statutory
services to the voluntary sector during these years:
"But there were also examples of indifference
or self complacency when the medical officer of
health had no opinion of the work of voluntary
organisations, or felt that health visitors
could do all that was necessary. The hostility
of a medical officer might prevent a
recommendation to the local authority to grant
aid a voluntary organisation or to make use of
its experience on an agency basis." (Roof f,
1957 p71)
A situation that Murray was to comment on eleven years
later:
"Some authorities are said to be more doctrinaire than
others about refusing to use voluntary organisations even
when consideration of expertise and staffing justify
their use." (Murray, 1969 p13)
This hostility was motivated by a variety of reasons
including political outlook, the view that voluntary
organisations were unprofessional and thirdly that they
were resistant to change, many still following the
policies of their founders (Wrong 1945,pp31-56). In 1945
the NSPCC for example;
" has given little help to the nursery school movement"
(Wrong, 1945 p49).
The ignorance about voluntary organisations is also in
part due to the lack of a modern literature until the
late 1970s, on the charitable sector. The few writers on
voluntary organisations have attempted to counteract this
negative image with a number of strategies. These feature
around a definition and the employment of professional
staff. Bourdillon writing at the beginning of this period
in 1945 begins this tradition. As we explored in the
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first chapter on definitions, this approach has been
undertaken by every writer on voluntary organisations to
date. It would be useful to give the Bourdillon
definition as it has set the style to date:
"A generation ago 'voluntary' was normally used
to denote 'unpaid'. A 'voluntary worker' was
someone who gave unpaid service to a good
cause, and the group which was formed to run
this good cause came to be known as a
'voluntary organisation'. The group took its
name,in fact, from the outstanding
characteristic of the workers upon whom it
depended. In recent years there has been a
significant shift of meaning here. Nowadays
many of the most active voluntary organisations
are staffed entirely by highly trained and
fairly well-paid professional workers. The
distinctively 'voluntary' character of such
bodies is the product not of the kind of
workers they employ, but of their mode of birth
and method of government. A voluntary
organisation properly speaking is an
organisation which, whether its workers are
paid or unpaid, is initiated and governed by
its own members without external control."
(Bourdillon 1945 p3)
A perceived hostility to the voluntary sector by
statutory sector workers over conditions of service has
been made by other writers (Brenton, 1985 p137). From the
perspective of organised labour, particularly trade
unions, voluntary organisations were seen as a
threat(Beach 1994). Such an issue is strong if both in
reality and perception pay and conditions in one sector
are worse than another. The absence until recently of
statistical information about the pay and conditions of
voluntary sector staff may have fuelled such antagonism.
In reality, as we come to know more about the voluntary
sector, we discover that many voluntary organisations
working in the field of personal social services have
followed public sector pay scales and have pension
schemes that are part of the public sector transfer
scheme (Cornwell 1994).
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It is perhaps ironic that as the effects of Community
Care legislation take effect and many former local
authority staff take up appointments in the voluntary
sector, there is a move away from centralised pay
bargaining. The irony of the trade union movement's
hostility to voluntary sector pay in the past, may have
been based on ignorance. In the future with clearer
statistical information on pay and conditions, it may now
be based on truth as a direct consequence of contracts,
which may drive salaries down.
3.8 RE-DISCOVERING CHARITY.
Lord Beveridge accompanied 'Voluntary Action' with a
second volume - 'The Evidence for Voluntary Action'. Its
343 pages (Beveridge and Wells 1949) list numerous
voluntary organisations and the scope and size of their
activities. For beyond the 'voluntary hospitals', there
was no large scale 'nationalisation' or
'municipalisation' of charitable activities. Combined,
however, with the decision to have a social insurance
programme run exclusively by central government services
as opposed to Beveridge's preference for an expansion and
renewal of roles for the Friendly Societies; the most
visible and the largest segment of welfare services to
the majority of the population was run by the state.
There remained, however, a considerable volume of
services with the voluntary agencies. The charitable
children homes of Dr Barnardo, The Church of England
Children Society and others continued. The majority of
children in care were in their homes as opposed to Local
authorities (Brenton, 1985 p24). As Brenton notes on the
report data of the 1959 Younghusband Committee on Social
Workers:
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"What the Younghusband data do suggest, however, is that
there remained in the mid-1950s, a considerable residue
of voluntary agency activity utilised and part financed
by local authorities ..." (Brenton, 1985 p27).
Services for the blind, the deaf were still left with the
charities (Rooff 1957). Even the social administration
textbooks of the 1970s still refer to the substantial
role the voluntary societies had in certain welfare areas
(Brown 1977,p139). As Crossman, the Labour Secretary for
Social Services in the late 1960s, commented:
"One of the things I learned as a Minister was the
staggering extent of voluntary activity in our welfare
state." (Brenton, 1985 p21)
The charitable sector's role in social welfare continued
after 1945, it did not wither away, and was substantial
in some areas as it had a virtual monopoly in others, for
example the blind and the deaf (Rooff 1957).
The 're-discovery' of charity in the 1960s is often
alluded to as referring to alternative organisations that
emerged in the 1960s who actively campaigned for change.
Organisations such as Shelter(1965) and the Child Poverty
Action Group(1966) or grass roots organisations
representing special problems such as Spina Bifida(1966),
emerged in response to the failure of the welfare state.
This emergence concept seems to ignore the history of the
voluntary sector that had agitation for change as one of
its origins. The campaign against the slave trade, the
Ten Hours League on factory legislation and the founding
of the NSPCC in 1884 are all examples.
An argument could be developed that the difference
between these 19th Century charitable organisations and
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the movements of the 1960s was the former were founded,
organised and led by the middle class. In response one
would argue that leaders of Shelter and CPAG such as Des
Wilson and now Labour MP Frank Field or another Labour MP
Peter Hain, the leader of the Anti-apartheid campaign
against the South African tour in the early 1970s, were
not working class.These organisations are organised
political campaigns that can be correlated to 19th
Century campaigning charities for better welfare and
against slavery.
Perhaps more damaging, is the perception that charity in
the 19th Century was a middle class preserve (Eyre 1988).
Professor Cole in 1945 depicts a very different history
of 19th Century voluntary action involving working class
men and women in numerous forms of self help community
activity. In his paper on 'Mutual Aid Movements in their
relation to voluntary social service', Cole(1945b)
provides an example of the 'Womens Co-operative Guild of
1883' which:
"was from the first essentially a body of working class
women managing their own affairs, with no such infusion
of middle-and upper-class leadership in its local
branches as went to the making of the Women's
Institutes." (Cole, 1945b p122)
The origins of many national charities commence from
humble beginnings:
"The Royal National Institute for the Blind was
started by a group of blind men led by Dr
Armitage, who lost his sight and was appalled
by the inadequacies in re-education, industrial
training and employment around him. It began as
an exercise in enlightened self-help."
(Nightingale, 1973 p330-331)
There is an alternative perspective and history to the
voluntary sector, not concerned with the 'great
philanthropists' which needs research. As the 'Voluntary
Action History Society' develops it will hopefully
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provide a stimulus for such research.
3.9 TO THE 'MIXED ECONOMY OF WELFARE'.
The post war years to 1979 was a reverse of the
relationship established in the Tudor Age of the state
acting as the junior partner, supplementing voluntary
action. Instead the local authorities for personal social
services and new local health organisations under the
National Health Service were to have the major
responsibility. The voluntary sector continued in many
areas to be major suppliers of welfare services.
Particularly in the area of personal social services,
which as Webb and Wistow(1987) point out:
"The personal social services were added as the 'Fifth
Social Service' only at the begining of the 1970s. That
they were coherently organised some twenty five years
after the first four state social services..." (Webb and
Wistow, 1987 p5).
The 'classical four' statutory services equally avoided
privatisation on the return of a Conservative government.
Brenton's observation that there were few compensatory
developments for voluntary welfare organisations during
the 1950s, (Brenton, 1985,p24) excludes a number of
areas where the charity and voluntary sector was
developing. The most visual was overseas aid where the
voluntary sector became a major player philosophically if
not economically. The pioneering and educational role of
the charity War on Want, founded in the 1950s shifted
the concept of emergency overseas aid to an understanding
of the needs of developing nations.
The relationship between the state and the voluntary
sector during these years to Wolf enden in 1978 was never
clear, as the observation studies by Hatch and Mocroft
(1983) illustrate. By the time of the Wolfenden Report
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(1978) there was a consensus that the voluntary sector
and statutory services should be working in partnership.
Brenton (1985) argues that this consensus derives in the
mid 1970s not because there was a shift in Labour Party
thinking to welfare pluralism but because of the economic
problems of the British state. The Labour Party needed to
curb public expenditure and a convenient method was to
promote a decentralised society (Brenton 1985, p136).
Beach(1994) has recently challenged the perspective that
the Labour Party in the 1940s was naturally hostile to
the Charity Sector. A view at the heart of Brenton's
proposition based primarily on the Labour Ministers,
Aneurin Bevan and Richard Crossman. Beach argues:
"Much of our understanding of Labour's attitude
to voluntarism during the formative years of
the welfare state is shaped by the image, built
up by Richard Crossman amongst others, of
Labour's hostility to 'the do-good volunteer'.
The volunteer was portrayed as amateurish,
indeed, the opposite of the professionals and
trained administrators who it was envisaged
would staff the socialist welfare state.
Voluntarism essentially meant Philanthropy
which itself was narrowly interpreted as, in
Crossman's words, an 'odious expression of
social oligarchy and churchy bourgeois
attitudes'. We detested voluntary hospitals
maintained by flag days', he says, 'We despised
Boy Scouts and Girl Guides'. These words,
spoken to an audience by a lecturer looking for
an impact, were phrased more for effect than
for posterity, yet this retrospective
interpretation of Crossman's has nevertheless,
assumed a certain credence and authority. Its
black and white rhetoric too often has been
taken at face value and, perhaps, we have been
mislead" (Beach, 1994 p4-5).
On Aneurin Bevan's position on the voluntary hospitals,
the egregious perspective is his opposition to the
voluntary hospitals. Yet Beach argues it was Bevan's
belief in the importance of universalism that precluded
the maintenance of voluntary hospitals and also led Bevan
to question the viability of local government in a
memorandum by Bevan as Minister for Health, records:
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...Under any local government system - even if
modified by joint boards or otherwise - there
will tend to be a better service in the richer
areas, a worse service in the poorer. Yet all
the population will be paying the same national
rates of insurance contribution and will expect
the state to see that an equally good service
is available everywhere." (Beach, 1994 p6)
A re-evaluation of these years indicates that Labour's
attitude was not as transparent as Brenton depicted.
Rather, as we argue from our participant observation of
charity and local government in the 1980s, Labour has a
multi-faceted and evolving policy where no single element
is representative of the whole.
Brenton's analysis of the economy by the 1970s is not
disputed. The basis of the British welfare state from
1948 had been on continuing economic growth and full
employment. By the mid 1970s the British economy was in
a very poor state. Sterling lost 23 9s of its international
value in the twelve months up to October 1976 and
billions of pounds had to be borrowed from the
International Monetary Fund (Lloyd, 1986 p464). The
conditions laid down by the IMF for that loan were for
considerable cuts in public expenditure.
It is, however, in my opinion too simplistic an analysis
to totally rely on political pragmatism for Labour's
claimed change of heart. One of Brenton's quotes for her
argument was the Labour Secretary of State David Ennals'
attitude to the voluntary sector and his famous 'pound
for pound a better buy'. Ennals had suggested to health
and local authorities that they should consider
increasing grants to voluntary organisations rather than
directly providing the same service. A suggestion that
became official Labour Government advice as the following
Department of Health and Social Security circular in 1976
illustrates:
...support for voluntary effort and encouragement of
self help schemes may represent better value for money
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than directly provided services..." (Vinten, 1989 p11).
My problem with Brenton's perspective is based upon my
work with David Ennals and Labour local authorities for
six years. As we discuss in the section on research
methodology the use of 'expert witness' to both support
and question perspectives, particularly when they derive
from secondary sources is a legitimate technique in
social science research.
From 1983 until 1989, I was the Secretary and Finance
Director of a National Charity and David Ennals was the
Vice Chairman. We worked together very closely on a
number of campaigns and so his political commitment to
certain issues both past and present became well known.
Unlike other prominent Labour figures who joined the
Social Democratic Party in the 1980s Ennals did not.
David Ennals was out of parliament from 1970-1974 during
which time he worked in the voluntary sector for the
mental health charity MIND. I believe his support for an
active and productive partnership with the voluntary
sector was genuine. I am not that naive however to accept
that when in power he did not make pragmatic speeches.
Nor was his commitment to a voluntary sector partnership
with the statutory services based upon the replacement of
a universal welfare state by the voluntary sector. He was
still committed for example, to a national health service
run by statutory authorities.
From this 'expert witness' perspective, I in part accept
Brenton's (1985 p140), other observation that the Labour
party conversion to welfare pluralism was not absolute,
particularly at the local level.
As the Finance Director of a national charity, I was
responsible with the Chief Executive for property and
long-term revenue negotiations with local authorities.
The Charity was pump primed, with central government
development finance to open drug rehabilitation centres
outside of London. There were four contrasting Labour
local authorities, which we worked with - South Tyneside,
Liverpool, Sheffield and Lewisham - each offer in their
distinct ways a variety of attitudes to the voluntary
sector:
South Tyneside was a traditional labour authority in the
North East of England. Upon meeting the Chair and Vice
Chair of the Social Services Committee, the introduction
was prefaced with 'Mary closed down the last poor law
workhouse in Jarrow'. The relationship with the local
voluntary sector was quite paternalistic and was led by
the local authority on a funding basis. The rationale for
the local authority involvement was a pragmatic decision
to sell a former old social services building. I was left
in no doubt that a traditional attitude to the charity
sector existed, but this was tempered with an interest in
working as partners and a recognition of the specialist
expertise of the charity.
Liverpool City Council negotiations commenced during the
mid 1980s when Derek Hatton was the deputy Leader of the
Council. The rationale was similar to South Tyneside for
discussions with a national charity on the basis of
attracting some central government funds for specialist
problems. The contrast was in the overt sense of control
by the local authority over the charity. The charity
management structure was to have local management
committees. In the case of South Tyneside this was to
have the chair and vice chair of social services
committee on the local management committee as
participant observers. The Liverpool approach was to
demand that two council representatives would be present
for every one representative of the charity, with
controlling votes. The attitude to the voluntary sector
was an overt political strategy of attracting resources
through the voluntary sector, with direct control by the
local authority over the charity. Needless to say the
charity did not proceed with these negotiations.
Under the title 'Tension between the Voluntary and
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Statutory Sectors in Liverpool' a chapter of Anne Eyre's
doctorial thesis of welfare in Liverpool in the 1980s
reflects the strain in the city from 1985:-
"On an ideological level, the City Council Crisis in
Liverpool represented a serious threat to the ideal of
partnership between the statutory and voluntary sectors."
(Eyre, 1988 p401)
The third local authority was Sheffield. A special
meeting of the council's drug and alcohol forum, however,
gave an indication of what Brenton refers to as the
'antagonism at the local level by Labour councils to the
voluntary sector' (Brenton, 1985,p138). This council forum
discussed the 'municipalisation' of drug and alcohol
services at an appropriate date and the respective
strategies to combat any hostility from local and
national charities. The commitment to a monolithic
welfare programme was still very strong at the local
Labour Party level.
The fourth Labour authority where the charity had a
centre was the London Borough of Lewisham. This Labour
local authority had a profile to the voluntary sector
similar to the one described by Hatch and Mocroft(1983)
in Islington to the early 1980s. There was support from
the council for the voluntary sector with considerable
formal and informal communication. There was emerging a
policy of partnership working with the local voluntary
sector with formal policies.
A study by Taylor and Lansley (1992) also commented on
Sheffield, Liverpool and London local labour authorities
attitude to the voluntary sector which accords with my
personal observation. A feature of their research was the
adherence particularly in the Northern cities to what has
been termed 'Municipal Socialism'. The picture in the
mid 1980s of, at a local level a more ambivalent attitude
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to the voluntary sector, accords with Brenton's
observation. Is this still true today? Taylor and Lansley
(1992) and Deakin (1994a) cite a number of commentators
who believe at the local level a change in Labour's more
traditional attitudes has occurred. Observing that a
combination of electorial defeats and the replacement of
councillors over time has led to less ideological support
for municipal socialism.
It is the adherence to welfare services based on a
statutory mode of delivery which is the principal problem
with Brenton. Brenton (1985) regards the acceptance of
pluralistic services by the Labour Party leadership as
accommodating a crisis in capitalism. She therefore
ignores that there may have been other reasons, just as
legitimate for the Labour Party's acceptance of a
pluralistic welfare system. This is of course because her
book is a critical analysis of the proposals for the
reversal of the welfare state provision of services. Her
own view following her analysis of both the US and the
Netherlands is that the voluntary sector can not replace
statutory services (Brenton, 1985 p206).
Brenton's critical challenge is to accuse left liberal
pluralist's that they have adopted the agenda of the
right and the failure of their thinking has not been to
have explored or considered a reform of existing state
welfare(Brenton, 1985 p213). With this as her salient
message her conception of a role for the voluntary sector
therefore does not advance the literature. Her
endorsement of •ramer(1981) therefore signifies the
indigence of her position, at best she can only entreat
a traditional role for the sector of advocacy.
Brenton raises the issue that a statutory welfare state
need not have been the path of welfare services from 1948
but that is the limit of her critical enquiry. She
rejects any consideration that it may have been the
British welfare state that was the accident of history,
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which we referred to earlier as being stimulated by the
universalism of the second world war. Or consideration of
other perspectives for the evolution of state welfare
services (Fraser, 1976 p222), for example, that the style
of the welfare state of the 1940s was a consensus for a
particular type of delivery of welfare services and that
this consensus of state delivery of welfare services
began to disintegrate from the mid 1970s (Deakin 1994).
A critique of the traditional Marxist explanation of the
rise of a statutory welfare state has been raised by
Orloff and Skocpol(1984). They question the assumption
that social spending on welfare is the necessary response
to the needs of a capitalist economy; why did state
welfare emerge in England but not in Massachusetts?
Massachusetts having a socio-economic profile very
similar to Britain. Orloff and Skocpol(1984) dismiss a
traditional response that liberalism held in the US as
opposed to Britain by pointing out the considerable
lasting influence of laissez-faire. They correlate the
increasing liberal interventionist movement with the
American Progressive movement. Therefore, they pose the
difference between the two must be attributable to other
factors. Their solution to the problem they pose is a
statist perspective. Thus they cite institutional
precedents, in Britain the poor law and respective
administrative capabilities as facilitating the
development of a state welfare system in Britain.
A similar view has been suggested by Beach(1994) who
suggests that the moves towards statutory services were
supported by the civil service and the treasury in
particular. For the US this did not happen, owing to
federalism, lack of a civil bureaucracy and established
political parties making the establishment of a public
welfare programme less feasible.
The strength of this perspective is to critically
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question broad universal theories for the development of
particular social institutions or a style of welfare. It
therefore allows for pragmatic and contingency reasoning.
An excellent example of this form of reasoning applied
to the voluntary sector is demonstrated by Blake
Bromley(1993). In his description of the evolution of
various forms of philanthropy he sets out a potentially
worrying future which he describes as 'Retrenchment
Philanthropy' (Bromley,1993 p13). The characteristic of
the partnership between the state and charity to date has
been, he argues a partnership between citizen and the
state. The future could be one of partnership between
charity and the state where the citizen has been
excluded.
Another example of creative thinking for an explanation
and a future for the voluntary sector has been provided
by Knight(1993). Knight argues that the consensus for a
monolithic welfare state was rejected by a sizeable
sector of the British population and suggests that
instead a 'public services' sector could evolve.
Flynn(1994) argues that there is still considerable
support for public services citing successive public
opinion polls. A 'post-Fordist' attitude to public sector
services, however, has developed with supporters of
public services (Brenton 1985, Flynn 1994) suggesting
that more democratic, customer orientated improved
service be the model. The recent Commission for Social
Justice exemplifying this approach:
"Fairer treatment within the health service
itself, however, can be assisted by giving
patients clear and enforceable rights. A choice
of doctor, information about treatment, access
to second opinions and limits on waiting times
are all important. So also are principles of
consent and confidentiality. The patient's
charter has better defined these rights, but
only to a limited extent, since it is not law.
Generally, people should have a right to the
fair distribution of all health and social
services, with decision-makers under an
explicit duty to treat people equally and
consistently, aided by clear rights of access,
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appeal and complaint" (Social Justice, 1994
p291).
The election in 1979 of a radical Conservative Government
and its subsequent policies of privatisation, was fuelled
by an economic theory that rejected state intervention
and placed market forces as the determinant of survival.
There was an emphasis on the individual taking
responsibility for personal spending ie lower taxation
and thereby limiting the role of the state.
The 1979 Conservative Government saw the voluntary sector
as enhancing this role and therefore increased funding,
in real terms to the voluntary sector. At the end of the
1980s according to the Charities Aid Foundation, central
government funding increased by 90 9.; over the last decade
in real terms, though they noted this was slowing down
(Charities Aid Foundation, 1989 p5).
The Government also curbed the power of the local
authorities and then radically changed the whole
philosophical thrust of welfare delivery that had been
developing since the commencement of the century with the
social insurance and old age pension state scheme of the
1906 Liberal Government. The abolition of SERPS and the
encouragement of private personal pensions.
No longer was the delivery of welfare services to be
provided by the state. Instead the state was to be a
resource provider in 'partnership' with both existing
voluntary agencies, the private sector and new
organisations that were hybrids with characteristics of
all three. To date these organisations incorporating the
universal services, of education and health into
contracted out schools and national health trusts.
The enactment of these social policies can not be
underestimated, as the case of public housing
illustrates. Forest and Murie (1988 p91) for example,
estimate that the sale of council houses was financially
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the most important in the privatisation programme raising
more money than any nationalised industry. Seventy years
of local authority public housing is being replaced by a
mixture of policies that combined sales into the private
sector, wholesale transfers into either existing housing
associations or the creation of new housing trusts and
new 'social' housing to be funded through the Housing
Corporation, a quango. 'Social Housing' financed by a
combination of public money from the corporation and
private money raised on the capital markets by the
Housing Associations themselves.
The revolution of these changes has created what has been
referred to as a 'mixed economy of care' in which the
barriers between the providers are blurred. It has also
meant that there are major issues in both social policy
and micro management to be considered. As Knapp and
colleagues with the following definition demonstrate:
"The voluntary sector sits in an increasingly
complex mixed economy. The variety of producers
grows, the funding sources multiply, and
different regulatory styles proliferate.
Although it is still possible to distinguish
four basic production or supply varieties -
public, voluntary(nonprofit), private(for-
profit) and informal -,the margins between them
are blurred. Some behave in a manner fully
consistent with the maximization of either
profits or managers' salaries, and a growing
number of public agencies are developing direct
labour organisations and all the trappings -
but without the benefits - of a commercial
enterprise." (Knapp, Robertson and Thomason,
1990 p184)
The agenda for the 1990s and into the next century for
voluntary organisations poses both opportunities and
considerable threats. The creation of a mixed economy of
welfare in which the voluntary sector will play a
substantial role is a bipartisan policy of the main
political parties. Both Labour and Conservative have
published guidance of the nature of the partnership
between the state and the voluntary sector. However,
Deakin	 (1991)	 claims 'these discussions lack a
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dimension':
" - the context that defines the nature of the
space the voluntary sector is now being asked
to fill, how it came to exist in the first
place, the ways in which it is likely to change
- and how the pace and direction of change can
be influenced. These processes will define the
environment in which voluntary organisations
will operate and the range of functions they
will be called upon to perform." (Deakin, 1991
p12)
Deakin places this context in the reforms of the Thatcher
Government of 1979-1990, some of which he believes are of
potentially lasting significance. The creation of next
step agencies and the managerial disciplines imposed on
government agencies and local government in particular.
The changes he argues are in essence rationalistic but
there is also the introduction of essentially commercial
methods and values into 'public sector transactions'. The
'customer is king' ethos being exchanged into individual
empowerment as one transacts for welfare services. A
problem however, is that the transformation from public
sector monopolies into private sector ones creates
benefits for senior staff and those facilitating change
but is there a gain for the actual consumer?
Deakin questions whether the respective values of each
system are compatible. The characteristics of
rationalistic public sector management which stress order
stability and control are closed, while market based
features of variety, choice and freedom are open. The
binding force to date has been a 'confident exercise of
authority' but this requires centralised power.
Centralised state authority he notes has been the
characteristic of the Thatcher administration. The
outcome of this centralising tendency has been first to
limit the possibility for innovation that would go
against the centres orthodox and in addition has pushed
to the periphery or removed considerably various checks
and balances. The removal of directly elected
representatives on health authorities for example. The
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managerial revolution with a business ethos has similarly
removed the former ethos of public sector professional
decisions making based on professional judgement. The
biggest loser, Deakin cites are the local authorities who
have all but been excluded from the execution of policy
and at the same time have been subject to intense
monitoring on their activities.
It was therefore going against this trend that the new
Community Care Act did provide a role for local
government (Deakin, 1994b p7). A role that was against
the policy paper on Community Care by the right wing Adam
Smith Institute who saw no role for local government.
Pine and Butler (1989)instead envisioned a service based
upon an expanded private sector with people paying for
such care:
"Government can, by providing very modest
encouragement to the private sector, help it
grow with that rising demand. It can, by means
of incentives to personal saving and personal
provision, make it easier for most people to
provide for their own care needs in
retirement." (Pine and Butler, 1989 p32)
There was also allusion, though not expanded upon, of a
role for the voluntary sector. The concept of those able
to pay for welfare has not just been proposed by right
wing 'think tanks'. As Hugh Mellor comments:
"I was young in the 1940s. I was inspired by
Beveridge's call to tackle the 'giants' of
disease, ignorance, squalor, idleness and want.
I believed then, as I still do, that government
has to play a major part in tackling them. The
essence of the welfare state approach as I see
it is that certain needs will be met,
irrespective of ability to pay, and that a duty
is laid upon the state to guarantee this. With
'the overriding principle' that services should
be universal, I concur, for without it we shall
be in danger of lapsing again into the 'two
nations' situation of pre-1939, with relatively
good facilities for the well-to-do, and second
best for those who do not have the means to pay
for them. Many of us felt that we had seen the
demise of that situation in the years following
the war and do not want to see it return.... On
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the other hand the economics of today may make
it sensible for there to be a limited degree of
'selectivity', whereby people pay something for
certain services if they can afford it, and do
not receive certain public services if they
could afford to buy them elsewhere." (Mellor,
1985 p2-3)
The resourcing role for local government as opposed to
the previous provider role has lead to what has been
termed the contract culture (Deakin 1993). In this market
of care the intention is to provide a degree of choice
for the consumer while the economics of market forces
should enable the best value for money. Those wealthy
enough either through insurance or enriched by home
ownership are 'means tested' out. The contract for care
issued by the local authority can be to either a non-
profit or profit making organisation.
The implementation of a 'contract culture' has caused
considerable debate in the voluntary sector with some
questioning whether the voluntary sector will lose its
specific identity. (Burt 1992; Deakin 1993,1994b; Leat
1993; Gutch 1993; Harris 1993) In addition, at the
prescriptive level there has developed a series of best
practice books (Adirondack and Macfarlane 1990) and from
the NCVO, specific publications as well as a series of
headlines that questioned the whole process:
"Community Care in Crisis" (NCVO News March 1992);
"Raising funds, lowering values" (NCVO News, July 1992);
"The Price of Independence" (NCVO News, July/August
1993);
"Signing your life away" (NCVO Contracting In or Out,
Summer 1991);
Management Crisis threatens (NCVO Contracting In or Out,
Summer 1992).
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The often attributed characteristics of the voluntary
sector of flexibility, innovation, advocacy it is
suggested will be placed at risk as voluntary
organisations will have to adopt a business oriented
approach to win contracts. A more conservative approach
will follow as they will be reluctant to upset funders.
Constraints on funding and the dictation of the funds by
statutory authorities will mean services will become less
innovatory. The changes in charity law to a regulatory
regime encouraging efficiency (chapter 3, section 3.6) in
the charity sector combined with the government 'putting
its own shop in order' with an Efficiency Scrutiny of the
ways government departments work with the voluntary
sector (Home Office 1990) are cited as examples of
promoting the 'business ethos' of the voluntary sector.
A Crisis in Charity Finance (Demos 1994 ) is also cited as
the expected increase in giving by the public and
business following tax incentives of the 1980s have not
materialised and government funding has been cutback. It
is suggested that as competition between voluntary and
private sector organisations occurs, then calls by the
private sector similar to that in the US of unfair
competition will increase (Steinberg 1994)and the tax
concessions of voluntary organisations should be
abandoned.
All these concerns led to the talk of crisis in the
sector, will it be able to cope with the new demands of
the post Thatcher era (Billis and Harris 1992). Or are we
being too pessimistic?
As we discover more about the real size and competition
of the voluntary sector, we know that over 90':1 of
charitable organisations have incomes of less than
£10,000 and employ no staff. The debates cited above
perhaps have no reality for the composition of the
majority in numbers but not income of the charity sector.
Voluntary and charitable organisations such as local
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Womens Institutes or self help mothers and toddlers
groups are relatively unaffected. Indeed, it may well be
that such groups may acquire resources for the grant
system favoured a relative few voluntary organisations
who actively networked with statutory authorities. It may
well be that all our views on the voluntary sector are
focused on a relatively small number of active fund
raising service delivery charities who are affected by
these changes. A recent report from Loughborough
University has indicated that a few fund-raising
charities receive most media exposure. (Fenton, Golding
and Radley 1993)
Manley (1994), criticising the convergence thesis
perspective in particular offers six rationales as to why
arguments for the voluntary sector's demise may be
illusory.
i) The non-profit sector is an enormous pyramid and there
is a tendency to focus attention on those organisations
at the apex;
ii) New charities are created(currently 4,000 a year)
because the founders perceive a gap in community action
or existing services are not meeting need. Such
organisations are unlikely to be influenced by commercial
or contractual influences;
iii) While there is plenty of interchange of ideas and
people between sectors such communication and transfers
have been primarily into the voluntary sector, thus
Manley asserts:
" I do not believe that there is anything like a similar
flow of people or ideas from the non-profit sector into
the for-profit sector. Transculture stimulation is
therefore largely one way." (Manley, 1994 p10); (A
perspective also shared by Wilson 1992)
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iv) The contract culture debate about polarisation and
loss of independence is over-exaggerated. Against the
whole range of non-profit activity it is only where the
statutory sector and NPOs overlap is there likely to be
scope for contracts;
v) Many charities are jealous of their individuality and
integrity and will not contemplate becoming involved in
a competitive tendering situation, particularly if it
would erode their voluntary base.
vi) Non-executive management brings a unique dynamic by
its interface between trustees and executive management
and staff. The power of founder/trustees to exert
influence over direction should not be underestimated.
Manley writing from the practitioner perspective after
twenty five years of financially managing Barnardo's
offers an alternative perspective to more younger leaders
of the sector, notably Etherington (1994b) and academic
commentators. It is perhaps to academics that his
criticism is most directed, urging them to understand the
'inner dynamics' of the voluntary sector rather than
impose a policy interpretation. It could be equally
claimed that Manley is offering a personal perspective
which has been focused by large traditional charities
which have not yet come to terms with change.
The advocacy and innovation role attributed to the
voluntary sector could be stimulated in the new funding
environment not weakened. The charity 'War on Want', for
example, survived on the basis that its profile and
supporters on its covenant data base was so individually
identified to its political perspective that many of its
supporters continued to give through its problems. The
French overseas aid organisation 'Medcins Sans
Frontieres' may be a model for overseas aid charities to
follow rather than as the Charity 'Save the Children
Fund' have recently achieved by the treatment of the
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lesbian comedian Sandy Toksvig. By dropping her from an
event for fear that it would damage the organisation's
fund raising and image, the charity has damaged itself
much more(Eisenstadt, 1994 p9).
The often announced pressure on the existing charitable
trusts bemoaning their fate as they are called on to take
on a greater role can perhaps be turned round to asking
why is our society not creating new charitable trusts
from the many new millionaires? If charitable trusts were
to be actively promoted and in the driving seat of
development, of taking the lead rather than following
developments then new ones might be created? As David
Carrington, the Director of the Barring Foundation,
noted:
"Carnegie had put libraries on the Map. 'New
maths' was developed by Nuffield. Right or
wrong, that sort of philanthropic vision did
not depend on the voluntary sector. It involved
intervening in the mainstream. Isn't that our
role, to create and fund the grand vision?"
(Carrington 1994)
Weisbrod (1988) has written of the impact Titmuss's(1970)
book on blood donorship had on US academics, particularly
economists in making them rethink fundamental values on
universal applications of for profit activity. He has
further developed his economic theory of the voluntary
sector to incorporate that for certain services the
public trust voluntary organisations over for-profit
organisations Throughout Taylor and Langan (1994) have
recently challenged this perspective. Their ability to
quote as yet primary research in this field is more
worrying for the voluntary sector and an agenda to take
action. For as the Junior Minister of Health has
recently stated on the voluntary sector:
win contracts and gain support where
its distinctive approach means it has something
extra, something special to offer. It should
not expect to be given preference where there
are others particularly in the private sector,
196
who can do the job just as effectively."
(Bowis, 1994)
The challenge for voluntary organisations is perhaps
rather than trying to copy business, the voluntary
sector should be developing its own strengths and
developing a public trust in the voluntary sector. For
example, as Wilson (1992) suggests building on the co-
operative aspects of the voluntary sector and developing
joint ventures rather than competitive strategies. To
deliver services that are responsive to individual need
with organisations that are accountable to the people
they serve and who fund them. To see services as not
being just for the poor and deprived but charity as a
vital and cohesive part of society providing a universal
range of services to the entire community.
As we discover more about current voluntary organisations
and find our assumptions about charity in the past are
being challenged, it may well transpire that the 'crisis'
problems of the mid 1990s are but a blip in a continuous
history of change. At one extreme determined by relation
with the state but also a constant existence determined
by charities themselves at the other. We have reviewed a
number of crisis for charity, how different is this one?
For example, in the 1950s the 'crisis' was should charity
exist? Charity clearly has and it is perhaps instructive
to consider the Nuffield Report of 1951 on why it would,
for providing a context for debates in the last part of
this century:
"Those who ' look forward to the complete
abolition of private charity do so usually on
the grounds that public actio must increasingly
supplant private actions. But this view implies
an unrealistic conception of the community as
something static, with a finite field of
beneficial action within which the state takes
over in turn all the activities which were once
private and individual. Such arrangements are
no more realistic than those of the 17th
Century French economist Colbert who held that
there is a finite amount of world trade, the
capture of part of which by one country
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automatically deprives others of their share.
Communities, like trade, change and expand with
the revelation and satisfaction of new needs.
To this vital process charities have in the
past contributed greatly; and in the future
they can continue to play a necessary part if
modern charity is not hampered by archaic
limitations upon private charitable objects or
by a passion for fruitless administrative
tidiness"( Nathan, 1952 p166).
3.10 Conclusion.
We have reviewed the main developments of the voluntary
sector since the 16th Century to 1994. The role of
Charity has been determined in large part by the state.
However, we must be careful in being too deterministic
for the rationale and motivations for philanthropy as the
reasons people give are complex. We have challenged a
number of commonly held assumptions about the voluntary
sector in particular that charity is naturally a
conservative philosophy, the 'scientific' consensus of a
statutory based welfare state.
The economic problems of the British state since the mid
1970s and the election of a radical conservative
government has formulated a 'crises in welfare' that has
focused on a revised role for charity. We have questioned
that broad generalisations of charity's role must be
tempered with the size and composition of the charity
sector. While the economic size and profile of the fund
raising charities is large, their numbers and activity
measured against the overall charity/voluntary sector is
relatively small. .
I do not contest that there are serious problems for the
major charities and their future role. Indeed the core of
this thesis is that the increased regulation with its
focus on the trustees of larger charities poses a real
threat to the continuation of the voluntary tradition.
I therefore, totally endorse the view of Blake Bromley
(1994) that perhaps we have reached a four hundred year
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cycle. The statute of Elizabeth in 1601 defined a new
role for charity now has the time come again? However,
such a definition must be all encompassing as we
concluded in chapter 1. The debate to date has tended to
be microscopic on those problems. There has been an
absence of discussion on the wider philosophical issues.
It is seeking a solution to these extensive questions
that the new Director of the NCVO believes the newly
established Commission on the Voluntary Sector must work
to. Stuart Etherington uses bold and adventurous words:
"I am not going to talk about redefining
charity in the sterile, semantic, charity and
taxed based way which seems to have dominated
the debate in recent times. What I am going to
talk about are the issues which will have
profound implications for our society and our
sector into the next millennium." (Etherington,
1994a p8)
The challenge for the NCVO's Commission is that it does
not become a 'Wolfenden' which equally with bold words
declared its mission:
n ...to review the role and functions of voluntary
organisations in the UK over the next twenty-five years."
(Wolfenden, 1978 p9)
An agenda that shortly after was dramatically changed
with the election of a radical conservative government.
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CHAPTER FOUR - THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHARITY REGULATION, CURRENT
PRACTICE AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS.
In this chapter we initially provide an historical account of
charity regulation. The historical perspective reinforces the
relationship of charity to state that we discussed in chapter 2.
We argue that the various regulations on the charitable sector
correlates with the importance of charity as an instrument of
social policy. Our historical perspective starts with Tudor times
in the first section to the establishment of the permanent
Charity Commission. We critically examine the Commission from
1853 to 1987 and the respective themes which led to criticisms
at the 1987 Public Accounts Committee hearing. How much was the
Commission itself to blame? We appraise the development of
regulation to the 1992 Act, including the application of
'regulation' theories to the charity sector. We review the 1992/3
Charities Acts, the recommendations of the 8th De-Regulation Task
Force and the current system of monitoring. We then undertake a
review of the development of accounting standards;, the
development of the Charity SORP; a review of current accounting
theories and their applicability to the charitable sector.
Finally, we compare these developments in England with the rest
of the European Union.
4.1 FROM TUDOR TO THE BROUGHAM COMMISSIONERS.
We established in chapter 2 the relationship of charity to the
state. The encouragement of charity was a cornerstone of Tudor
social policy, following the dissolution of the monasteries, to
meet the problems of the age. Jordan (1958, p122-116) asserts
that the whole thrust of the Tudors' policy was to mould
charities to secular ends and to assist donors in creating
charitable institutions. Prior to the Tudors, most charitable
trusts were established for religious purposes and therefore came
under the jurisdiction of the 'Ecclesiastical Courts'. The 1601
statute resolved the twin problems of encouraging giving and the
protection against abuse; its lasting importance, unintended, was
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to define charity to the 20th Century:
"The statute of 1601, as we shall date the law,
secured the enforcement of charitable uses by
instructing the Chancellor to appoint commissions to
inquire into abuse, to take evidence, to impanel
juries, and to hand down decisions subject only to his
review. There remained as well the possibility for a
complainant to take a direct appeal to Chancery
against the abuses, though this method gradually
became disused. Though ostensibly concerned with no
more than the correction of existing abuses in
charitable trusts and the encouragement of future
donors to raise up such charitable institutions, the
statute became in fact a great landmark in the
development of the law of charitable trusts." (Jordan,
1958 p113)
Charity regulation was introduced to ensure that the purpose or
purposes for which a trust was established were adhered to and
that a body of commissioners or the court of chancery had
authority to investigate and make judgements. The importance of
charity to the Tudors and the protection the state afforded to
it cannot be underestimated:
"We have frequently noted that the poor laws were
given full effect only very gradually and unevenly
during the course of our period. In contrast,
charitable trusts were lent formidable and most
effective protection during the whole of the Tudor
period and were subjected to periodic and competent
review after the statute of 1601 had carefully
delineated an impressively orderly scheme of
commissions of inquiry." (Jordan, 1958 p116)
It can be no accident of fate that the next major regulative
legislation for charity occurs in the 19th Century with the
reform of charitable organisations to meet the problems of the
industrial age (Butler, 1960). The 1960 Charities Act takes eight
years to come to legislation after the Nathan Report (1952),
perhaps reflecting the importance of charity to the age. It is
not a regulatory Act as we explore later, rather its primary
purpose is to supplement aspects of the statutory welfare state.
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The 1992/93 Charities Acts have more importance, for charity as
we reviewed in chapter two is to have a more prominent role. The
public and private corporations are encouraged to give, public
confidence in charities is therefore a paramount issue. There is
a clear correlation between the importance of charity to the
state and the emphasis of regulation.
As Jordan cites the form of regulation enacted by the Tudors was
effective in preventing abuse, its clear purpose is to view
effective charity regulation as being part of a strategy for the
encouragement of giving:
"...inquisitions into 'frauds, breaches of trust, and
negligence' could be instituted in a great variety of
ways. Most commonly, responsible inhabitants of a
parish simply complained of malfeasance to the bishop
of the diocese, to a commission already in being, to
the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper, or and not
infrequently, to the Privy Council. In other cases the
institution of complaints has been noted from such
persons as the clergyman, the vestry, the overseers,
the municipal authorities, or a local justice of the
peace. There are a number of instances, too, when
descendants of the donor filed a complaint, and not a
few in which a single and evidently humble petitioner
set in motion the effective machinery of
investigation. Finally, if a whole community was so
negligent and dull as to fail to protect its self-
interest, these commissions of inquiry could and did
ferret out malfeasance and more often simply rural
incompetence by regional inquiries designed to review
the current status of all known charitable funds. The
consequence was that charitable funds were on the
whole administered with quite astonishing probity and
skill and that a tradition of the highest fidelity in
the discharge of duty was quickly established. This
fact in itself lent powerful encouragement to
substantial men considering benefaction and accounts
in no small part for the huge sums vested in
charitable trusts during the last two generations of
our period." (Jordan, 1958 p116-117)
Some characteristics of Tudor regulation are still part of
charity regulation today. Most notably reliance on members of the
community to report any abuse in charity. Though how effective
this has been as a system is unknown both historically and to
date. In my interview with the current Chief Charity
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Commissioner, he commented that the Commission had not felt that
people were reluctant to bring suspected abuse to the
Commission's attention. The Commission had . improved its
accessibility for complainants with designated phone lines to
staff. Concern over 'whistleblowing' by charity employees,
mirroring concerns in the wider economy has prompted ACENVO to
support new research in this field (Dalton 1993), though the
Charity Commission at the present moment has no plans for a
whistle blowing line(Fries, 1994).
Secondly, the promotion of high standards of probity by trustees
which we discuss in chapter 4. A third theme from Tudor times was
the protection immortalised of the 'testor's' wishes. When
someone left or gave money to charity they could be assured that
it would be spent on the purposes intended. The important aspect
of charity regulation has been ensuring that a breach of trust
has not occurred. Where the purpose of the gift cannot be applied
to its original intention then a 'Cy-pres' scheme may be sought.
'Cy-pres' is Norman French for 'as near as possible' and, until
the creation of the permanent Charity Commission, required the
authority of the Chancery Court for a scheme to be made.
The creation of charity commissions is not new. Henry V had
passed a statute to protect charities by creating a charitable
commission which could be established by the ecclesiastical
authorities to 'secure such corrections and reparations as might
be needed' (Jordan, 1958 p114). The fact that by the time of
Elizabeth I many medieval charitable institutions had decayed was
to be a manifestation of the future. The use of commissions was
quite common, the Brougham reports 1818-1837 (held in the current
Charity Commission offices) estimated that from 1643 to 1746 some
nine hundred and sixty-one special commissions were held.
However, after this date their use became infrequent with only
nine commissions formed between this date and the first Brougham
Commission in 1818.
Why the special commissions fell into disuse and there was a
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failure to introduce replacement investigation machinery is not
clear. Owen (1965) suggests that the contributing reason may have
been the outcome of any commission inquiry. Inevitably this was
referral to the 'Court of Chancery' which was both time consuming
and very expensive. The last special commission, Owen (1965 p85)
notes was in 1787 but the Lord Chancellor did not make a decision
until 1817. The expense of chancery was so great that the entire
endowment of the trust being protected could be lost in legal
costs. The only alternative to the Court of Chancery was in
common law to the Attorney General who could act if a charity had
been abused. The only problem with this measure was that the
legal costs of the court case would be borne by the complainant,
a considerable disincentive.
While court costs and delays must have been a major factor in
dissuading the formation of commissions there must be other
reasons. Clearly this is an area requiring further historical
research. One method of inquiry would be to review the perception
of charity against the economic, social and political conditions
of the time. The latter half of the 18th Century saw the advent
of the industrial revolution. Between 1750 and 1840 the
population of England and Wales multiplied by rather more than
two. (Hobsbawm and Rude 1973). Domestic production of grain
covered 98%- of British consumption. While there was undoubtedly
hardship as Thompson (1974) has recorded, the majority of the
population was fully employed. In particular, in the agricultural
communities where the vast majority of charities were sited.
Britain was also perpetually involved in a series of wars, though
they were now all overseas.
Charity may have been seen as requiring no reform because the
purposes it was there to serve were considered as being met. The
Brougham Commissioners' later findings that charity resources
were being used to subsidise the poor rates would suggest that
there was little encouragement in the country to press for
reform. It was only after the end of the Napoleonic wars, that
perhaps economic crisis, the fear of the new industrial working
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class and the agricultural rising of 1830 combined with the
domination of political economy philosophy, prompted the state
to reconsider the role of charity. This was certainly the view
of Butler (1960), when as Home Secretary, he introduced the 1960
Charities Act by reflecting on 19th century reform:
"Between 1801 and 1831 alone, the population rose from
11 million to 16.5 million and by 1851 half the
population was urban. So it was against this
background that the previous big legislative step was
taken...it is to meet a new social situation that the
law of charity has to be revised in our day...At that
time charity law could not keep pace with the
revolutionary changes taking place in the country."
(Butler, 1960 p408)
The interest by the state in charity regulation was renewed in
the 1780s. The intellectual stimulus for reform was provided by
the early political economists, Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus and
David Ricardo (Roll 1973). The influence of these early
economists with a philosophy of laissez-faire, and a minimum but
efficient public expenditure led to revisions in the poor law.
One of the requirements placed on overseers for the first time
was to maintain statistics on poor law expenditure between 1783-
85.
The Gilbert Act is an example of the relationship of state to
charity. Thomas Gilbert introduced a charity Act that was
designed to complement the new poor law legislation. His Act
required ministers and church wardens to furnish data on
charities for the benefit of the poor. Of the thirteen thousand
returns expected, only fourteen were said not to have made a
return (Owen, 1965 p86).. The findings, however, showed that
information about charity was hopelessly imprecise or incomplete.
For the political economists this was a scandalous state of
affairs, as it meant the country was not receiving the best value
for money from charity and therefore the poor were having instead
to rely on the state. The incompleteness of the returns, believes
Owen (1965), was the ammunition required by the reformers to
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demand change and he comments:
"One can think, fairly enough of the Gilbert Returns as the first
step toward a more rational and responsible attitude on the part
of the state." (Owen, 1965 p87)
Charity reform was now on the agenda, linked of course to the
desire by Malthus and his supporters for charity to take on an
ever greater responsibility for the poor thus allowing a
reduction in the state's responsibility. The problem was to
encourage private charity and thereby confidence in the
administration of charity. Two Acts were passed in 1812 to
improve regulation. The first, the Charitable Donations
Registration Act, required the central listing of all endowments.
This Act, Owen remarks, was 'honoured more in the breach than in
the observance' (p182-183).
The second was the Charities Procedures Act, which was the work
of Sir Samuel Romilly. In chapter one we mentioned Romilly as
providing a legal classification for charity in 1804 which was
the precedent for Lord McNaughten's four heads of charity.
Romilly's act was designed to expedite and reduce the cost of
chancery proceedings and provide a summary remedy. The Act,
however, failed to avoid the recourse to the chancery court as
an Attorney General later remarked:
"Summary must be interpreted according to the glossary of the
court of chancery." (Owen, 1965 p183)
More dramatic reform was required if charitable abuse was to be
curbed and the champion for that cause was found in Henry
Brougham.
4.2 THE BROUGHAM COMMISSIONERS
The reform in Charity Law movement was fuelled by what Owen (1965
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p183) terms 'Scottish-Whig-Utilitarian'. This perspective
embraced the economic theories of Adam Smith and the political
philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and its leading principal
utilitarianism (Gregg, 1973 p276-278). Brougham was initially
driven to reform by the need for an education system that
supported the growing industrial power of Britain. Brougham saw
the jumble of educational trusts and their inefficiency as being
a barrier to providing that workforce. In 1816 with himself as
Chairman, Parliament approved a select committee to investigate
the education of the poor in the metropolis. Owen (1965 p184)
describes in detail the transfer from this modest committee to
the establishment of a commission which was to meet from 1818 to
1837 and produce a report covering forty volumes.
The commission was approved and in 1819 its terms of reference
were expanded outside of education. The commission resources were
also increased to twenty persons of whom ten were paid. A
commission was constituted by two commissioners. The style of the
commission was reflected by a contemporary author Thomas Love
Peacock (1828) in his book, 'Crotchet Castle'. Peacock satirised
the Brougham commissioners through his mouthpiece Dr Folliott
(the full encounter in the book is attached as Appendix 4). The
Commissioners would arrive in a parish and interview the local
minister and other worthies. Peacock's book gives an indication
of the lack of powers the commissioners had, for after finding
the good doctor guilty of having a pound lumped into his salary
which was intended for charitable causes all they could do was
to 'admonish' him.
At least the commissioners met with a reply, for as Owen notes:
"The Commissioners were constantly learning of lost
records or of records alleged by their custodians to
have been lost, and occasionally were met by a flat
refusal to produce documents, as when the Dean and
Chapter of Lincoln barred a commissioner from
materials relating to the scandalous conditions of the
Meer Hospital." (Owen, 1965 p189)
A photocopy (from the Brougham records) of the Meer Inquiry is
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attached as Appendix 5. On the records page 396, the Report says
of the warden:
"but of late years the true source of his income has
been the fines on renewals of leases. Some of these
are specified in the sequel. In the meantime, however,
it may be stated that they are extremely
profitable;and from the date of the above arrangement
to the present day have gone exclusively into the
pocket of the warden."
On the records page 398, the total sum was estimated between the
years 1819 to 1834 to be £13, 428 4s lp. The conclusion of the
Commissioner, John MacQueen, was:
"Notwithstanding the obstacles thrown in the way of
this Inquiry by the Cathedral dignitaries, sufficient
materials have been collected to render it
indispensable that the case of the Meer Hospital,
under all its circumstances, should be certified to
the Attorney-General, and the same having been
submitted to a General Board of the Charity
Commissioners, has been so certified accordingly."
(record page 399 in Appendix 5)
If the abuse was so great then it could be, as in the Meer case
referred to the Attorney General, and indeed some four hundred
charities were. Given the lack of powers, Owen concludes on the
Brougham Commissioners:
"This was essentially a fact finding enterprise, an inventory of
the nation's charitable endowments rather than a procedure for
correcting their abuses." (Owen, 1965 p190)
However, it is not an entirely dismal picture on the ability of
the Commission. Their inquiries did have some positive effect by
the presence and publicity which probably abated many abuses.
The value of the Brougham Commissioners today is the volumes
which list the resources and activity of charity between 1818 -
1837. As an historical archive it provides not only a
contemporary picture of charity but also a valuable chronology
on the development and activity of a charity. In modern charity
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research, issues such as why and how charities develop, problems
of management and success, merger and failure are still at a
primary stage (Cornforth, 1994). The Brougham records as
illustrated by the Meer extract (Appendix 5) provide meticulous
descriptions of origin and problems. The records would provide
a useful sample for comparative management oriented research. For
financial charity research they provide a wealth of statistics
on the assets and income of charity. They also demonstrate a
profile of small to large charities which is not too dissimilar
to the income profile in the 1990s which we described in chapter
one. Of the final total of 28,880 charities, 3,331 had an income
of less than ES per year while 1,749 had an income of more than
£100. The animal image of charity having a very large head and
a very very thin, but extremely long body, has been consistent.
The work of the Brougham commissioners was very thorough. By
1834, Owen (1965) notes some 26,751 charities had been dealt
with. Outstanding was half of Wales and six English counties.
To expedite the work, Parliament voted further resources and set
up a select committee. The final reports were published between
1837-1840 and the Commission had cost £250,000. Compounded using
the Retail Prices Index since 1915 and Burnet's 'History of the
Cost of Living' this was estimated by Stephen Williams (Senior
Lecturer in Accounting at South Bank University leading the CSO
study) to be in today's value £8.2 million. In context, until
1988 this sum was greater than the yearly running costs of the
entire Charity Commission.
On one level, the conclusions of the commissioners were
gratifying for charity as they found relatively few examples of
outright abuse. Their primary observation was the encumbrance of
the legal regulation of charity which made any reasonable
management of the country's charity resources virtually
impossible. An example of this as we mentioned earlier was the
use of 'dole' charities. The inconsistency of their application
meant they were used in some cases to reduce the poor law costs
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in a parish.
Action to remedy abuses and to co-ordinate charity to ensure its
resources met the needs of society was required. Recommendation
was made by the select committee for the establishment of a
permanent charity commission which would:
"Superintend the scale and exchange of charity
property, scrutinise charity accounts, appoint and
remove trustees in certain circumstances...suggest
schemes for the government of charities and the
correction of abuses in their constitution and
administration." (Owen, 1965 p191)
Given the scale of the Brougham Commission's findings and the
consensus for reform, Owen (p197) remarks it is intriguing as to
why it took another fifteen years for a Bill to reach the statute
book. He suggests that it was simply inertia and more pressing
business taking precedence, with occasional maliciousness by
special or local interests on particular Bills, that delayed its
implementation. The Nathan Committee (1952) pre-dating Owen's
published book by thirteen years was more forthright:
"The delays in the passing of this legislation were
due partly to the accidents of the Parliamentary time-
table, partly to changes in government, but more than
anything else to resistance to the setting up of an
independent board to look into the doings of
trustees." (Nathan, 1952 p21)
The final spur was a Royal Commission in 1850 investigating a
case of malpractice which led to the Charitable Trusts Act of
1853.
4.3 THE CHARITY COMMISSION TO 1987.
The Charity Commission founded in 1853 was to have three paid
commissioners, two of whom were to be Barristers of twelve years
standing. Their investigative powers allowed for examination of
trustees under oath and a requirement for documents to be
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produced on request. The act pre-dating the Charities Act 1992
by one hundred and twenty two years also required trustees to
send annual accounts. The Act was deficient' in the main
recommendation of the select committee which was to avoid the
need to have to use the legal process for the appointment of
trustees and in particular the use of 'cy-pres'. Where a 'cy-
pres' scheme was insufficient and a more general re-organisation
was necessary the approval of parliament was required.
From Owen's (1965) detailed description of the early years of the
Charity Commission, a number of themes emerge which illustrate
tensions and problems that have been a part of the Commission
throughout its history. These are:
4.3.1. The legal culture.
4.3.2. Insufficient power.
4.3.3. The accounts failure.
4.3.4. Insufficient resources.
4.3.5. A reactive approach.
To these I have added:
4.3.6 The Commission's Accountability.
4.3.7 The Commissioners.
We look at each of these in turn, and compare comments made in
the respective 1987 reports on the Charity Commission with those
of Owen and his early history of the Charity Commission to 1900
and in the 1950s with the comments of the Nathan Committee.
4.3.1. The Legal Culture.
The most often heard criticism of the Charity Commission is that
it is a department of lawyers. Both the 1975 (Expenditure
Committee) and 1987 (Committee of Public Accounts) Parliamentary
Accounts Committee encounters with the Chief Charity Commissioner
cited this image. Owen comments on the first Chief Charity
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Commissioner, Peter Erie:
"In the two decades Erie served as Chief Commissioner he was the
guiding hand of the board, and he was at least partly responsible
for its heavily judicial and legal...approach to charity
problems." (Owen, 1965 p203)
"They regard themselves as an independent quasi-judicial body."
(Nathan, 1952 p40)
My respective interviews with Denis Peach, the Chief Charity
Commissioner 1982-87 and Peter Mimpriss, partner of solicitors
Allen and Overy and Chairman of the Charity Law Association,
confirmed that there was a dominant legal culture in the
commission. An example Mr Peach cited was the regulation of new
charities, with him having to encourage the lawyers to use the
fourth head more liberally.
The commissioners do meet as a court, a power that they have
fought over the years to acquire and strengthen. The power of
'cy-pres' enables them to deal with many charity schemes promptly
in comparison to the courts. Mr Mimpriss valued highly the
commissioners' powers in this regard. He estimated the savings
in costs to the government and to charities to run into many
millions of pounds. It was also the first point for Woodfield
(1987 p10), who saw this as the reason why the Commission was
established and why it should continue. Both as a justification
for its existence and its prestige the 'court' authority of the
Commission is important. Has that authority, however, detracted
from the Commission taking a more active stance?
The evidence (Nathan 1952; Owen 1965; Nightingale 1973; Goodman
1976; Expenditure Committee 1975; Gerard 1983; Public Accounts
Committee 1987) suggests that the commissioners' legal authority
has made the Commission oriented towards legal affairs rather
than a policy direction. The Chief Commissioner, in his evidence
to the 1987 Public Accounts Committee, remarked:
223
"We are not a political department, we are an extension of the
High Court rather than of the executive." (Public Accounts
Committee, 1987 p2)
He also pointed out that the scope for redeployment of staff
within the Commission was limited because of these legal
responsibilities. The government had given powers to the
Commission to undertake statutory tasks which the Commission in
the first instance had to deliver.
There is an underlying theme in the Woodfield Report (1987) that
the commissioners had overstated their legal responsibilities.
On land transactions, for example (p36-37), the deployment of
staff and the reluctance of the Commission to use existing powers
to reduce the need for consent. On their sitting as a court:
"The Commissioners need occasionally to sit as a board when
acting as an extension of the High Court, but separate
arrangements can, without breaching the spirit of the statute,
be made for management questions." (Woodfield, 1987 p15)
Woodfield (1987 p10) was decisive in recommending that the quasi-
judicial functions of the Commission be not taken away from it.
The 1982-87 Chief Commissioner felt that the problem was the lack
of resources:
H ... either one legislates and reduces some of our
functions to enable staff to be redeployed-and the
Scrutiny team have entirely endorsed the need for us
to give advice as the only authoritative body outside
the High Court which can do so-or one simply has to
make more staff available to do the tasks which have
been imposed on the Commission." (Public Accounts
Committee, 1987,p5)
This is also the view of the current Chief Commissioner, Richard
Fries (1994), who has seen a dramatic increase in the
Commission's resources including a doubling of staff since 1987
(Home Office, 1993).
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4.3.2.Insufficient Power.
The Woodfield Report (1987, p26) drew specific attention to the
inadequate and doubtful powers of the Commission. Owen comments
on the Commission in the 1850s:
"It was only gradually that the commissioners came to sense the
weakness of their position, especially their lack of power
necessary to carry out significant reforms" (Owen, 1965 p204)
n 
...position has remained unchanged since 1860...in two respects
it has regressed." (Nathan, 1952 p26)
Robin Guthrie, the Chief Commissioner from 1987-92, noted in the
Commission's 1987 Report:
"We have in the past drawn attention to our lack both of
sufficient resources and adequate powers to act quickly to deal
with abuse." (Charity Commission, 1987 p1)
Mr Guthrie is quite correct to say his predecessors had drawn
attention to the lack of resources, however, on the issue of
power there is less emphasis. His immediate predecessor, Mr
Peach, in 1986 did make a call for greater power but this was on
page 11 of the Annual Report. There does not seem to be the same
prominence of the Commission emphasising its lack of powers.
Indeed, as late as 1982 the Commission reported:
"Our regulatory and investigative functions under the 1960 Act
are also important; but they amount to a very small proportion
of our work." (Charity Commission, 1982 p6)
Woodfield (1987, p28) noted recent reports by the Commission had
requested powers to be strengthened. From a review of the
Commission's Annual Reports since 1960, prior to Mr Peach's Chief
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Commissionership 1982-87, the Commission had not given emphasis
to its lack of investigative powers. Indeed, it is back to 1963
to find the Chief Commissioner on page 12 (Charity Commission,
1963) commenting that it had only the power of chancery in
compelling charities to register.
A conclusion has to be that the Charity Commission, only in the
1980s had really started to publicly declare a deficiency in its
powers. In part this comes about due to:
"The work of investigating complaints about charity
administration increased by more than one third over the previous
year." (Charity Commission Annual Report, 1982 p27)
Woodfield (1987) believed the inadequacy in the Commission's
powers was not the lack of them but the type and flexibility. In
particular, a major omission the report believed was the lack of
preventive measures, for example, the Commission could not stop
someone they had removed from trusteeship becoming a trustee of
another charity. There was also inadequacy in the Commission
ability to intervene as the government White Paper explained:
"At present the Commissioners' powers under sections
20(1) and (2) of the 1960 Act are exercisable only
when they are satisfied, after an inquiry under
section 6, that there has been misconduct or
mismanagement in a charity's administration and that
it is necessary or desirable to protect charity
property or secure its proper application. The
Woodfield Report concluded that the requirement to be
satisfied that there had been mismanagement or
misconduct and that it was " necessary or desirable"
to act to protect charity property seriously
restricted the Commissioners' ability to act where
abuse was suspected. It recommended instead that the
Commissioners should be empowered to act where one or
other of these conditions was satisfied." (Home
Office, 1989 p27-28)
The problem of the Commission's powers had been debated at length
by Nightingale (1973) who believed that there were also other
reasons for the Commission's hesitant use of its powers:
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"If the trustees' inaction amounted to
'mismanagement', the Commissioners could remove them,
freeze the assets and appoint new trustees. But
nothing of the kind seems to have been seriously
contemplated, and there are two main explanations for
this. First, the recalcitrant charities were usually
small, perhaps providing an income of under £5.
Second, compulsion or harassment now might deter
people from becoming trustees in the future,and the
cause of charity would suffer." (Nightingale, 1983
p19).
From Colin Davies' (1985) study on the Charity Commission and
regulation, there is a more damning comment:
"What appears to have been lacking is the will, not the means."
(Davies, 1985 p88)
A view we explore in greater depth in section 3.3.5.
The defect in the scope and flexibility of the Commission's
powers identified by Woodfield (1987) has subsequently been
rectified by the 1992 Act.
But neither Woodfield nor the subsequent White Paper (Home Office
1989) dealt with the trustee issue raised by Nightingale. Or the
type of dispute which the Commission referred to in 1984:
"We are statutorily precluded from acting in the administration
of a charity and our powers are therefore limited when complaints
relate to questions of policy, or to differences among trustees
or members." (Charity Commission, 1984 p13)
It is likely to be these type of problems which may come to
dominate the charity agenda (Palmer and Harrow 1994). The
challenge for the Commission will be how to use their powers in
relation to trustees. In clear cases of fraud or misapplication
there should be no problem, but against 'honest' trustees it will
be more problematic. As Palmer and Harrow comment:
"Trustees,as volunteers, cannot be exhorted and
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cajoled into proactivity or harassed or embarrassed
into assessment of the charity's long-term aims and
critical evaluation of its impact. Similarly, to
assume that trustee training is the answer to ensuring
that charities operate at full efficiency and with
integrity (to refer to the Charity Commission's dual
concern) may be to miss the point that there are
limitations on the extent to which volunteers may be
trained before they cease to represent a volunteer
input. It may also be a mistake to place a great deal
of faith in an activity which is done to people,
rather than in one which people choose for
themselves." (Palmer and Harrow, 1994 p105)
4.3.3. Accounts Failure.
Woodfield (1987, p22) noted that less than 10 5:5 of charities sent
in accounts. Owen records for 1853:
"Although they had hopefully looked forward to receiving accounts
from forty thousand charities, the first year total was a
disappointing ten thousand." (Owen, 1965 p204) ;
While Nathan comments: "...the accounts of less than a third of
all trusts thought to be on the Commissioners' books are received
each year." (Nathan, 1952 p46)
The enigmatical attitude of the commissioners to annual accounts
was perhaps best summarised in the 1970 Annual Report:
"It seems reasonable to assume that in requiring
charity accounts to be submitted to us, Parliament
intended that we should more than simply file these
accounts when we receive them, and we are anxious to
resume a systematic scrutiny of charity accounts as
soon as circumstances permit." (Charity Commission,
1970 p21).
In 1965, the Charity Commission undertook a pilot exercise on the
scrutiny of accounts "...to discover the problems likely to arise
and to show what the staffing requirements would be" (Charity
Commission, 1996 p25).
The intention was to undertake a five year review in which during
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that period all charity accounts would have been scrutinised.
However, in 1967 the Commission reported:
"A periodic scrutiny of the accounts of all charities
requires a considerable number of staff, who need to
be trained for the work. Our experience of the results
achieved by this work in the past two years has not
convinced us that the effort and expense involved is
fully justified" ( Charity Commission, 1967 p25).
The Commission did say it would review accounts as and when
required and that its inquiry section was to continue.
Nightingale (1973, p279) questioned "was this one wonders a wise
statement?" For Nightingale (1973) the Commission was sending all
the wrong messages. He suggested, if nothing else, it would not
have taken much resources to demand annual accounts from all
charities and simply put them on public file.
In 1973, the Commission announced it was again going to resume
a systematic scrutiny of charity accounts. However, on the issue
of a qualified accountant, the Commission stated:
"The absence of a qualified accountant on our staff has, however,
been cited as evidence that we are not properly equipped to
undertake this work. We think this criticism is based on a
misconception of what is involved." (Charity Commission, 1973 p7)
During the year the Commission reported that the new section had
looked at nearly 8,500 charity accounts. They concluded that the
examinations had not revealed any major shortcomings. However,
in a few cases payments had been made for purposes which were not
covered by the trusts of the charity. The Commission's report
also commented on advice they had given to improve
administration. The Commission positively concluded for 1973:
"The main benefits of the year's work are, on the one
hand, that it will now be becoming apparent that
charity accounts will be subject to periodic
inspection and, on the other hand that in a
substantial number of cases we now have up-to-date
information about the finances and activities of
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charities which would not otherwise have reached us"
(Charity Commission, 1973 p33).
The 1974 Charity Commission Annual Report, however, records that
only 6,500 accounts are checked:
...partly as a result of staff shortages and partly
because the section temporarily assumed responsibility
during the year for the task of issuing requests for
the accounts of national charities in order to relieve
the pressure of work on the registration division in
London" (Charity Commission, 1974 p26).
The Commission declares it intends to ask for more resources for
this work and is reviewing training for staff on the section. In
1975, the Commission announces that training has been provided
by the then Liverpool Polytechnic.
The debate on accounts should not be viewed in isolation.
Nightingale (1973 p279) had been critical of the Commission's
failure to check accounts. The Goodman Committee's Report in 1976
made specific recommendations on charity accounts and the role
of the commissioners:
"(b) That there should be statutory requirement of
professional audit of accounts where the income
exceeds a certain figure; for smaller incomes, the
audit should be independent.
(c) that the staff of the Charity Commissioners should
be sufficient at least to enable the accounts of all
new charities to be examined for the first three years
of their existence and of all charities to be examined
not less frequently than every five years.
(d) That the Charity Commissioners should have
sufficient staff with accountancy skills to advise
whether the system of preparing accounts is adequate
to give related information to the public." (Goodman,
1976 p114)
The Goodman Committee was established under the auspices of the
then National Council of Social Service, now National Council of
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Voluntary Organisations. Its remit was to examine existing
legislation and to suggest improvements which will benefit the
work of voluntary organisations (Goodman, 1976 p1). The
membership of the Committee, notwithstanding Lord Goodman
himself, was an impressive collection of charity executives,
Queens Counsels, Chartered Accountants and a former charity
commissioner. Also at this time was the 1975 Review of the
Charity Commission by the Expenditure Committee.
While acknowledging the respective reports in its 1977 Annual
Report, the Commission seems to have done little else. The
Commission, in 1979, does however issue a set of guidance notes
for trustees which can be used as a checklist and two new forms
for accounts presentation. One for charities with an income of
less than £500 and one for greater than.
It is not until 1984 that accounts are mentioned again. In part
this may be due to the fact that, as the Commission reported in
its 1979 Report, that the Annual Report is meant to provide an
illustration of the Commission's work rather than a comprehensive
review. The other side of the argument, however, must be that the
accounts scrutiny function was not at the forefront of the
commissioners' concerns. By 1984, however, the Commission does
express concern over the inadequacy of this work by a two page
prominent feature at the beginning of the report.
A similar concern is also raised in the 1985 Report and by 1986
the Commission has become almost bellicose on the accounts issue:
"Nevertheless, the failure of many bodies of trustees
to submit accounts and the lack of our resources to
enable them to be called in and questioned on any
significant scale, suggest that there may be a need
for the accounts of all but the smallest charities to
be professionally audited; a need for those charities
which raise funds from the public to be made more
accountable to those who contribute to them; and a
need to penalise(personally) those trustees who fail
to submit accounts." (Charity Commission, 1986 p12)
The subsequent reports of Woodfield (1987) and the Public
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Accounts Committee (1987) did place accounts scrutiny at the top
of the agenda. The 1992 Charities Act incorporates many of the
Goodman (1976) recommendations. The Commission does seem to be
guilty of an irresolute attitude towards charity accounts until
the mid 1980s.
4.3.4. Insufficient Resources
The Chief Charity Commissioner in the 1984 (p6),1985 (p6) and
1986 (p2) Reports of the Commission complained about the lack of
staff resources. Historically a problem from its inception:
...under the terms of the early Acts they were entitled to only
a modest establishment. Successive Acts, which imposed additional
responsibilities on them, brought no comparable increase in
staff" (Owen, 1965 p302);
...the commissioners have from the start suffered from the
serious disadvantage of being understaffed." (Nathan, 1952 p28)
There is little debate that by the mid 1980s the Commission was
seriously under-resourced and the then Chief Commissioner, Denis
Peach, had made this very clear in the Annual Reports which we
cite above. As we illustrate later (Home Office, 1993), the
Commission has subsequently seen a doubling of its resources in
terms of numbers of staff. In addition to this real increase the
Commission has also seen some functions of its work disappear,
notably the Official Custodian. The Commission is also subject,
like all government departments, to the annual budgetary review
where it has to justify the use of its resources. The expansion
has been in the areas of information technology with some focus
on facilitating monitoring via computerisation of the central
register. In addition, the monitoring and investigation section
was increased to now comprising nearly a sixth of the
Commission's establishment. There remains the historic issue as
to how the lack of resources emerged and could the Commission
have done more to resolve it?
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The Commission's concerns about insufficient resources in the
modern era are announced in 1964. However, this refers to the
constraints of limited resources and as such has to be read
against a later report which stated:
"Between 1960 - 1965 our staff was more than doubled, but since
then there has only been a slight increase although the volume
of work continues to grow." (Charity Commission, 1970 p5)
A major blow for the Commission in the late 1960s was the
decision to open a Liverpool office. This decision was imposed
on the Commission by the Government as part of its policy to move
parts of the civil service out of London. Undoubtedly for a
department as small as the Charity Commission this was a major
drain on staff resources, particularly management time. It must
also be understood against the office technology of the late
1960s and the resources available to a small government
department.
By the 1970s the Commission was sending signals that it required
more resources in its Annual Report. However, to the 1975
Expenditure Committee the Chief Commissioner, in his evidence on
staffing, states:
"I think, for what we are trying to do at the present time, we
have enough staff." ( Expenditure Committee, 1975 p30)
It is perhaps not surprising that with the election of a
Conservative Government in 1979 committed to a cut back in public
expenditure, the Commission's staff were reduced from 395.5 in
1976 to 330 at the end of 1981 (Charity Commission 1981). There
may also be an element of bad timing that the arrival of a
reforming Commissioner in 1982 is set against a cutback in
resources both in the Commission and public expenditure as a
whole.
As we discuss in the next section on reactive image, the
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Commissioners did little to promote themselves as dynamic leaders
with innovative ideas which would have attracted attention and
resources. Nor, within the resources they had, did they take a
pro-active stance to marshalling them to the best effect:
"By its own admission it has been slow to develop the
resource management systems necessary to control
deployment of its limited staff resources to best
advantage. We note that, in contrast to the
Commission's view, the Treasury thought there was
scope for better deployment of existing staff through
improved resource management systems." (Public
Accounts Committee, 1987 pviii)
Throughout the Comptroller and Auditor General's Report to the
Public Accounts Committee (1987), he draws attention to and
rejects the Commission's defence of resource limitations.
The Woodfield (1987) Report took a more conciliatory view to the
Commission on resources. Noting as we discussed under
insufficient powers, the Commission was constrained by having
some statutory duties. These duties which were important twenty
seven years before in the 1960 Charities Act were no longer
paramount. Other issues such as accounts scrutiny, however, had
come to the fore, particularly for fund raising charities.
The Commission was understaffed, particularly by the early 1980s.
However, by this time it had also been instrumental in causing
its resources problem, by its failure to adopt a more critical
attitude to its activities.
4.3.5. A reactive approach.
The Comptroller and Auditor General's Report (Committee of Public
Accounts, 1987 pv) on the Charity Commission concluded that the
Commission had adopted a passive attitude. Historically, there
is a lack of action by the Commission:
"They became increasingly content to operate as , a government
office dealing with routine matters in a routine fashion" (Owen,
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1965 299);
"..it has always been open to the commissioners and
the ministry to adopt a policy of positive and
frequent intervention in the administration of trusts
or a policy of interviewing only when something
serious is brought to light. In the event they have
adopted the latter course." (Nathan, 1952 p45)
This last state of affairs and the themes above developed after
what Owen (p213) described as:
"early decades of enthusiasm that waned with both the lack of
resources and perhaps most importantly the disappointment the
Commission constantly had when Parliament refused them extra
powers." (Owen, 1965 p329)
The commissioner's reports from 1960 do acquire a more propitious
approach, the previous reports primarily detailing schemes and
accounts. The 1963 Report has the commissioners proposing to take
the initiative and 'track down' those charities which had yet to
register and once registration was completed to ensure it is kept
up to date.
In 1968, the Commission proposes to the National Council for
Social Service a Working Party on fund raising. Nightingale
(1973, p287) suggests this was because the Charity Commission can
say nothing about the quality of a charity. From the public
perception of the Commission they are often criticised as not
taking a more pro-active approach. Yet as Nightingale (1973)
observed the Commission is a government department and is
constrained from taking what could be interpreted as a political
view. Indeed, given the sensitivity of the independence of
-
charity from both the political right and left as well as the
whole issue of religious freedom, the Commission walks a thin
line. As Lord Nathan observed in the 1960 House of Lords Charity
debate on wishing the Commission to be more pro-active on social
affairs:
"The Bill has given the Commission no power of initiative."
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(Nathan, 1960 col 578)
A lack of initiative in the Commission was the conclusion of the
1975 Expenditure Committee, who reported:
"We consider that the Commissioners have failed to put
themselves across to those concerned with charitable
and other voluntary activities as an effective
instrument for the promotion of charitable resources.
We feel that in living up to their self-imposed image
of benevolent family solicitors they have given
perhaps too much to their legal duties as opposed to
their responsibilities in other spheres. They failed
to convey to us any impression of dynamism(as opposed
to dedication), imagination, innovation or management
efficiency." (Expenditure Committee 1975 pxxix)
This conclusion was after the Committee had noted that in their
dealings with the commissioners they had been co-operative and
expeditious. In part, the Commission's public problems
culminating in 1987 can be dated from this encounter. There were
other events in between which signified this negative image of
the Commission. The most important, however, may have been their
tepid attitude to the Goodman Report (1976). The Commission, in
their 1979 Report, rejected its major proposals and stated that
no changes were required. Beyond the change on very small
charities amalgamating which found its way into the 1985 Act, the
recommendations of the Goodman Committee were ignored. As we
cited earlier in section 3.3.2, the Goodman committee was
composed of leading figures both in charity and from professions.
The inadequacy of the Commission over scrutinising accounts, the
failure to update the register and its hesitant attitude to
investigation were the principal indictments of the Comptroller
and Auditor General's Report (Public Accounts Committee 1987).
The language in the report of 'ineffective', 'passive attitude',
'widespread failure' and 'complacent' were used against the
Commission.
The response of the Chief Commissioner to these observations was
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in part to see them as unfair. As we comment in section 3.3.7,
the then Chief Commissioner Denis Peach had been introducing
reforms and there is certainly a view within the Commission and
outside that he personally 'took the flack' for the Commission's
past failings. Within the limited resources he now had, Mr Peach
had been rectifying the serious shortcomings in the Commission's
performance. There is also the view (Peach 1994) that the
National Audit Office inquiry was unnecessary due to the
Woodfield investigation. The NAO report was overshadowed by this
more embracing scrutiny, as Vinten (1989) comments:
"The second major examination was carried out in the
well-worn tradition of the 'Rayner' scrutiny.. .The
report was able to draw on the earlier report, and it
is instructive to have juxtaposed an audit report with
a 'Rayner' scrutiny on the same subject. The scrutiny
is more radical, thorough-going and managerially
based, and represents the ideal response to an audit
report, rather than the more superficial response
emanating through examination of a department in the
Committee of Public Accounts." (Vinten, 1989 p33-34)
Woodfield had asked and answered the question - Do we need a
Charity Commission? - with a positive answer. If the Treasury
through the NAO had been considering disbanding the Commission,
it now had a major problem. For to do so would question the
integrity of the Woodfield Report and Sir Philip himself!
There is, however, general agreement that the Commission was
guilty of taking too passive an attitude both in modernising its
internal management:
"For whatever reason, the Commission seems to have found it more
than usually difficult to modernise its methods of work and
secure better value for money." (Woodfield, 1987 p14)
and the Commission's attitude to the charity sector, particularly
on investigation from 1960, when in the Act they were to:
...have the general function of promoting the
effective use of charitable resources by encouraging
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the development of better methods of administration,
by giving charity trustees information or advice on
any matter affecting the charity and by investigating
and checking abuses." (Charities Act, 1960 S.1(3))
The issue for the Commission in the mid 1990s is how to avoid
'slipping back' into a passive attitude now the 1993 Act has come
into law and the various components have been enacted. It may be
that the structure of the Commission and its accountability have
been the root causes of the Commission's problems, both of which
remain unchanged.
4.3.6 The Commissioners Accountability.
This point was raised by the Nathan Committee (1952) as to
reasons why the Comission had not been more pro-active:
"they have been severely handicapped by having no one in a
position to champion their cause in Parliament." (Nathan 1952
p28)
The Charity Commission was set up as an independent body
reporting to Parliament through an appointed member of the
government. This method proved unsatisfactory and led in 1887 to
the establishment of the 'Parliamentary Commissioner', a senior
back bench MP who would represent the Commission in Parliament.
Until 1960, the reports of the Commission were addressed to the
Sovereign.
The Nathan Committee (1952) believed this had been a major cause
of the Commission's resource problem. To deal with this problem
it was recommended that the Charity Commission become responsible
to a ministry. It was eventually decided this was to be the Home
Office. The new Chief Charity Commissioner in the 1960 Report
provides an eloquent description of the Commission's creation and
what the 1960 Act meant for the Commission:
"It was a favourite constitutional device in the first
half of the 19th Century to establish statutory
independent commissions to apply to individual cases
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policies laid down by Parliament. In order to preserve
their independence, no power was conferred on any
authority to give them directions, but they were
required to report their operations to Parliament
annually, so that Parliament might judge whether their
duties were being carried out in an acceptable way....
Our decisions in individual cases thus remain subject
to review only in the courts. The Home Secretary,
however, has been made responsible under the first
schedule for the appointment and remuneration of the
commissioners, he will make any statutory instruments
required under the Charities Act; and he will defend
the Charity Commissioners Vote in Parliament; and
will thus be answerable for the general efficiency of
the Charity Commission as a public department."
(Charity Commission, 1960 p7)
The clarity and support the Chief Commissioner expected from the
Home Secretary was questioned by the 1975 Expenditure Committee,
who noted:
"...the responsibilities of the Home Secretary in
regard to the Charity Commission are extremely
tenuous.. .It is not regarded as the Department's
responsibilities to edit the Annual Reports of the
Charity Commission which are submitted to the Home
Secretary. Not one of these has ever been debated in
the House." (Expenditure Committee 1975 - Education,
Arts and Home Office Sub-committee px-xi)
The tenuousness of this relationship may, however, in part be due
to the Commissioners themselves, as the evidence to the Committee
of the Chief Charity Commissioner illustrates:
"I have, for instance, made it my business while I
have been Chief Commissioner, to go twice a year to
see the Permanent Under Secretary in the Home Office,
just to tell him what we are doing and to have a
little talk with him." (Expenditure Committee, 1975
p30, paragraph 164)
The Chief Commissioner's reply to the question on initiatives
from the Home Office certainly gives the impression that the
Commission did not wish a closer relationship:
"No, I think that we would discourage any initiative from the
Home Office side. We would feel that they were trying to
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interfere with what we were doing." (Expenditure Committee, 1975
p30 paragraph 165)
What damage did this distancing have? A 'backwater image' was
identified by the Expenditure Committee (1975, pxxix). Did the
distancing contribute to the lack of resources to the Commission?
Mr Peach (1994), the Chief Charity Commissioner from 1982-87, did
not believe the special nature of the Commission relationship
affected the resource question. This is because prior to the
Financial Management Initiative of the mid 1980s (Likierman 1988;
Fry 1988, Flynn 1994), the Home Office and Home Secretary had no
involvement. The Charity Commission's vote was submitted direct
to the Treasury. Mr Peach did believe that the FMI system, if it
had been operating earlier would have secured the Charity
Commission greater resources. The Commission's account's outturn
and plans do confirm a dramatic increase in resources:
Year
87/88
88/89
Total Income (m)
7
8
Staff Numbers
332
346
89/90 10 406
90/91 14 456
91/92 18 572
92/93 22 686
92/93 plan 21 731
93/94 plan 22 750
94/95 plan 23 728
95/96 plan 24 722
Source: Home Office Annual Report 1993, p94-95 (Cm2208)
(London: HMSO)
Would a direct approach to the Home Secretary have obtained
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greater resources? Mr Peach never did approach the Home
Secretary direct - it would have been a 'sneaky thing to do'.
More important, while significant to the Commissioners, the
amounts involved were miniscule in relation to the Home
Secretary's public expenditure programme. And given the
priorities at that period of constraint (for example, police,
prisons, the voluntary sector at large) it did not in common
sense at that time (in Peach's view) justify an approach to a
busy Minister. The change in the P.E.S.C. system improved
matters. But the watershed in Peach's view was the Woodfield
Report, which meant that even intransigent junior Treasury
officials had to show sense. We therefore can only speculate.
A short term gain, however, at the cost of infuriating the
Treasury?
Did the independence of the Commission and its going against
certain government Minister's requests have an effect on the
Vote? In the case of the 'Moonies' in the early 1980s, when
certain government Ministers demanded that the Commission ban
them, the Commission pointed out that the activities registered
were charitable and therefore asserted their independence. Mr
Peach did not believe this had any effect on the Vote. It
probably, however, did not help the Commission either. It may
have also contributed to the behaviour of certain conservative
MPs at the 1987 Public Accounts Committee interview of the Chief
Commissioner.
Nathan (1952) had concluded that the Commission without a
champion in Parliament had been weakened. The Commission becoming
responsible to the Home Secretary did not on its own overcome
this problem. In part this was because of the desire to ensure
the freedom of charity; the 'independence' of the Commission was
to be maintained. The resource allocation process until the 1980s
meant the Commission was 'on its own' in its requests to the
Treasury. With cutbacks in public expenditure from the mid
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1970s, the Charity Commission must have been a relatively easy
target for Treasury restraints with no Minister directly
defending or promoting its cause. The Commission itself though
has to shoulder considerable responsibility, for by the evidence
of its own chiefs it had in turn kept the Home Department at arms
length. As Mr Peach advised the 1987 Public Accounts Committee
on how often he had met the Permanent Secretary and Ministers in
the Home Office:
"As far as Ministers are concerned, half a dozen times
in the last three years. As far as the Permanent
Secretary is concerned, apart from socially, only
once. Broadly speaking we are day by day independent
of ministerial control and so the occasions in which
I would normally expect to meet Ministers or Home
Office colleagues are fairly few and far between."
(Public Accounts Committee, 1987 p11)
The relationship with the Home Office is tenuous and as Goodman
(1976) noted:
"It is evident from the Act that the Home Secretary can take the
Commissioners to task. Their seeming immunity from intervention
may be related rather to successive government's view of their
work than to any lack of powers on the part of the Home
Secretary" (Goodman, 1976 p122).
The Commission's reluctance to have an advisory council as
suggested by Nathan (1952, 1960), or an independent charities
board as suggested by Goodman (1976), must be questioned.
Woodfield (1987) was against an independent advisory council,
though he did not disclose the reasons why. The Woodfield
solution was for the -Commission to appoint two part-time
commissioners as available to them under the 1960 Charity Act.
Woodfield saw these two part-time commissioners as the equivalent
to non-executive directors. In addition, using managerial
solutions to resolve problems in the public sector(Flynn 1994)
Woodfield(1987) recommended the establishment of a top management
board.
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The International Freedom Foundation, a right-wing think tank,
believed the Commission to be totally unaccountable. Its report
(Gordon, 1991) attacked the Commission for its • inactivity on
political abuse by charity and repeated the criticisms of
Woodfield (1987). In particular, the report noted:
"This veil of secrecy covers many other areas of this
public body's work. In the compilation of this report,
the Charity Commission Press Office refused to give
background details regarding the Commissioners as they
felt that "such information had no bearing on any
possible study of the workings of the Commission". Not
only is the Commission registrar, judge and jury, but
its court hearings are in private." (Gordon 1991 p12)
The report went on to recommend that the time limit on
commissioners employment should be restricted to five years;
that more new blood and outside ideas be encouraged primarily
from the business world and most interestingly that the
Commission should no longer be responsible for complaints
investigation against charities. The report recommended that an
Ombudsman for charities be established who would have this role.
In our conclusion, we return to the commissioners and this
question. In particular, should the Chief Commissioner be a
hands-on manager or a high profile figure in the forefront of
charity development? As we now discuss, the Chief Commissioners
since 1960 have adopted different styles.
4.3.7 The Chief Commissioners
Owing to the small size of the Charity Commission and its
distance from normal Ministerial control, the role of the Chief
Charity Commissioner has-much more importance than the equivalent
head of another civil service department. From my visits to the
Commission and discussions with staff, it has been conveyed to
me that the character of the Chief Commissioner has set the style
of the Commission both externally and internally.
Owen (1965, p203) describes the first commissioners in depth. He
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concludes as a group they were capable and notes that some of
them were distinguished equity lawyers (p303). The system of
appointing the third commissioner who would work himself up to
Chief Commissioner was also established with only one notable
exception - that of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald who was appointed
directly to the Chief Commissioner's post in the 1870s. It may
be somewhat ironic that the Chief Commissioner in the recent
history of the Commission in the late 1970s also had the surname
FitzGerald. Owen (1965, p303) notes the Pall Mall Gazette comment
on Sir Seymour was "one of Lord Beaconsfield's bad jobs". A
similar view was expressed by Commission staff about Mr
FitzGerald who was 'aloof' from affairs.
The Nathan Committee suggested that the board of the Charity
Commission should be widened:
"...the board itself should be comprised not of officers of the
civil service nor necessarily of lawyers, but of men and women
of standing, selected primarily for their experience in public
and charitable affairs." (Nathan, 1952 p95)
The Nathan Committee recommendations were rejected by the
Government for the 1960 Act and were latterly rejected by the
Goodman Committee (1976 p119). Goodman did however recommend the
setting up of an independent charities board to advise the
Commission on general policy. Woodfield (1987 p15) rejected the
idea of an independent advisory council. Woodfield did recommend
that the provision in the 1960 Charity Act for two part-time
commissioners be enacted, to provide input on policy making. In
addition, we have noted from two past Chief Commissioners
evidence that the relationship between the Home Office and the
Commission is ethereal. The Chief Commissioner once appointed,
therefore has considerable autonomy within the Commission.
Owen records by the beginning of the 20th Century:
"The sanguine and aggressive zeal with which earlier
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commissioners had entered upon their work was conspicuously
lacking, and their late-century successors seemed inclined to
accept their situation uncomplainingly." (Owen, 1965 p329)
The tone of viewing the Commission as a quiet backwater for civil
servants was echoed by Lord Houghton in the 1992 House of Lords
Charity Debate:
"Who has regarded the Chief Charity Commission job as suitable
for an undistinguished civil servant reaching retirement age."
(Houghton 1992)
Was this a true assessment? Using the Charity Commission Annual
Reports; interviews with Charity Commission staff; an interview
with Mr Peach and an interview with Peter Mimpriss, the Chair of
the Charity Law Association and a partner with solicitors Allen
and Overy, we present the following assessment:
The Chief Charity Commissioners, all men, since 1960 have been:
	
1960-65	 C.P.Hill
	
1965-75	 T.C.Green
	
1975-82	 T.Fitzgerald
	
1982-88	 D.Peach
	
1988-92	 R.Guthrie
1992-date R. Fries
The Chief Commissioner appointed in 1960 was Christopher Pascoe
Hill who broke the tradition of previous appointments by being
a civil servant who had not previously been a charity
commissioner. He had, however, been in the Charity Commission for
the last four years on secondment from the Home Office preparing
the 1960 Charities Bill. The Charity Commission Report of 1960
compared to 1959 could not be more different. The 1959 Report
beyond one page which refers to modernising alms houses with
bathrooms, the number of charities that sent accounts to the
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Commission and the amalgamation of army trusts, has no management
commentary. It is simply a list of schemes and the accounts of
the Commission.
The 1960 Report has seven pages of social policy comment with one
section entitled 'Relations with Voluntary Bodies'. The report
describes the new reporting relationship with the Home Office
with the comment that it should assist in the passing of new
legislation 'or to embark on the new activities which current
developments called for" (Charity Commission, 1960 p6).
The social policy theme of the commissioners reports are
continued into Mr Green's period as Commissioner. For example,
in 1971, the Report comments that charities need to be kept up
with the times and gives an example of homes for children being
no longer sex-segregated. During Mr FitzGerald's tenure as Chief
Commissioner, social policy commentary is not so prominent though
comments are still made, for example, the 1977 Report comments
on Wolf enden. The last three Chief Commissioners, including the
current Chief Commissioner, have all expanded the social policy
aspects in the introduction. There are however major problems
with using the Commission's reports as a benchmark on attitude,
particularly of the Chief Commissioner. The Commissioners'
reports, as the 1979 Report advised, 'give an illustration rather
than a comprehensive picture of the Charity Commission's work'.
To construct a chart providing some chronological or numerical
analysis of the reports is therefore of little value. It is also
not until 1992 that the introduction is signed off personally by
the Chief Commissioner. Until 1992, all the Commissioners' names
appear.
Confidential interviews with staff provide a useful oral history
and background to events and persons but are fraught with
methodological difficulties as we discuss in the research methods
chapter. A general impression, however, was conveyed that the
Chief Commissioners, up to but not including Mr Peach, were very
much in the mould depicted by Lord Houghton.
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The method of appointment of the Chief Commissioner provides a
more objective assessment. Prior to 1960, the appointment was by
Royal Warrant on the recommendation of the Prime Minister for
life. From 1960 to 1981, the appointment was made by the Home
Secretary not in open competition and was permanent until normal
civil service retirement. Mr Peach was appointed from open
competition within the civil service. Both Mr Guthrie and Mr
Fries have been appointed from external advertisements.
Mr Guthrie was then Director of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Mr Fries has come from the Home Office. For Mr Fries, the post
has been limited to five years though re-appointment is
available.
Mr Peach's period as Chief Commissioner is marked by the
respective reports of Woodfield (1987) and the National Audit
Office (Public Accounts Committee 1987). The consensus both
within the Commission and outside was that Mr Peach was active
in introducing reforms and indeed by bringing problems in the
Commission to public attention enabled subsequent reforms. There
is primary document evidence to support this contention:
In the 1987 Public Accounts Committee Report (1987 p6), Sir
Gordon Downey the Comptroller and Auditor General, confirmed that
Mr Peach had welcomed the scrutiny and encouraged the auditors
to undertake exercises that they normally did not do. In
particular, these exercises confirmed the need for greater
resources.
The Commission's own reports brought attention to their concerns
about the limitations and their ability to conduct investigations
and check accounts (Charity Commission, 1984 p6; 1985 p6; 1986
p2).
The critical comments of the P.A.C., who were concerned mainly
with the matter of charity accounts, and seemed to ignore the
Commission's lack of power and resources, is in sharp contrast
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to the more complimentary and appreciative comments in the House
of Lords debate on 27th January 1988, which certainly recognised
not only the Commission's limited resources but the changed style
and approach.
e.g. Allen (Col. 666) ..."grey civil servants.	 Anyone who
knows.. .less appropriate."
Houghton (Col 671) "The Charity Commission has long been
neglected..."
Faithful (Col 677) "All the work...inspiration given to the
work by the retiring Chief Commissioner..."
Mishcon (Col 686) 	 "Tribute...a great Chief Commissioner
whose work will always be appreciated".
Ferrers (Col 691) ... "congratulate the Chief Commissioner (on
progress on Woodfield) .
Ferrers (Col 695) "Under his distinguished leadership.. .a
new flexibility and a human face..."
My interview with Peter Mimpriss, Chairman of the Charity Law
Association, gave examples of meetings at the Commission and
elsewhere in the early 1980s where there was an 'opening of the
doors' by the Commission. There had been very limited contact up
to this point, Commission staff being very helpful once you knew
whom to talk to. The Commission to those 'not in the know'
however, seemed distant. Mr Peach is credited, unlike his
immediate predecessor, as instituting the Commission's increased
public profile and dialogue with the sector.
In particular, Peach sought to open up the Commission and change
what was regarded as a legalistic approach and "closeness". His
aims were to encourage legal and administrative staff to deal
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informally wherever possible; to go for the spirit rather than
the letter of the law; to encourage charities or would-be
charities to seek informal advice and to use the fourth head to
extend and develop charity law in a changing society.
Lord Houghton's comments in the 1992 House of Lords Charities Act
debate were condemned by Lord Allen, the former Permanent
Secretary at the Home Office in relation to Mr Peach:
"The noble Lord, Lord Houghton, spoke in rather
deprecatory terms, about the chairman of the Charity
Commission before the present incumbent. I submit that
that is rather unfair. The previous occupant was
appointed to the post following an open competition
and anyone who knew him would hardly subscribe to the
view that he was a rather dull and undistinguished
civil servant." (Allen, 1992 p849)
It is, however, the assessment of the P.A.C. on Mr Peach that has
taken the centre stage as Lord Houghton's comments made at the
start of this section illustrated. From my own interview with
Mr Peach, I would endorse Lord Allen's opinion. During our
discussion we focused on a wide range of social issues including
'gay' charities. His promotion of the wider charity clause, the
sensitive handling of Oxfam and his encouragement to the lawyers
in the Commission to use the fourth head of charity to widen its
use were all discussed. Mr Peach is certainly no dull civil
servant. As an internal Oxfam paper commented:
"As you will appreciate, this statement by the Chief
Commissioner[over Oxfam's 1985 book: Nicaragua: a
Threat of a Good Example]was a considerable departure
from the Commission's public statements - it might
even be said to be in direct conflict with what they
had said in their Reports. These statements by the
Charity Commissioners are very encouraging and we are
fortunate in having a liberal-minded Chief Charity
Commissioner." (Gordon, 1991 p12)
The subsequent increases in the Charity Commission budget as we
identified would also support the contention that the Financial
Management Initiative would have derived greater resources to the
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Commission. Mr Peach had introduced the concept of viewing
budgets as business plans into the Commission. Finally, in a
discussion with the next Commissioner Robin Guthrie, (Guthrie
1993) he confirmed that much of the reform in the Commission for
which he was receiving credit was due to Mr Peach 'who had been
much maligned'. Mr Guthrie's period as Chief Commissioner saw in
the new Charities Act and further encouraged a dynamism in the
Commission. A published interview with Robin Guthrie by David
Billis (1991) gives an example of a more pro-active role for the
Commission, in particular the challenge of Europe.
The open competition appointment of Mr Guthrie and subsequently
of Mr Fries, is a welcomed reform as ensuring that the Chief
Commissioner's post does not again become seen as a final resting
place nor that the Chief Commissioner has to necessarily come
from the civil service. Another influence to keep the
Commission outward-looking is the expected expansion of role it
now has as a regulator under the 1992 Charities Act (see section
3.6). A final spur to maintaining initiative is the recent
development of a policy unit which as part of its brief is to
monitor events in Europe.
We consider in the next section another mitigating factor for the
Charity Commission; failure to be more pro-active until the late
1980s: the respective developments in regulation and the growing
sophistication of accounting emerging only in the early 1980s.
To date our review has been micro centred on the Commission
itself. We now move to a macro analysis of the development of
regulation.
3.4 FROM THE 1960 TO THE 1992 CHARITIES ACTS
The respective parliamentary debates of the two Acts provides a
useful insight into the attitude of government to the charity
sector. The 1960 Act was set against:
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"Sections 10-12 of the Act were the outcome of a
lengthy period of discussion of the part which
charities should play after post- war social
legislation had resulted in the traditional benefits
provided by charity being largely provided by the
statutory services." (Charity Commission, 1970 p11)
The register was conceived not as a regulatory device but as a
resource particularly for social workers to use the assets of
charity for the benefit of society. The filing of accounts was
for this purpose. In addition, the Home Secretary stated the
active use of the register:
"...would also serve as a permanent record to ensure that
charities in the future do not like so many in the past become
forgotten and disappear." (Butler, 1960 p413)
The 1960 Act was described by the Lord Chancellor:
"It has four main aims: first to modernise the
machinery of administration of charity law; secondly
to establish a statutory foundation for voluntary co-
operation between Charity and the statutory welfare
services on a basis of equality and
partnership;thirdly, to establish a central register
of charities, and fourthly to extend and specify the
conditions which must be satisfied before the purpose
of a charitable trust can be altered, by what is known
as a Cy-pres scheme." (Hansard 1960 col 563)
The 1960 Act was never intended to be an overtly regulatory Act,
though it did increase the powers of the Commission. Rather, it
was seen as facilitating charity and the Commission was
prohibited from getting involved in directly administering
charity:
"The Commissioners shall ... have the general function
of promoting the effective use of charitable resources
by encouraging the development of better methods of
administration, by giving charity trustees information
or advice on any matter affecting the charity and by
investigating and checking abuses.(3);but the
commissioners shall not themselves have power to act
in the administration of a charity. (4)" (Charities
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Act, 1960 S.1)
Reviewing the concerns of members of the Lords in the 1960 debate
it is doubtful if the 1960 Bill would have ever become law if it
had been overtly regulatory. The power of the charity lobby
should not be underestimated as Dr Vaughan, a junior Minister in
the early 1980s, discovered after his attack on the Citizens
Advice Bureau. The outrage following his decision to withhold
their grant perhaps contributing to his subsequent loss of office
(Brenton 1985). Historically a more substantive political figure
- Gladstone - was to write in his diary after the defeat of his
attempt to limit income tax exemptions:
"deadly encounter with the so-called charities ... I was
endeavouring to uphold the reality of truth and justice against
their superficial and flimsy appearances." (Randall and Williams,
1995)
Lord Amulree's 1960 col 581) comments that no-one could object
to charities managing their affairs efficiently, were in direct
contrast to the comments by Viscount Simonds:
"I do not believe in the least in a central register." (Simonds,
1960 col 600)
The debate in the Lords could have taken place a hundred and
fifty years before and reflected on one side the reformers such
as Lord Brougham, while the other side viewed charity as a
personal act which the state should have the least involvement
with. Lord Saltoun (1960) personified this view with his
description of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution:
"The lowest point that the Royal National Lifeboat Institution
ever touched in its history was in the third quarter of the 19th
Century when it was receiving a government grant. When that
institution repudiated the grant, refused it and put it aside,
the public took the Institution to its heart and it has never
failed since then." (Saltoun, 1960 p613)
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Against this background it is not surprising that Randall, upon
his appointment as a Charity Finance Director, noted:
"When I first read the 1960 Charities Act, I thought there was
a printing error, it should have read 1860." (Randall 1992)
The style of regulation in the 1960 Act contrasts vividly with
that of the 1961 Trustee Investments Act, where very clear
controls were laid down on the respective holdings by charities
of various classes of investment (Harrison 1994). In part the
regulatory style of this Act must be understood as a significant
progressive step from the 1925 Trustee Act which had an even
narrower band of investment. It should be noted that both Acts
do not apply exclusively to charity but to any trust in law,
whether it is a charitable trust or otherwise. However, in
regard to active supervision the 1961 Trustee Investment Act was
more like the 1960 Charity Act, which followed a form of
regulation which was largely self regulatory (Gillingham 1994;
Wilson and Butler 1985).
Vinten (1989) provides a rationale for the regulation of
charities by a historical overview of charity regulation in
comparison to the financial services sector. Vinten provides an
explanation for the method of regulation in the 1960 Act, the
overt regulation in the 1961 Act on investment and the rationale
for the regulatory role and style of the Charity Commission in
1992.
Vinten (1989) uses insurance as his benchmark
"The case of insurance is instructive, since it shares at least
two characteristics with the charity, and legislation was
introduced around the same period, in 1870. First of all it is
essentially based on trust, and secondly it provides vast sums
of money" (Vinten, 1989 p18).
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Vinten (1989) then describes the regulation of the banking
industry and that it was not until 1979, following the secondary
banking crisis, when the overt regulatory role of the Bank of
England became formalised. He compares the limited role of the
Bank of England to this date as being equal to the role of the
Charity Commissioners. Vinten also considers two other
historical factors: the developments of company law and the
accountancy profession. The late development in company law for
professionally-audited accounts; not to view fraud and error
detection as primary purpose; the relative limited sophistication
of accounting theory; the reliance on stewardship principles in
the public sector all contributed to acting as a constraining
force on the Commission. How justified is this view?
The developments of company law and the orientation and growth
of the accounting profession conform to Vinten's description
(Hopwood 1985, 1985; Lehman 1992; Millichamp 1986; Pallot 1992;
Ryan, Scapens and Theobald 1992; Woolf 1990). Company law and the
accounting profession co-terminally develop as business activity
increases. The role of the auditor is to report to the
shareholders on the accuracy of the financial statements.
Accountancy was primarily seen as a practical activity shaped by
professionals:
"Financial accounting gained its importance as a
practical activity long before accounting researchers
came on to the scene. Consequently accounting
practices were shaped by accounting practitioners and
the government agencies which took an interest in the
protection of share-owners and creditors." (Ryan et al
1982)
We look at the development of accountancy theory in section 3.8
but as a historical description; the shift and emphasis towards
regulation in the financial services environment does not take
off until the 1980s in the United Kingdom. The legislative
exemptions to this rule being the handling of clients' money (The
Prevention of Fraud Investment Act, 1958) and the investment
policies of certain fiduciary institutions which was the Trustee
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Investments Act 1961.
City regulation was based on self regulation developed from Adam
Smith whose market model assumed that self-interested behaviour
combined with market competition would adequately protect the
public interest. This 'laissez-faire' system was through self
regulated organisations, with a licensing system for those not
in such organisations from the Board of Trade. Following
successive scandals and the Gower report the Financial Services
Act of 1986 was passed (Weston and Copeland 1988; Peasnell and
Ward 1985; Thomas 1989; Reid 1988) which, while supporting the
principle of self regulation, also introduced a statutory body
to oversee the self regulatory organisations.
Until the 1980s, business world and academic debates on
regulation are limited (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald 1992) in the
UK, though an impressive literature was developing in the United
States following the publication of George Stigler's 'Theory of
Economic Regulation' (Stigler 1971; Posner 1974; Peltzman 1976)
and from a 'critical theory' perspective, the work of Okcabol and
Tinker (1990) and Merino and Neimark (1982) who argued that the
securities acts which developed statutory regulation bodies:
...were part of a continuing nineteenth- and twentieth-century
effort to reconcile corporate dominance with individualistic
eighteenth-century democratic and economic theories without
disturbing the existing set of social and economic relations."
(Merino and Neimark, 1982 p34)
If the Charity Commission to the late 1970s was actively seeking
guidance they would have.found little coming from academia or the
private sector. They also had no counterpart body to compare
themselves against as we discuss in Section 3.9. The Charity
Commission would have also found little guidance from public
sector accountancy until the 1980s:
"Despite the ancient origins of governmental
accounting (Normanton, 1966; Chatfield, 1974) and the
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size and significance of governmental activity in
modern times, the subject was, until recently, ignored
by academics and practitioners alike. After a period
of unwarranted neglect(see Perrin 1981), the 1980s
witnessed an upsurge of interest in public sector
accounting." (Pallot, 1992 p38)
The UK interest in charity accounting also begins in the early
1980s. In 1981, a report was commissioned by the Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales to be conducted by the
late Peter Bird, Professor of Accounting at Kent University.
Although there had been previous published articles on charity
accounting in the professional journals (Sams 1978; Fenton 1980;
Manley 1977,1979), Bird's(1981) work:
"was the first systematic study of the charitable sector by
accountants, certainly in recent years." (Gambling, Jones, Kunz
and Pendlebury, 1990 p8)
Also in 1981, the then Auditing Practices Committee issued a
guideline on charities. The guideline highlighted key areas
peculiar to charities:
Donations and fund raising;
Legacies;
Central and local government grants and loans;
Branches;
Overseas activities;
Specific funds;
Grants to beneficiaries.
The statement left it to the individual auditor to decide how
appropriate SSAPs (Statement of Standard Accounting Practice)
were to be applied, although it did prescribe SSAP2:
"It is essential that the financial statements of all
charities should include a statement of the main
accounting policies in accordance with SSAP2. However,
the explanatory foreword recognises that 'there may be
situations in which for justifiable reasons accounting
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standards are not strictly applicable because they are
impractical or exceptional, having regard to the
circumstances would be inappropriate or give a
misleading view'. In considering the appropriateness
of particular SSAPs to charities, it must be
remembered that SSAPs have been prepared primarily
with business enterprises in mind, whereas charities
are not-for-profit organisations. As a result it is
important for the auditor to use his judgement as to
the appropriateness or otherwise of an SSAP to the
individual circumstances of the charity concerned."
(Auditing Practices Committee, p9-10 1981)
The Bird (1981) research highlighted the complete inconsistency
of accounting treatments in the charitable sector. It also
commented:
"The expertise of the Charity Commissioners is also entirely that
of the lawyer...As a result there is no effective monitoring of
the public accountability of charities by ensuring prompt filing
of accounts and by expert review of a significant proportion of
these." (Bird and Morgan-Jones, 1981 p225)
The Bird (1981) research led directly to the issuing in February
1984, by the Accounting Standards Committee, of a discussion
paper - 'Accounting by Charities' (Accounting Standards Committee
1984). This was followed in 1985 by Exposure Draft 38 (Accounting
Standards Committee 1985) and subsequently SORP 2 being issued
in May 1988 (Accounting Standards Committee 1988).
The movement for changes in charity regulation has therefore to
be set against activity in the business world in the 1980s with
challenges to the market model; the Financial Management
Initiative in the public sector; the increasing interest in the
charity sector as alternative deliverer of services to statutory
services and the development of professional and academic study
of regulation and accountancy in general with an overflow into
charities.
The Charity Commission had traditionally seen its regulatory role
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in charities as the protection of charity from abuse by trustees
or anyone else and from inappropriate interference from
government or any other outside party. The legal culture of the
Commission had seen such protection in maintaining the integrity
of the original purpose of the charity and making 'cy-pres'
schemes when such intentions were no longer appropriate. The 1984
Commission Report illustrated this approach:
"We are statutorily precluded from acting in the administration
and our powers are therefore limited when complaints relate to
questions of policy, or to differences among trustees or
members." (Charity Commission, 1984 p18)
This deemed passive attitude of the Commission to its supervision
role (Public Accounts Committee 1987) was condemned by the Public
Accounts Committee who demanded increased action. The Woodfield
Report (1987) debated what that role should be. Woodfield was
assertive in believing that the Charity Commission should be
retained as opposed to any other government body. Woodfield (1987
p10) provided the following rationale for the retention of the
Commission:
(a) as a statutory body with the powers of the High Court it
saved time and legal costs;
(b)tax benefits placed an obligation on the state to see that
they are not abused;
(c)public should be able to find out what charities exist, what
their objects are and particularly what grants might be
available;
(d) government encourages charitable giving; to support that
activity an organisation is required whose advice can be relied
upon and which in crucial matters is authoritative in law.
Woodfield (1987) also discussed self regulation and the charity
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sector:
"The expression 'self-regulation' does not quite
express what the charitable sector has created to fill
a widely acknowledged need. It is more the
establishment of organisations to maintain and enhance
standards, to encourage good practice and introduce
professional ethics where these are appropriate. It is
also valuable and in the public interest to provide a
centre of information of what is available so that
charitable funds can be dispersed to maximum effect...
Our conclusion is that all these activities within the
charitable sector itself are much to be encouraged and
are evidence of a lively response to current needs.
But these activities cannot be expected to be a
substitute for a statutory framework and a body with
statutory powers. Both the size and variety of
charitable activity, and its voluntary character, make
it impracticable to devise any internal regulatory
body which would be accepted by charities as
representative and to which even reserve powers of
monitoring could be given." (Woodfield, 1987 p11)
The form of regulation relating to charity has a different
tradition to both the public and private sectors, yet at the same
time the charity sector has been affected by changes and attitude
in the development of regulatory environments of the other two
sectors. On a continuum line, at one extreme there has been from
the late 19th Century to the present day increasing control over
local authorities to the extent that many question if local
government is not but an agent of central government (Byrne 1981;
Hepworth 1992; Marsland 1985). The establishment of the district
audit originating under the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 could
have been a model for charity regulation. It was not because of
the philosophy that charity activity should be independent of the
state. The two most important influences for this tradition and
its continuation are the freedoms of religious worship and to
determine one's use of personal wealth.
The level of regulation imposed by Government can be expressed
diagrammatically as a continuum:
Overt Regulation	 Little Regulation
259
Local Government	 Charity	 Private Sector
With, at the other extreme on the continuum, the Adam Smith
'laissez-faire' attitude to regulation in the private sector with
its reliance on self interest and market forces. The charity
sector is depicted as being mid-way between these two extremes.
An implied feature of this model is the assumption that the
private sector, when it concerns itself, is opposed to
regulation.
This assumption has been challenged by Stigler's 'Theory of
Economic Regulation' (Stigler 1971) which has challenged
conventional understanding of why in a market economy the private
sector actively supports regulation as opposed to resisting it,
by his contention that:
...as a rule regulation is acquired by an industry and is
designed and operated primarily for its benefit." (Stigler, 1971
P3)
While regulation can be thrust upon an industry, Stigler
challenges the view that regulation of industry is instituted
primarily for the protection and benefit of the public at large
as a result of market failure. Instead, he argues that using the
state's basic resource - the power to coerce - industries may
actively seek from the state four main policies to increase its
profitability.
The first is the direct subsidy of money, secondly control over
entry by rivals, a third is control over substitutes and
complements, while the fourth is directed to price fixing. There
are costs to bear for these advantages, notably procedural costs
and the admission of outsiders due to the political process.
Stigler therefore concludes that regulation, far from serving the
consumers' interests, can actually work against them if an
industry has manipulated the political process by resource
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misallocation. Because of costs of 'buying' regulation it will
tend to be large mature industries that will seek regulation.
A major problem with Stigler's theory, which he acknowledged, was
the role of the regulator. If the political process was so
manipulated then why would an industry allow the creation of a
regulation machinery that can challenge its activities? For
Peltzman (1976,) defending Stigler, the answer:
...rests on the heed the political process must pay
to the marginal position. It suggests that what the
'capture' literature treats as an ad hoc detail -
that "the political process automatically admits
powerful outsiders to the industry's councils" - is in
fact integral to regulatory processes." (Peltzman,
1976 p217)
For Peltzman, a rational regulator will be seeking to balance a
number of interests as opposed to a single economic interest no
matter how powerful.
An alternative explanation for regulation has come from critical
theorist's Merino and Neimark (1982), who argue that a crisis in
capitalism provokes regulation. Using Hirschman's contention that
'classical' economic theory was motivated by political, not
economic, considerations:
"Overthrow of the feudal order demanded justification, and the
'divine rights' of the feudal order that justified hereditary
power were superseded by the 'natural rights' of individuals to
promote their own self-interest." (Merino and Neimark, 1982 p35)
Their historical appraisal of regulation in the United States
from the late nineteenth century begins with concerns over
economic concentration stifling market competition. Most
importantly, the American nation's philosophy that hard work,
particularly for the self employed, would bring economic success
was being seriously challenged by:
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"the spectre of enormous economic power in the hands
of a small group of men (who did not own the resources
that they controlled) raised questions about the
effectiveness of property and contractual rights based
on the assumption of competition among individuals in
free markets to protect the public interest." (Merino
and Neimark, 1982 p35)
The subsequent anti-trust legislation being passed to curb the
power of industry cartels. Another policy was, however,
encouraged to maintain the 'democratic' nature of the country:
that of promoting stock ownership among the masses of the
population with the concept that the stock holder was the 'owner'
of the corporation. The subsequent stock market crash of 1929 was
popularly blamed on manipulative behaviour by some prominent Wall
Street firms and the Democratic Party adopted regulation reform
as part of its 1932 election programme. To restore faith in the
system and to solve the problem of investors' capabilities, the
philosophy of disclosure regulation was adopted. Disclosure
legislation's fundamental aim is to provide information to
investors not to shield them from ventures of dubious merit.
Subsequently, attempts to curb 'insider trading' in the 1980s
have indicated the limitations of this approach. Correlated to
these developments have been the development of the accounting
profession and accounting standards which we discuss later in
this chapter.
How does the application of these theories aid our understanding
of the context of charity regulation?
The former Chief Charity Commissioner, Robin Guthrie, provided
a description of the role of the Charity Commission in the
supervision and management of charities:
"The Charity Commission has essentially three functions to
perform: registration, regulation and investigation. Registration
involves the establishment of charitable status and the keeping
of records on all the organizations that have charitable status.
The problem has always been to maintain this kind of
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information."
"The Commission was originally set up in 1853, and in
1960 there was a new Act, and the Registrar of
Charities was established, but only now - for the
first time in four hundred years - are we going to
have a means of keeping any kind of register up to
date. This is very significant and it will transform
the relationship between charities and the organ
through which they are accountable to the public.
Regulation includes the projudicial Acts -making
schemes and orders giving consent for the redeployment
of charitable assets and so on. Investigation, which
has hitherto been a minor part of our operation, has
already increased. It involves looking into possible
abuse or interference." (Billis, 1991 p284)
The following characteristics can be identified:
1. Focusing on the publicly available register to give up-to-date
information about individual charities.
2. A charity will have to seek the approval of the Commission if
it wishes to change the focus of its activities.
3. An active monitoring role that will keep a watching brief on
charities and intervene if maladministration occurs.
The Government White Paper on Charities that led to the 1992
Charities Act (Home Office 1989) discussed the rationale and
focus for the regulation of charities. Interestingly, the paper
discussed at length the increase in government grants to the
charitable sector and correlated their use to the need for the
government to ensure that these funds were properly and
efficiently used. In drafting the paper there was no reference
to the many charities which receive no government aid and
therefore why should they be subject to regulation? One sentence
relating to tax benefits could be implied to include those
charities not receiving public grants, but an alternative
proposition rarely discussed is that charities enjoy such reliefs
because they reduce public expenditure that might otherwise have
to be incurred.
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The White Paper was extremely precise on how it envisaged the
regulation of the charitable sector operating.
The White Paper reaffirmed the independence of the sector and the
intention of the legislation which was for charities to
'flourish' in a framework where the integrity of charity could
be assured:
"The Government's overall objective in approaching
legislation for charities is to achieve a balance
between on the one hand proper control by the Charity
Commission and proper accountability by charities, and
on the other the freedom and corresponding
responsibility of individual organisations to develop
and do business. Their proposals are designed to
produce a stronger and a more modern framework of
supervision which will equip the Charity Commission
for a more active role, narrow the scope for abuse,
encourage trustees to shoulder their responsibilities,
and ensure continuing public confidence in the
sector." (Home Office, 1989 p4)
A mixture of regulatory patterns has developed. One aspect was
to focus on self regulation by encouraging industry organisations
such as the Institute of Charity Fund Raising Managers to produce
codes of best practice supported by emphasising the role and
responsibility of charity trustees and a greater vigilance by the
public. The most significant example of the emphasis towards the
self regulation and a boundary line of the Commission's
intervention was the rejection of the proposed 'Charity
Ombudsman'. This proposal (Houghton, 1992 p3) would have allowed
the Commission to investigate a complaint from a member of a
membership charity about serious mismanagement or misconduct.
Instead it was rejected and recommended that such grievances
should be resolved within the charity by an appropriate internal
procedure. It would be wrong for the Commission to have such an
interventionist role.
The other side was a more pro-active Commission which would
require charities to send it information annually on their
activities and if necessary intervene directly in the management
264
of charities by, for example, sending in a receiver/manager, a
new power under the 1992 Act. Earl Ferrers, for the Government,
outlined the role for the Commission and its relation with
charity:
"I think the Charity Commission has to be a policeman
but in the same way that police in normal life are
friends of the community, though periodically they
have to take action against them...They will be
friends of the charity world but periodically they
will have to take action against some people."
(Ferrers, 1991a p12)
The debates of the 1992 Charities Bill lack the passion and depth
of the 1960 debate. In part this is due to its intention:
"It is a regulatory Bill. It does not invite consideration of the
moral, social or philosophical aspects of the voluntary sector."
(Ferrers, 1991b 844)
and secondly, the speed in which it was conveyed to become law
on the last day of the dissolution of Parliament for the 1992
General Election.
Adopting a critical perspective on charity regulation Ferrers'
comments on the nature of the 1992 Bill must be challenged.
Historically, the establishment of the permanent Charity
Commission is at the same time as charity is reconfirmed (see
chapter 2) as the principal organ of state social policy. Fuelled
by the Charity Organisation Society, there is a climate of action
to ensure that charities' resources are efficiently deployed for
the state's purpose. Public confidence needs to be maintained in
the system of donation that funds donated either by the living,
and most importantly by the dead, are spent on the purposes for
which they were intended. The 1960 Charities Act is passed
primarily to ensure that charities' resources are again being
efficiently deployed, in this case a register that will enable
social workers to access charity funds for the benefit of the
welfare state. The 1992 Charities Act is what Ferrers declares
a regulatory Act, designed to ensure public confidence in charity
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as the state again sees charity as a principal instrument of
social policy rather than statutory local authorities. Public
confidence not in charity to deliver services but regulation that
focuses on the ways charities raise and account for funds.
Facilitating individual giving to charity to enable charity
resources to be used for welfare spending rather than increased
direct taxation. The 'disclosure' method is therefore adopted
with emphasis on the public's access to charity reports and
accounts combined with some interventionist power for the Charity
Commission. The 1992 Charities Act contained therefore a
considerable amount of social policy from the critical
perspective. The Act can be viewed as being a part of the shift
which we reviewed in chapter 2, since the late 1970s on economic
and social policy. The lack of debate on the Act and its
packaging by government in the way Ferrers described avoided such
crucial issues as should this be the future for the charity
sector?
From a 'positivist perspective', one can understand the style of
the Charity Commission as the 'regulator' and the support for the
Act from the charity industry itself (Randall 1992b; Framjee
1992; Phelps 1992;); a sentiment summarised by Robert Hazell, the
Director of the Nuffield Foundation and Vice Chairman of the
Association of Charitable Foundations,:
"The Association of Charitable Foundations welcomes the Charities
Bill, and the new powers given to the Charity Commission."
(Hazell, 1992 p26)
While Harry Kidd, formerly the legal adviser of the NCVO, could
comment:
"The publication of the Bill should be an occasion of
particular pride and pleasure to NCVO. Six years ago
they appointed a working party on malpractice in
fundraising, which reported in the following year. It
is as chairman of that working party that I write this
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note. We can fairly claim that very much of the
content of the Bill derives ultimately from our
report, which gained the backing of Sir Phillip
Woodfield and was reflected in the White Paper, so
that the new regime that the legislation introduces is
not something imposed on charities but something for
which they (or at any rate, we) asked." (Kidd, 1992
p27)
Against Stigler's (1971) four main policies, the charity industry
meets the most obvious criteria of direct subsidy of money
through relief from income tax. The second policy of control over
entry is partly met by a voluntary organisation having to go
through the expense of registering with the Charity Commission
but is more enforced by the increased costs of compliance with
the Act for larger charities, with the requirement in particular
for professional audit. Most importantly for policy two is the
control over fund raising which as Stephen Lee, Director of the
Institute of Charity Fundraising Managers, points out:
"Virtually every form of public collection activity will now
become regulated." (Lee, 1992 p12)
and therefore means that the preserve of major appeals will be
for only the largest of charities. The concept of restricting
direct entry into the market was a question directly put to the
current Chief Charity Commissioner, who answered that while in
the Charity Commission there was no intention to introduce such
a policy, a debate in the charity sector as a whole should be
undertaken on, 'what sort of range of activities can sensibly
be brought together'.
Against a third criteria of substitutes and compliments some
parts of the charity sector have been active, as we noted in
chapter two in promoting their particular charities in the
winning of contracts and their advantage over the private sector.
The fourth class of price fixing is not applicable to the charity
sector, though in relation to point 3 and the concerns over
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contracts there exists a potential application.
The Charity Commission supported in 1992 a study into self
regulation (Charlton, 1992) which found no support for self
regulation by the sector itself. Instead there was support for
regulation that would strengthen, not undermine, public
confidence in the sector. However, that must not be at the cost
of restricting independence of action. Charlton's study also
found that the 'industry' saw legislation as providing base rules
to minimise and control malpractice but that the promotion of
best practice was the responsibility of the sector. The report
recommended the establishment of a Charity Standards Council:
"this would promote best practice, draw attention to existing
guidelines, identify gaps and address unmet needs for learning
and for continuing improvement." (Charlton, 1992)
Stigler's theory provides a rationalist perspective for
understanding the current Charities Acts, style of regulation and
the relationship between the charity industry and the Charity
Commission. Its principal problem in application to the charity
sector is it is far too deterministic. There is no evidence
historically or currently of a 'charity cartel'. The mid 19th
Century Charity Organisation Society attempted such a leadership
role, but as Owen (1965) chronicles it failed in this endeavour
causing more antagonism from the sector against it than support
for it. Charlton's (1992) study on charity self regulation found
no evidence for the organisation of such opinion, indeed a
conclusion of his study was: "...no single body is recognised
widely as having responsibility for promoting standards"
(Charlton, 1992).
The criteria of Stigler's four policies that an industry would
advocate for, on closer review of the charity sector, equally
looks less convincing. Tax relief for charity as Randall and
Williams (1995) declare in their chapter on the History of Income
Tax and Charity:
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"One would assume then that any decision to exclude
charities from the tax base would not have been made
accidentally, given this obvious though undetermined
wealth, it would have been a deliberate act of social
policy. However, the striking thing is, when one
peruses the record of debates on the introduction and
re-introduction of income tax, that the exemption
granted to charities in the legislation was not an
issue - it was hardly discussed. The implication is
that it was common ground, taken for granted. Indeed,
the income tax provisions were merely restating in
slightly different form exemptions which had been
present in earlier taxes. An example is the tax,
introduced in the 1690s, which became known as the
land tax, but which when introduced bore more
resemblance to a wealth and income tax. This tax was
to provide the administrative machinery upon which
income tax was erected. It contains a section
exempting universities, hospitals, almshouses and
certain named charities from the charge to tax.
Another tax, inhabited house duty, introduced in 1778
by Lord North, contains exemptions for "any hospital,
charity school or house provided for the relief of
poor persons". There was, therefore nothing new about
income tax's treatment of charities, it reflected a
consensus." (Randall and Williams, 1995)
Contemporary tax debates equally give no evidence of a
coordinated or concerted attempt by a 'charity cartel'. There is
the 'Charity Tax Reform Group' who have achieved some VAT
exemptions in specialist areas but have been relatively
unsuccessful to date in wholesale relief of VAT for the charity
sector. The specialist areas being primarily in the field of the
disabled and medical research, which has been complementary to
government policy. The other major tax advantage, the 'Gift Aid'
scheme, has been attributed to Michael Brophy, Director of the
Charities Aid Foundation, and his relationship with the then
Chancellor Nigel Lawson. The scheme, however, has been criticised
by a number of charities (Harrow, Hind and Palmer 1993) as being
badly thought out and potentially damaging for the sector. These
criticisms focusing on Brophy winning concessions that the
government, as part of their policy, would have granted and
thereby diluting the force of the campaign for more substantive
reliefs on VAT. From a critical theory perspective, the 'gift
aid' scheme would be an example of supporting substitution policy
from statutory welfare services. A parallel example would be the
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promotion of personal pension schemes with tax incentives over
the statutory SERPs scheme. A second financial management
criticism, which has still to be proven, is that 'covenants'
which give charities a medium term income supply stream are being
replaced by short-term one year amounts under 'gift aid'.
Stigler's (1971) second policy of restricting entry has even less
evidence to support it. The Charity Commission does not have the
power to refuse to register an organisation that meets the
purposes of charity. Indeed, as we cited earlier from our
interview with Denis Peach, against the Government's wishes the
Charity Commission registered part of the 'Moonies.' The
interview with the Chief Charity Commissioner made clear that the
Commission had no intention of introducing such a policy.
Economically, there is little evidence to date that new 'fund
raising' charities cannot compete in the charity market for funds
and grow quite quickly. As, for example, the 'AIDS' charities
like the London Lighthouse and the Terence Higgins Trust who have
received substantial finance from both statutory and private
sources.
The third and fourth policies of Stigler's (1971) theorem
currently have little application to the charity sector beyond
speculation of what might happen in the contracting environment.
It is conceivably possible, however, that if the projected
pessimism of the contract state was to see a 'premier' league
of charities then Stigler's theorem would begin to have more
relevance to the sector. Stigler's (1971) theory does, however,
provide a focus for why the charity industry supports regulation
rather than opposes it, based upon a self interest concept. As
the Charlton (1992) research observed on the widespread concern
by the charities themselves over scandals that undermine public
confidence in charity.
The wider application by Peltzman (1976) on the role of the
regulator is useful in recognition of the different interest
groups that the regulators must be aware of. The Charity
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Commission is unique in both being a department of government yet
also a branch of the Court, independent of the executive. The
relationship of the Charity Commission to the charity sector is
complex as the following extract from my interview with the
current Chief Charity Commissioner illustrates:
"Denis [Peach the former Chief Charity Commissioner]
used to be fond of talking about the initiative and
idiosyncrasy of the voluntary sector. The whole
tradition is on a framework that individuals can use
and benefit from according to their own commitments.
It encourages a person's initiative, certainly any
concept of rationalisation or directive powers and the
notion of interfering with charities of anything other
of a legal integrity, I suspect its always been
foreign in the Charity Commission. Charities, those
responsible for charities, may do whatever they choose
within their powers and the Charity Commission's own
responsibility is to make sure the legal requirements
are complied with." (Fries 1994)
The application of critical theory encompassing both a wider
perspective on the relationship of charity with the state; and
secondly identifying the use of 'disclosure' methods -
particularly as we explore in section 3.7 on the style of charity
accounting - offers a challenging understanding of the
development and nature of charity regulation. The major weakness
of this perspective is that at its extreme it is too
conspiratorial. Critical theory excludes by its rejection of
'individual' roles to 'class' roles:
"...the dialectical interaction of social roles under
capitalism." (Okcabol and Tinker, 1990 p80)
a contingent analysis of the independence and nature of charity
which has also impacted on the style of regulation which has
developed in the charity sector to date; and the nature of the
relationship with the Charity Commission.
4.5 THE 1992/3 CHARITIES ACTS AND THE DEREGULATION TASK FORCE.
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The principal measures of the Act can be grouped as follows
(Turner Kenneth Brown, 1992) and a brief summary is provided. The
numbering in brackets relates to the respective section of the
1992 Act:
i) Increase in the powers given to the Charity Commissioners:
The commissioners (or any person appointed by them) can now
request copies of any documents from any individual relating to
an issue involved in an inquiry (6).
If the commissioners are satisfied that there is or has been any
misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of a charity
they have the following new powers-
The power to suspend any trustee, officer or employee (8), The
power to appoint such additional trustees (8), the power to order
any debtor of the charity not to pay any liability without the
approval of the commissioners (8) and the power to appoint a
receiver and manager (8).
ii) Measures to make charity trustees more accountable:
Certain persons are now disqualified from becoming trustees,
notably those convicted of offence involving dishonesty and
bankrupts. The anomaly of someone who has been removed as a
trustee by the commissioner for one charity and is able to become
the trustee of another is resolved. A director disqualified under
the 1986 Insolvency Act and the Directors Disqualification
Act. (45) Trustees to ensure that none of their number are so
disqualified.
Trustees are now responsible for ensuring that charities with a
gross income of more than £5,000 must display on documentation
that they are a charity (3) and that they send in the filing
requirements relating to accounts (19-26).
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iii) Increased disclosure and accounting requirements for
charities:
All stationery etc for charities with an income over £5,000 to
display charitable status (3). Charities to keep 'accounting
records' and to retain them for six years. Depending on size of
income annual statements of accounts in a form determined by
regulation (19-26). Depending on size of income either a full
professional audit or an independent examination (19-26) (see
later comment on deregulation proposals). Annual Report to be
prepared and filed with Commission in form prescribed by
regulation (22-26).
iv) Trustee Investments Act 1961 and investment powers:
Power given to the Secretary of State to relax restrictions on
wider range of investments (38) and make regulations extending
investments which are authorised for charities (39).
v) Charity Property:
Divestment of charity property held by the Official Custodian
(28-29); Disposal of charity land without the approval of the
commissioners (32); Restrictions on mortgaging charity land (34).
vi) Ex-gratia payments:
Charities, subject to the Commission's approval will be able to
make payments or waive entitlements (17).
vii) Miscellaneous changes in charity law machinery:
Charity registration raised from £15 to £1,000 (2) Dormant bank
accounts can be transferred to another charity (18) and small
charities (subject to certain exemptions) defined as a charity
with a gross income of less than £5,000 in the last financial
year able to transfer its assets to a similar charity (43).
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Subject to regulation the Charity Commission able to charge fees
(51).
viii) Fund-raising:
New definitions provided in relation to fund raisers (58); Formal
agreements to be prescribed by regulation to be introduced (59);
a clear public statement on how much a charity and all other
parties will receive when a professional fund-raiser solicits or
a commercial participator makes representations (60); a charity
able to apply to the court to prevent unauthorised fund-raising
(62); Secretary of State able to make regulations on form and
contents of agreements between charities and professional fund-
raisers, make records publicly available and any other provision
relating to raising of funds (64).
ix) Public collections:
New definition provided of what is a public charitable
collection, so no longer includes coffee mornings and permits for
collections (65).
' The 1992 Act can be seen to have considerably extended both the
interventionist powers of the commissioners and the requirement
on charities to send information to the commissioners.
Fund-raising control had been subject to considerable attention.
The Act also removed many previous restrictions on charities
particularly with regard to commercial transactions on investment
and land subject to obtaining professional advice.
To enable the commissioners to discharge their regulatory duties,
the Act in addition to prescribing various controls, such as on
fund-raising, placed the emphasis on the role of trustees. The
Act did not go, however, as far as some proposed at the committee
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stage on trustees responsibility and liability. The failure to
display charitable status was proposed as a criminal sanction on
every trustee. Subsequently, this was revised to the person
actually authorising or issuing the document. The emphasis was
also changed to the onus of proof being placed on the prosecution
(Turner Kenneth Brown, 1992 p8).
Parts of the 1992 Charities Act did not last for long, becoming
the 1993 Charities Act, a consolidation Act as the Lord
Chancellor explained:
"The Bill consolidates the Charitable Trustees Incorporation Act
1872, the Charities Act 1960 and Part 1 of the Charities Act
1992. The need for this consolidating measure arises from the
substantial amendments made to earlier legislation by Part 1 of
the Charities Act 1992." (Mackay, 1993 816)
Other aspects of the Act, particularly relating to smaller
charities were, however, to be removed. For, in September 1993,
an 8th De-regulation Task Force was established to examine
regulation of charities and voluntary organisations. This was an
additional task force to the seven the government had already
created to review 'red-tape' business practices. The Charity De-
regulation Task Force (Baring 1994a) reported in July 1994 with
189 proposals for reducing the burden of legislation of which 72
had been accepted, 60 were under review and 57 had been rejected.
In volume 1 of the report the concerns of over-regulation
specifically for smaller charities were summarised by the Chair:
"...it is estimated that 91 96 of charities have an
income of less than £100,000 per year and 90%- of
charities have no paid staff, relying entirely on
voluntary effort. The effect of numerous regulations
coming from different sources, and often not designed
with the voluntary sector in mind at all, is
particularly damaging, acting as a marked disincentive
to thousands of small groups, such as village halls
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and community centres, which are often the mainspring
of community life. The danger is that volunteers are
beginning to say: "Its not worth the hassle", a phrase
that could be the death knell of voluntary activity in
this country." (Baring 1994a)
While not implicitly criticising the 1992 Charities Act, the Task
Force made a number of recommendations, subsequently accepted
that will change the proposed regulations which are determined
by the Secretary of State. The principal contribution of the Task
Force is to clarify what was implied in the 1992 Act - that is
the difference in treatment between large and small charities.
Recommendations of the Task Force (1994b page number in report
shown in brackets) relating to the 1992/3 Acts which were
accepted were designed to reduce the burden on small charities.
These accepted recommendations were to be reviewed after two
years and the financial thresholds to be reviewed every two
years, included:
1. Charitable status disclosure on documents raised from £5,000
to £10,000.(8)
2. Charities below £10,000 to have a simplified annual report and
need to only produce a receipts and payments account. The
accounts and report do not have to be sent to the Commission.
They are, however, to be made available to the public and the
Commission on request. An annual filing return to maintain the
accuracy of the register and for basic monitoring information
will be sent to the Commission. (8-9)
3. Charities below £10,000 will not require the proposed
independent examination of accounts. (9)
4. Annual Income threshold for preparation of full accrual
accounts raised from £25,000 to £100,000. (9)
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5. Threshold for professional audit from £100,000 to £250,000.
The De-regulation Task Force also made recommendations for
clarity and longer transition periods for parts 2 and 3 of the
1992 Act relating to fund-raising and public collections.
In general, the De-regulation Task Force saw its principal aim
as reducing the administrative burden on smaller charities which
were administered by volunteers as opposed to paid staff. It
therefore made a series of wide ranging recommendations relating
to not just charity law but also covering water disposal charges
for village halls to registration fees for play schemes. A
general acceptance was that the Small Business Litmus Test would
be enlarged to also include voluntary organisations and charities
where appropriate.
The developments in reducing the burden on small charities
replicates the wider debate in the 1980s and 1990s to the burden
and applicability of audit and accounting standards on business.
A DTI Consultative Document on the audit and requirements for
very small companies (DTI, 1993) had proposed the abolition of
a compulsory audit for very small companies: a proposal
subsequently enacted in the 1993 Budget. Introduced by secondary
legislation in 1994, the changes involved the removal of audit
from companies with a turnover of less than £90,000 and the
replacement of the professional audit with a report by an
independent accountant for companies with turnovers between
£90,000 and £350,000. There is a clear correlation between
companies and charities regarding exemption and the independent
examiner, except the amounts for charities are much less. No
audit or independent examiner is required for charities not
exceeding £10,000 gross income. An independent examination is
required for charities between £10,000 and £250,000 gross income.
A professional audit being mandatory on charities at £250,000
which is £100,000 less than the company requirement. The reasons
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for these differences relate to the public interest perspective
and the fiscal relief given to charities. The inconsistency
between the two for those charities which are incorporated
reflects the need to have a single registration, a reform in
charity law that we discussed in chapter one.
The traditional argument for small company audit abolition
featured on for whom the accounts and audit were intended. It
is argued that in most small companies the shareholders and
directors are the same and are therefore responsible for their
own actions (Barker 1985). Audited accounts are historical in
nature and the benefits of such a review are of little value.
Small companies with limited resources would receive greater
benefit from a more limited examination which would focus on
their needs and incorporate forward planning (Woolf 1990). Small
companies' accounts are in many cases drawn up by outside
accountants who also act as the auditor, therefore the
accountants are auditing themselves. With the exception of the
tax authorities, there is no evidence for 'third parties
interests', such as banks and trade creditors, which have
traditionally been cited as requiring the audit. Banks usually
require a director's guarantee charged upon personal assets,
while trade creditors place little faith in historic audited
accounts, relying instead on a trading record (Berry, Citron and
Jarvis 1987).
The argument for retention is based on the premise that it is the
price for limited liability and confidence in the corporate
sector (Bishop 1992). Historically, the audit was developed to
protect shareholders with the distinction, from the late
nineteenth century, between shareholders and paid management.
Jensen and Meckling's (1976) seminal paper on agency costs
identified the cost of the audit as one payment or sacrifice to
value maximisation shareholders must pay to control the self
interests of 'disinterested management'. Some small companies
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have minority shareholders; independent accounts provide
reassurance to them and to the corporate sector as a whole.
Secondly, although an historic document, the audit does provide
management with an independent check on the accuracy of the
accounting systems, and the auditor is often able to recommend
improvements in those systems via the management letter sent at
audit completion. Thirdly, the tax authorities rely on accounts
for computational purposes. Accounts would still be required by
the tax authorities, and they would not accept computations that
have not been independently verified (ICAEW 1985).
The debate for abolition in the UK began in the early 19805 with
the adoption of the EEC Fourth Directive in the 1981 Companies
Act. The accounting regulations permitted small companies to
publish modified accounts comprising a balance sheet but failed
to amend the first schedule to the Act which required small
companies to have audited accounts. In 1983, the then Auditing
Practices Committee (APC 1983) issued guidance which stated that
auditing standards applied equally to small companies but that
exemptions might arise as the result of applying a cost benefit
test. No such exemptions were forthcoming, and its successor,
the Auditing Practices Board, in 1991 confirmed this position of
auditing standards applying to all companies (APB 1991).
In the mid 1980s the DTI issued a number of documents (DTI 1985;
DTI 1985a) which identified the problem and recommended
abolition. However, led in particular by the Certified
Accountants (ACCA), their proposal to abolish the small company
audit was defeated. This was not the end of the debate as the
case for abolition would be strengthened by the increased costs
associated with the EC Eighth Directive. The EC Eight Company
Law Directive is concerned with auditors' qualifications and the
supervisory regime (DTI 1986; DTI 1993). The British system is
self regulatory through the appropriate professional bodies who
developed their own regulatory requirements including
registration and inspection. 	 The costs of meeting these
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requirements were placed on the auditing firms who in turn placed
the costs on clients. Research at Manchester University
indicated that the audit was costing as much as 4.5% of turnover
for companies in the range of £20,000 - £50,000 (DTI 1993).
The early 1990s saw the campaign to abolish the small company
audit gathering pace with the need to reconcile standards of
auditing and costs (Burton 19 j3); the lack of support for a
distinctive small company audit (Hatherly and O'Reilly 1993);
support for independent review (Searjeant 1993); the revenue
withdrawing their opposition (Bruce 1993) and disagreement
between the auditing professional bodies (Accountancy Age 1992) .
The ACCA (1993) with these pressures qualified their objections
and the effective opposition to abolition was over.
While the traditional 'agency' argument does not apply to
charities, where it is not the trustees' money (unlike
proprietary companies), the audit costs perspective was extremely
serious. In a sector that has considerable concerns over
administrative costs (Fenton, Golding and Radley 1993), for the
auditors to be taking 5p in every pound yearly from donations,
would not have been tenable for smaller charities financed by
public donations. The cost of professional audit has also
prompted the question of the universal applicability of
accounting standards to all companies. A recent consultative
document by a Working Party of the Consultative Committee of
Accountancy Bodies (CCAB, 1995) has raised this question. From
the 'user of accounts perspective' the development of accounting
standards was intended for shareholders to understand company
accounts, but as for smaller companies the shareholders and the
directors are one and the same.
Evidence that cost rather than any other criteria has prompted
a review, articulated by the Working Party, can be evidenced by
Professor Harold Edey's paper on 'Accounting Records and the
Smaller Company', published by the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in 1992.	 Professor Edey makes no reference to
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reducing the applicability of accounting standards (Edey 1992).
The consultative document, however, details accounting standards
which have become much more complex. Compliance by the auditor
for ensuring such standards have been complied with has meant
that costs have risen, argues the consultative document, which
concludes:
"The Working Party considers that the needs of less complex
entities and those who deal with them would be best served by
straightforward, uncomplicated accounts and that some of the
requirements of accounting standards tend to conflict with these
needs." (CCAB, 1995 p107)
For the charity sector, the public interest argument overrides
the traditional user of accounts argument, but the cost burden
perspective is applicable. The adoption of the SORP only for
larger charities is evidence that the compliance cost overrode
initial expectations of the original charity SORP's of universal
application. Unlike the corporate sector the charity sector, for
reasons of public confidence, is subject to a monitoring body,
the Charity Commission. It is clearly intended that the costs
of monitoring the charity sector, unlike the corporate sector,
are falling on that body rather than smaller charities paying
higher audit fees in some other form of self regulation. It is
to the current system of monitoring by the Charity Commission
that we now turn.
4.6 THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MONITORING.
The inquiry section until the late 1980s was based in the two
offices - Liverpool and London - each with its own head and
overseen by the Secretary of the Commission. The general approach
of the section was to react to complaints which it would then
investigate. The register was not viewed as a monitoring tool,
being paper-based and of limited value (Woodfield 1987; Mitchell
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1994). Following the Woodfield Report (1987), an expanded
Monitoring and Investigation Division was established under a new
civil servant who was recruited from outside the Charity
Commission. Victor Mitchell was appointed following a career in
investigation management and management services with Customs and
Excise. His particular expertise was Investigation Management,
Operational Management, Information Systems and Performance
Indicators.
The then Chief Commissioner Robin Guthrie viewed the development
of a Monitoring and Investigation Division as a top priority
(Mitchell 1994). The Annual Reports began to state how much
charity property the Commission had protected and its more pro-
active approach:
"We have in the past drawn attention to our lack both
of sufficient resources and adequate powers to act
quickly to deal with abuse. The implementation of the
Scrutiny Report's recommendations would increase those
powers and improve the resource situation by shifting
the focus of our work from some existing statutory
responsibilities to a greater emphasis on Monitoring
charities and the investigation of abuse." (Charity
Commission, 1987 p1);
"The main aim of the fundamental programme of change on which we
have embarked is to transform the Commission into an essentially
proactive organisation." (Charity Commission 1989, p1)
The first stage was to change the emphasis of the new division's
approach from being a complaints department whose focus was
addressing the concerns of the complainant to a focus on the
charities themselves. To assist the charity sector and promote
public confidence in charity. An initial internal workshop for
Commission staff asked the question - 'what the business of the
Commission was in investigation and monitoring' (Mitchell, 1994) .
Value for money was seen as a key component in this philosophy
and a focus on what effect on charity and particularly the
282
trustees and beneficiaries would this increased interest have.
A degree of sensitivity had to be balanced, particularly with
trustees, between a public criteria seeking action and support
for the charity. Different strategies for different concerns,
particularly if they arose from genuine mistakes. The focus was
to improve awareness and accountability.
"The confidence of the public and government in
charities is dependent not only upon the open
accountability of trustees and our own capacity to
identify and root out abuse, but also upon the
effectiveness with which trustees themselves use their
resources to fulfil the purpose of their charities...
Trustees must become fully involved in the control and
management of their charity from the start and be
clearly aware of their responsibilities in this
regard." (Charity Commission, 1990 p1-2)
To meet this strategy the Commission embarked upon an educational
initiative for trustees by the production of booklets, notably:
CC2 - The Charity Commissioners - How they can help
charity trustees;
CC3 - Responsibility of Charity Trustees;
CC41 - Payment of Charity Trustees.
The monitoring aspect was to be undertaken by the development of
an annual return in addition to an annual report and accounts.
With the assistance of representatives from the sector, the
development of an appropriate return was begun with a first
prototype sent out to charities for return in 1990-91. The NAO
supported the development of Performance Indicators. This was
in addition to a National Audit Office review on progress in the
Commission which reported to Parliament in November 1990:
"We had responded positively to all the conclusions of the
Committee." (Charity Commission, 1990 pl)
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In parallel to the development of an annual return, emphasis was
placed on looking at the accounts and updating the register. The
accounts review was further developed to see them as a support
to monitoring. A training programme for non-qualified accounting
staff using the qualified accountants by this time employed in
the Commission and professional firms was started. The checking
of all the top charities' accounts was seen as being part of the
core business for the qualified accountants. The review is also
intended to include a programme of visits, to offer advice and
support and to enable Commission staff to improve their knowledge
and appreciation of the work and problems of charities:
"We recognise that if we are to fulfil successfully our general
function of promoting the effective use of charitable resources,
we must work even more closely with charities. We need to
understand the problems which charities face." (Charity
Commission, 1993 p4)
The register was seen as integral both to the support and
supervision role. To be designed to identify charities in need
of assistance or corrective action, thus meeting the dual
concerns of confidence in the charity sector and ensuring that
it was subject to an effective supervisory regime. Linking the
annual return to the register a number of indicators would be
included. For example, 'fund-raising costs to funds raised' and
'accumulation of income to charity type'. As the return
information is input to the computer a 'credibility programme'
would check the information. This programme is still being
piloted but is expected to be operational at the end of April
1996 (Mitchell 1994).
An example of the way questions are being formulated to support
supervision on fund-raising:
a) Initially, questions on fund raising would ask:
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1. Are you a Fund-raising Charity?
2. Do you employ a Fund-raiser?
b) Instead they are changed to:
1. Methods of Fund-raising used:
2. How much Funds did you raise?
3. How much did you expend on fund-raising costs?
The annual returns will generally be income determined. For
charities with an income less than £10,000 the return and the
requirements will be low key, primarily to ensure the charity
still exists. A key aspect will be the requirement for a
nominated trustee to sign on behalf of all trustees, however, on
the form it will state that the return was discussed and agreed
by all the trustees.
Mr Mitchell moved to become the Director of Operations at the
Commission. In October 1994, the Commission structure on
monitoring and investigation was to have an Investigation
Division which was based in the Charity Support Division which
embraces regulation and schemes. The regulatory function's aim
is to make sure that charities are able to function in a modern
world. A central monitoring unit is based in the Charity
Database Division. The Database will contain all information
about a charity it will not be available to the public. The
register will, however, be available to the public. With the
expanded use of terminals by modem, it should be possible to
access the public register in the future without having to travel
to one of the three Commission offices.
The Commission's supervision and monitoring initiative is
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therefore based on obtaining three components of information:
i) The Annual Return;
ii) The Annual Report;
iii) The Accounts.
while the focus is on the trustees effectively managing their
charities. We now turn to reviewing respectively the accounts.
The emphasis on trustees is reviewed in chapter 4.
4.7 CHARITY ACCOUNTS AND AUDITS.
In section 3.5 we described the development of a charity
accounting SORP(Accountancy 1988 p 149-159) in the 1980s. SORP's
(Statement of Recommended Practice) were introduced by the
Accounting Standards Committee in 1982:
"As SSAPs had been issued in increasingly
controversial areas, problems of enforcement had
emerged. One of the purposes of SORPs was to allow the
profession to continue to develop rules in
controversial areas but to reduce their status so as
to pre-empt enforcement problems.
The reduced status of SORPs is as follows:
a) The Accounting Standards Committee has
approved a SORP but the approval of the
councils of the six chartered bodies has not
been sought.
b) SORPs are not mandatory on members of the six
chartered bodies. Explicitly, the Accounting
Standards Committee does not require disclosure
of either the fact or the nature of any departure
from SORPs." (Gambling, Jones, Kunz, Pendlebury,
1990 p8)
Three very different academic studies (Ashford 1991; Gambling,
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Jones, Kunz Pendlebury 1990; Hines and Jones 1992) have been
undertaken of the charity SORP. The Ashford study was supported
by the Charity Finance Directors Group, and consistedof
reviewing the accounts of fifty six of the largest charities.
Gambling and colleagues produced a research report for the
Association of Certified Accountants. Their study was a review
of the SORPs development and its context. A case study approach
was used which looked at six charities chosen to represent a
diversity of income, legal status and activity. The Hines and
Jones study was to look at the annual reports and accounts of the
top fifty-four charities chosen from Charities Aid Foundation's
list of top voluntary income over a three year period to include
before and after the SORP. The Hines and Jones survey eventually
resulted in a final sample of forty charities who sent them their
reports and accounts. It should be noted that a 100 9,5 response
should now be achieved following the 1992/3 Charities Acts which
requires charities to send their published accounts on request
(This part of the Act coming into force by December 1995).
Though, at present, as the editor of the Henderson Top 2,000
Charity Guide (1994) has noted, there has still been a reluctance
by some charities to supply them or to request a fee of £25 for
a copy (Rattigan 1994).
All three studies came to the same conclusion; that the SORP was
generally being ignored or had not even been heard of. One reason
for non-compliance was suggested by Gambling and his colleagues
to be down to the lack of ownership of the SORP by charities
themselves:
"It can be seen that charities were by no means the
majority of those who commented on this discussion
paper. Since one of the "representative bodies"
collated the comments of 19 District Technical
Advisory Committees( which are committees of the
accounting profession), the most numerous comments
were those of the professional accountants. This gives
some support to the view expressed by one of our
respondents [E], to the effect that the SORP reflected
the opinions of the accounting profession about
charity accounting, rather than those of the charities
themselves." (Gambling 1990 p9) See also Hyndman
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(1990, 1991) and the accounting theory interpretative
school debate at the end of section 3.8.
Hines and Jones(1992) suggested the non-compliance was not a
surprising finding. Referring to other studies of compliance with
non-mandatory accounting standards they concluded that "...This
persuasive approach does not appear to have much success" (Hines
and Jones, 1992 p54).
The problem with non-compliance with the first SORP was to be
temporarily shelved following the wholesale change in the setting
of accounting standards. There had been a growing lack of
confidence in the Accounting Standards Committee, and following
a report by Sir Ron Dearing a new Accounting Standards Board was
created and came into force in August 1990 (Ebling 1990).
The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) adopted all twenty-two of
the extant 'Statement of Standard Accounting Practice' (SSAPs).
The adoption by the ASB gives the status of accounting standards
within the parameters of Part VII of the Companies Act 1985.
Under the ASB, a SSAP is now called a Financial Reporting
Standard (FRS).
In order to produce financial statements which give a true and
fair view, it may be necessary not to comply with a particular
SSAP or FRS. If this is the case, it is further necessary to
disclose and explain in the accounts the fact of non-compliance
and the reasons why. Directors of companies, other than most
small or medium-sized companies, will be under a statutory duty
to disclose the fact of any material departure from such
standards in all accounts. Under Section 245(b) of the Act, where
accounts of a company do not comply with requirements of the Act,
the court may order the preparation of revised accounts and that
all or part of the costs be borne by such directors as were party
to the approval of the defective accounts.
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In addition to the monitoring of company's accounts by the DTI
(which would include monitoring of charities incorporated as
companies), an independent body, the Financial Reporting Review
Panel, was set up under the Companies Act 1989 to monitor and,
if necessary, enforce compliance. This panel is empowered to
apply to the court for a declaration that the annual accounts of
a company do not comply with the requirements of the Companies
Act 1985. The Panel can then obtain a Court Order requiring the
directors of the company to prepare revised accounts. The Panel,
however, will not actively search for defective accounts but will
only examine matters drawn to its attention. The Panel will
report an auditor to their professional body in any case where
the company has voluntarily accepted, or the court has declared,
that its accounts were defective and where the auditor had not
qualified his report in that respect.
The new regime does have considerable teeth to enforce the
application of accounting standards. The ASB, however, announced
in the October of the year it had been created that the SORPS
would not be adopted by the Board. The ASB did say that SORPs
could be:
"...developed by bodies recognised by the Board to provide
guidance on the application of accounting standards to specific
industries." (Accounting Standards Board 1990)
Subsequently, a Review Committee sponsored by the Charity
Commission and chaired by Michael Webber, one of the new part-
time charity commissioners, was set up at the invitation of the
Accounting Standards Board(Hobson 1993).
The Committee comprised members of the accounting profession,
including the previous SORP chairman Fergus Falk, an accounting
academic Professor Trevor Gambling who had written on the SORP,
and leading Charity Finance Directors, notably Adrian Randall of
the Cancer Research Campaign and Ian Theodorsen of Save The
Children Fund.
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The Committee issued an exposure draft of the revised SORP in
March 1993 (Charity Commission ,1993b) requesting comments by the
17th May 1993. The previous SORP, the preface noted, had been to
provide general guidelines of best practice. As the original
SORP2 Chairman had written:
"In framing the recommended practice the ASC has
sought to make, in a readable document, detailed
recommendations which take all of these circumstances
into account. We have attempted to make
recommendations sufficiently clear to help charity
accounts achieve greater consistency which will aid
comparability. It would have been easier to have
produced a brief statement of bland principles. The
Woodfield Report, scrutiny of the supervision of
charities, expects charities to conform to SORP2, so
we have done our best to make our recommendations
appropriate to the vast majority of charities." (Falk,
1987 p77)
The draft SORP attempts to build constructively on the lessons
learnt from the original SORP by addressing major issues and
problems in the layout of charity accounts. It has adopted a
radical approach to solve these problems which recognises that
charity accounting issues are fundamentally different from those
in the commercial sector. A major omission is that such a
fundamental topic as the applicability of SSAPs to charities is
not addressed or even referred to in SORP2. It was included in
the ASC discussion paper - Accounting by Charities (Accounting
Standards Committee 1988) but did not find its way into the final
document. It is ironic because SSAPs were designed to increase
the comparability of accounts by narrowing the areas of
difference and variety in the accounting treatment of the matters
with which they deal. In its defence, SORP 2 does address some
of the issues which are contained in the SSAPs, such as
capitalization and the depreciation of fixed assets, and does
examine areas of accounting in which there are no SSAPs for
guidance, such as fund accounting and the recognition of the
voluntary income.
The draft SORP repeats many of the concepts and requirements of
the original SORP but has also introduced significant changes.
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These are:
4.7.1 Prescriptive Approach:-
The Charity Commission's objective is that the SORP
recommendations will reduce the current diversity in accounting
practice and presentation which was identified by Gambling
(1990), Ashford (1991) and Hines and Jones (1992). Michael Webber
(1993), the Chairman of the Charity Accounting Review Committee,
explained this statement by referring to the alternative
accounting treatments allowed under the original SORP " -
experience in working with the original guidelines has shown that
many of these alternatives need to be eliminated for the sake of
simplicity and consistency" (Webber, 1993 p1).
The prescriptive approach will be greatly enhanced if, as
expected, the SORP is used as the basis of the accounting
regulations under the Charities Act 1992/3 (Home Office, 1995).
4.7.2 Detailed trustees' report:-
Like the original SORP (Accountancy 1988 p150), the draft SORP
requires charities to include a comprehensive review and
explanation of the accounts in the trustees' report. The
disclosure requirements have been increased to cover important
issues such as the availability of assets to fulfil obligations
of the charity on a fund-by-fund basis and post balance sheet
events. Paragraphs 22 and 23 of the SORP give comprehensive
guidance and can be used as a checklist. The main constituents
of the trustees' report follow those of the original SORP and
those recommended in the 1989 Government White Paper, namely:
* explanation of organisation, objectives and policies;
* review of developments, activities and achievements;
* review of the transactions and financial position;
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* explanation of the salient features of the accounts;
* other information which could be usefully included;
Additional disclosure requirements include:
* review of results of trading or other non-charitable
companies included in the results;
* availability of assets to fulfil obligations on a fund-by-
fund basis;
• note of post balance sheet events;
• statistical information;
• material grants made other than to individuals;
• funds held as custodian trustees.
4.7.3 New Format for Accounts:-
One of the underlying themes of the SORP is the need to move away
from judging charities by a single performance indicator, that
is, by the difference between income and expenditure - the so
called bottom line. Unfortunately, this measure was a natural
product of the Income and Expenditure Account allowing ready
analysis, like the net profit figure does in commercial entities.
The danger of this analysis can best be illustrated by a simple
example:
A child care charity receives annual income of £10m, which it
uses to pay the running costs of its existing homes, say £4m, and
buys a new home costing £6m. The income and expenditure account
would show a surplus of £6m and taken in isolation the charity
might be criticised for not spending enough money on charitable
purposes. In reality, this money had been spent on the purchase
of a new home which is just as important as the money spent on
running costs. The charity may have built up very large reserves
but if these are all tied up in residential homes, then these
reserves have been utilised for charitable purposes and are not
available for revenue expenditure, even though the Income and
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Expenditure Account is likely to have shown substantial revenue
surpluses over a number of years.
To overcome this problem, the draft SORP suggests a 'Statement
of Financial Activities' to replace the Income and Expenditure
Account. The new statement still has to show the resources made
available to the charity and the expenditure incurred by the
charity during the period. However, expenditure in this case
includes both revenue and capital expenditure, in order Webber
(1993) argues, to present a complete picture which gives a true
and fair view of the charity's activities. The key issue for the
reader of charity accounts is to understand how incoming
resources have been applied and what changes have taken place in
the various funds of the charity during the year.
This radical approach will find favour with those charities who
consider capital expenditure is as important as revenue
expenditure in achieving their charitable purposes. But there is
opposition from some accountants on technical grounds because
capital and revenue are conventionally kept separate. Indeed,
the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) have insisted that the
Statement of Financial Activities is presented for comment with
a choice of two formats. The second format was introduced because
they thought that the format favoured by the Committee could
mislead in that it seemed to imply that capital expenditure was
a reduction in total resources, when in reality it is expenditure
for the future benefit of the charity's beneficiaries.
Fund accounting is still given prominence in the proposed SORP
because the requirements to separate out funds subject to
different restrictions, and the separate identification of assets
and liabilities making up those funds, stem from trust law. Fund
Accounting and its use for financial reports was developed in the
US by Vatter (1947). Fund Accounting has been criticised as
being used by charities to obscure and not enlighten users of
293
accounts by:
* failure to present an overall picture of an entity's
activities,presenting a number of reports instead;
* failing to report on aspects of an entity's activities by not
reporting on transactions directed through some funds;
* obscuring the effects of an entity's activities by
interfund transfers not clearly differentiating between those
interfund transfers and transactions;
* failing to differentiate between funds subject to
external restrictions and funds subject to reversible
designations by the trustees of the charity itself" (Newberry,
1992 p21).
To overcome these problems unlike the original SORP2, the draft
SORP insists on separate disclosure. Indeed, paragraph 29 (Charity
Commission, 1993b) states that the statement of Financial
Activities:	 be presented in columnar form if the charity
operates more than one fund." (Charity Commission, 1993b p15)
This means that the minimum analysis will be a split between:
* Unrestricted funds, including designated funds;
* restricted funds;
* permanent endowments.
with further analysis of each category in the notes to the
accounts, if appropriate.
Furthermore, paragraph 39 (Charity Commission, 1993b) requires
the accounts to include a reconciliation of the opening and
closing balances analysed between the major funds of the charity.
The appendices to the draft SORP include numerical illustrations
n
294
of how this can be achieved. The nature and purpose of each major
fund should also be disclosed.
4.7.4 Investments at market value:-
The draft SORP states that long-term investments, including
investment properties, should be included under fixed assets at
market value with the cost disclosed separately. This change in
treatment stems from the strong conceptual argument that charity
accounts should show the total resources available to the
charity, which means carrying investments in the balance sheet
at their current market value rather than at historic cost.
This treatment is in line with the ASB views on valuation.
However, it is likely to be a particularly contentious area,
causing some charities to disclose very large reserves which will
need to be explained elsewhere in the accounts. Ian McGregor, the
Finance Director of the Wellcome Trust, Britain's largest charity
by assets and income, has indicated that his charity may well
ignore this recommendation. Any changes in value and realised
gains and losses should be disclosed in the Statement of
Financial Activities.
4.7.5 Overheads:-
The categories of overhead cost identified in the original SORP2,
namely administration, publicity and fund-raising, are redefined
and a new category of 'support costs' is added. The SORP tries
to get away from the idea that all overheads represent wasteful
expense and should be minimised. If too little money is spent on
key overheads, such as financial control, then the charity is
unlikely to achieve effective performance of its charitable
purpose, or even survive in the present recession.
The SORP attempts to change the conventional view by explicitly
recognising the nature of each overhead cost. The new category
'support costs' comprises:
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"all services supplied centrally.. .in support of the charity's
project work or other direct charitable expenditure." (Charity
Commission, 1993b p44)
This definition should encourage charities to recognise that a
proportion of Head Office administration costs are legitimately
support costs and so can be disclosed as such under charitable
expenditure. Similarly, publicity costs have been redefined as:
"all costs incurred in educating and informing governments,
institutions and members of the public." (Charity Commission,
1993b p44)
and as such should also be disclosed separately under charitable
expenditure. This definition of publicity may cause problems
because it is not the normal understanding of the term, which is
nearer to advertising and promotion rather than education.
Indeed, whilst many charities would agree that education was one
of their main charitable objectives, they would probably already
include it under direct charitable expenditure anyway and
certainly not under publicity as an overhead.
The Draft SORP Issued
The draft SORP received considerable publicity and exposure. A
special edition of the respected journal NGO Finance (April 1993)
was published wholly devoted to the SORP. The Journal not only
published in full the draft SORP but also articles from leading
figures in the charity field on specific subjects including
members of the Review Committee. Meetings were held of various
interest groups including the Charity Finance Directors' Group.
This resulted in over 350 written submissions commenting on the
Exposure draft (Webber, 1994).
296
In February 1994, the Chairman of the Review Committee wrote an
open letter: "To all bodies or persons who submitted written
comments on the SORP Exposure Draft" (Webber, 1994).
The letter explained progress to date and the expected plan to
the issuing of the SORP. The delay in part was due to
'protracted' discussions with the ASB. Such discussions featured
on reconciling the differences between charities and commercial
entities. The revised SORP was granted its 'negative assurance'
by the ASB in January 1994 as Webber explained:
"The ASB's principal task in relation to SORP has been
to ensure that no conflict exists between the
recommendations of the SORP and the current accounting
standards. The ASB's "negative assurance" is a
statement that it is satisfied in that respect, and is
essential confirmation for those preparing charity
accounts." (Webber 1994)
In addition to explaining the delay, the letter went on to
describe the impact of the Charity De-regulation Task Force that
we discussed in section 3.5 which proposed the threshold for the
application of the SORP to be raised. The letter then explained
that the SORP would not be published until the draft regulations
by the Home Office were published:
"We intend to publish the revised SORP at the same
time as the draft regulations so that the
recommendations for best practice can be viewed
alongside the proposed legal requirement. It is
essential that the SORP and the regulations which are
eventually established should be entirely compatible
with each other, and it may be that changes made to
the draft regulations following this consultation
period will require some consequential changes to be
made to the SORP. That is why the SORP cannot be
finalised until the regulations have reached their
final form and have been approved by Parliament."
(Webber 1994)
Webber, as a charity commissioner, then explained the Charity
Commission's views on the SORP. In particular, he wished to make
it clear that the SORP was not mandatory. He then went on,
however, to make it clear that if charities did not follow the
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SORP and this led to a distorted or misleading view of a
charity's affairs, the Commission may criticise. The importance
of trustees in ensuring as accurate a picture as possible was
emphasised. Departure from the SORP should be seen as being a
last resort and only if it could be justified in a positive way.
Finally, the letter referred to simplified versions of the SORP
for smaller charities preparing receipts and payments accounts
and that the final documents will be published by the Charity
Commission and be free to charities. The draft Home Office
Regulations were issued in January 1995 (Home Office 1995) and
the Statement of Recommended Practice on the 1st February
(Accounting by Charities 1995).
The success of the new SORP and the new regulations wait to be
assessed. Given the intention to closely bind the enforceable
regulations and the decision to raise the threshold of the full
SORP's application, there is every indication of the SORP being
successful in ensuring compliance with its format and treatment.
The accounting SORP and regulation will therefore be a powerful
tool in both the formal regulatory structure of the Commission's
role and the adjuvant of empowering the public and other bodies
to assess the performance of charities. A standard followed by
charities allowing for comparisons and the development of
performance indicators.
There is, however, from confidential discussions and internal
correspondence between members of the Committee, considerable
concern over certain aspects of the revised SORP. These papers
and conversations were disclosed to assist my understanding of
the SORP and the accounts setting standard. It was on the strict
understanding that they would not be publicly disclosed until the
Review Committee authorised such disclosures or other members
'broke rank'. I would therefore urge the following for future
charity accounting research.
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Once the regulations and the SORP are in force a variety of
research projects will undoubtedly begin. As a signpost for such
research we would urge that the 350 submissions sent to the
Review Working Group feature as part of that research project.
We would also urge that the current confidentiality rule over the
Committee be lifted to allow access to not only the minutes
(which are relatively non-committal) of the Committee but in
particular the working documents. They provide an insight into
the complexity of charity finance and the problems with the SORP
which undoubtedly will emerge. In addition, they would bring an
invaluable contribution to an understanding of accounting
standard setting.
4.8 ACCOUNTANCY THEORY AND THE SORP.
Whittington(1986) commences his review of accounting theory:
"Financial accounting theory has accumulated a vast literature.
A cynic might be inclined to say that the vastness of the
literature is in sharp contrast to its impact on practice."
(Whittington, 1986 p4)
He concludes his review of accounting theory by asserting that
most qualified accountants are unaware of theoretical
developments and moreover are proud of that ignorance. It is a
sad indictment of the accounting profession that such a statement
can be made. For the use of theory is paramount if we are to
understand developments such as the emergence of the SORP and its
likely future.
There is an academic accounting literature on the setting of
accounting standards which we consider. We then evaluate this
literature to enhance understanding of the application of the
SORP. The seminal paper for this debate was written by Watts and
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Zimmerman (1978):
"This article provides the beginning of a positive theory of
accounting by exploring those factors influencing management's
attitudes on accounting standards." (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978
p112)
Through the illustration of a number of empirical studies, they
determine from a rationalistic perspective of self interest that
management will lobby on accounting standards for its own
interest:
"The histories of the Committee on Accounting Procedures, the
Accounting Principles Board and the FASB are replete with
examples of managements and industries exerting political
pressure on the standard setting bodies." (Watts and Zimmerman,
1978 p131)
Why firms lobby, they argue, is due to government intervention
which has an effect on their cash flows. Large firms in
particular, as they have most contact with government, are the
most likely to lobby. They conclude that as long as accounting
standards will have an impact on cash flow then political
lobbying will continue.
A subsequent paper (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979) declared that
because accounting theory has had little substantive, direct
impact on accounting practice it had also little influence on
accounting standards bodies. Their intention:
"Our objective in this paper is to begin building a
theory of the determinants of accounting theory. This
theory is intended to be a positive theory, that is,
a theory capable of explaining the factors determining
the extant accounting literature, predicting how
research will change as the underlying factors change,
and explaining the role of theories in the
determination of accounting standards. It is not
normative or prescriptive." (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979
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p276)
They begin by examining the demand for accounting theories in an
unregulated economy and then the additional demands generated by
government intervention.
Audited financial statements are voluntarily produced in an
unregulated economy due to articles of incorporation and
contracts between corporations and creditors. These contracts are
encouraged as they increase the welfare of the promoter or
manager because they reduce agency costs. Agency costs (Jensen
and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980) arise because managers' (the
agents) interests do not necessarily coincide with the interests
of bondholders or shareholders. As an illustration, the managers
may decide to award themselves additional compensation payments
(perquisites), for example a more luxurious car, first class
travel, instead of retaining the funds in the firm for growth or
increasing dividends. An equilibrium occurs when the net costs
of an agency relationship, the agency costs, are minimized by
trading off the costs of the perquisites against the monitoring
costs.
Watts and Zimmerman (1979) therefore suggest that the function
of audited financial statements in an unregulated economy is to
reduce agency costs. As examples, they illustrate studies of
management compensation schemes in the 19th Century which tied
management to the firm's profits. A problem, however, was that
profits were effectively cash flows as accrual accounting was not
used. Thus short-term manipulation by management was possible but
this in turn led to several contractual devices such as
restricting dividends to a fixed proportion of profits to control
such abuse. From their analysis, Watts and Zimmerman suggest that
accounting theories will serve three overlapping functions in an
unregulated economy:
i) Pedagogic demand:-
A diversity of accounting procedures will develop to meet the
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miscellany of agency costs across firms. Such diversity of
accounting procedures leads to difficulty in the teaching of
accounting, consequently accounting teachers will develop
pedagogic devices to assist learning and to structure the
variation found in practice, thus:
"Nineteenth century accounting texts and articles indicate that
accounting theorists recognised the diversity of practice and
attempted to distil general tendencies from the diversity." (Watts
and Zimmerman, 1979 p279)
ii) Information Demand:-
In the unregulated economy there is a requirement for writers to
do more than just describe variations in practice. An additional
demand is for the prediction of the effects of accounting
procedures for both the managers' and auditors' welfare in court
cases. The emergence of professional audit in the late half of
the 19th Century was due to the contract of the auditor with the
shareholders to monitor management. If the auditor fails then he
is legally liable. In addition, the welfare of the auditor
depends on their efficiency in monitoring management:
"Auditors would value information in the form of theories
predicting how agency costs vary with accounting procedures.In
particular, auditors would like to know how managers' actions and
hence agency costs would be affected by alternative accounting
procedures." (Watts and Zimmerman,1979 p279)
iii) Justification Demand:-
A review of early accounting texts illustrates that a prevailing
theme was the fear that managers would use accounting to serve
their own interests at the expense of shareholders. Auditors were
able to use such works in their discussions with management as
they sought to establish their authority:
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"Accounting texts(and theories) which detail how
managers seek to manipulate profits and the consequent
effects of those manipulations on shareholders and
bondholders not only improve the auditor's ability to
monitor such behaviour, but also provide the auditor
with ready made arguments to use against such
practices in discussion with management." (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1979 p280)
The demand for accounting theories in a regulated economy were
then developed:
i) Accounting and the Political Process:-
The value of a firm is affected by the government through either
transfer of wealth to government, ie taxes, or recipient of
wealth from government le subsidies. Financial statements perform
a central role in these wealth transfers. Therefore the content
of such statements as they noted in their previous paper, (Watts
and Zimmerman, 1978) are affected by this political process.
II) The Effect of Government Intervention on the Demand for
Accounting Theories:-
There is a correlated increase in demand for accounting theories
as rules and regulations which result from government regulation
of business increase. As the advocacy battle intensifies between
proponents and opponents of special interest legislation, so the
justification demand for theories will expand. For the proponents
of regulation the arguments will centre on public interest and
market failure:
"Government regulation creates a demand for normative
accounting theories employing public interest
arguments, that is, for theories purporting to
demonstrate that certain accounting procedures should
be used because they lead to better decisions by
investors, more efficient capital markets,etc.
Further, the demand is not for one theory, but rather
for diverse prescriptions... With increased government
intervention in business, the demand for theories
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which justify particular accounting
procedures(proposed in the self-interest of various
parties) has come to eclipse the demand for theories
which fulfil the pedagogic and information roles."(Watts and Zimmerman, 1979 p283)
iii) Rationality or 'Theory Illusion':-
The assumption that public officials act in the 'public interest'
is challenged by Watts and Zimmerman (1979) who instead support
the proposition that individuals involved in the political
process act in their own interests. To adopt this perspective
implies that the assumption that eventually the best accounting
theory will prevail will not necessarily occur. If the welfare
interests (costs) of public officials are neutral (zero) then the
best theory will prevail, if not then government officials will
not use the best theory available:
"We assume that political transactions costs are large
enough to cause the acceptance of "invalid" theories,
that the competition among excuses does not always
lead to acceptance of the "best" theory. The
usefulness of that assumption depends on the empirical
consistency of its implications. It is an empirical
question...in our model of the political process
everyone is rational. No one is being "fooled" by
"theory illusion". If people do not investigate the
validity of theories, it is because they do not expect
such investigation to be worthwhile. If the expected
benefits of investigation to an individual are small,
he will make only a limited investigation." (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1979 p284-5)
iv) The Supply of Accounting Theories:-
Watts and Zimmerman (1979) challenge the proposition that
accounting theory is used to determine accounting practice and
standards and that the supply of such theories will ultimately
improve accounting practice. Instead they suggest that a supply
and demand condition exists. If there exists a large number of
individuals who are able to supply a wide diversity of theories
at relatively low cost then supply will be responsive to demand.
Therefore consumers will determine the production of accounting
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research through incentives to accounting researchers. The more
prestigious the academic researcher, the greater will be the
resources deriving to them and their university and their own
prestige, salary and research budget will grow. The tendency for
some academic researchers to write papers on current
controversies derives from such self interested motivating
factors.
An output of academic research is policy recommendations. Whether
intentional or not by the researcher, Watts and Zimmerman (1979)
argue these recommendations will be favourably quoted by those
with vested interests. Those purporting a particular view will
seek out accounting researchers who have advocated a particular
practice which happens to be in the practitioner's, bureaucrat's
or manager's self interest. They may even then, through
commissioning further research, predict more accurate
justifications. The ultimate end product is to produce a survival
bias for theory. The bias introduced by the vested interests:
"Rationales differ(and are inconsistent) across
accounting standards because a standard is the result
of political action. The outcome depends on the
relative costs which the various involved parties are
willing to incur to achieve their goals. And these
costs will vary with the expected benefits." (Watts
and Zimmerman, 1979 p287)
From an empirical examination of legislation and industries as
diverse as railway development to capital markets, Watts and
Zimmerman claim support for "the hypothesis that accounting
theory has changed after the introduction of government
regulation." (1979, p289). Political action they claim, generates
accounting theory, not vice-versa. They conclude:
"We are not offering any judgement on the desirability
of accounting theories fulfilling an excuse role. What
we are arguing, however, is that given the existing
economic and political institutions and the incentives
of voters, politicians, managers, investors,etc. to
305
become involved in the process by which accounting
standards are determined, the only accounting theory
that will provide a set of predictions that are
consistent with observed phenomena is one-based on
self interest. No other theory,no normative theory
currently in the accounting literature,(eg current
value theories)can explain or will be used to justify
all accounting standards, because:
1. accounting standards are justified using the
theory(excuse) of the vested interest group which is
benefited by the standard;
2. vested	 interest	 groups	 use	 different
theories(excuses) for different issues; and
3. different vested interest groups prevail on
different issues.
While a self-interest theory can explain accounting standards,
such a theory will not be used to justify accounting standards
because self-interest theories are politically unpalatable. As
a consequence, not only is there no generally-accepted theory to
justify accounting standards, there will never be one" (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1979 p300-301).
Can this proposition of Watts and Zimmerman enhance our
understanding of charity regulation and the SORP? A number of
developments can be clarified and explained by applying their
theory to the development of charity accounting standards and
regulation:
The support of the charity industry for a specific charity
accounting standard can be explained by a self interest
perspective. Despite individual reservations representing
specific interests, there was wholesale support for the new SORP
from the respective charity self help pressure groups: The
Charity Finance Directors' Group (Hind 1993); The National
Council for Voluntary Organisations (Silley 1993); The
Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations
(Dalton 1993); The Institute of Charity Fundraising Managers (Lee
1993); The Association of Charitable Foundations (Siederer 1993)
and from the accounting profession with leaders of major
accountancy firms involved in charity audit supporting the SORP
(Framjee 1993; Finlayson; 1993; Pianca 1993; Vincent 1993). The
provision of a separate standard that specifically recognises the
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specialist nature of charity both enhances the 'industry' and
'status' to the professionals who work within or provide services
to it.
The support of the Charity Commission can equally be explained
as the active support of the SORP provides a justification for
its own role, particularly following criticism of its past
inertia in this field. The emergence of a charity accounting
standard can be correlated to the interest of government in the
charity sector.
The initial emergence of the SORP from the accounting profession
initially corresponds to Watts and Zimmerman's explanation of
diversity of accounting practices and the attempt to explain
them. The initial SORP accepts this diversity; the revised SORP
moves to a more prescriptive approach as regulation requirements
shape it.
The findings of this thesis's empirical research on charity
auditing discovered:
u 
...100% of those who answered the survey had external auditors
(98.6% being chartered firms) even though only 57% of the sample
required this because they were incorporated charities." (Palmer,
1992 p7)
The rationale for external audit can be explained by the two
propositions offered by Watts and Zimmerman (1979) for
unregulated firms; that it was either in their articles or the
pressure of corporations and creditors. For charities, an
additional pressure would have been those in receipt of
government grants or from foundations who would have demanded
audited accounts as part of the grant condition. The specialist
nature of charity operations and the perceived threat of
litigation leads to a charity auditing standard.
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The rationale for regulation, Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1979)
argued, was the implied nature of public interest and market
failure. The public interest argument was propounded for charity
regulation and the SORP. Market failure was perceived as the
Charity Commission failure to supervise charities identified by
Woodfield (1987) and the Public Accounts Committee (1987). There
seemed to be a transference of the Commission's failure to
monitor charities as there also being a failure generally in
charities. Yet the Commission throughout their Annual Reports
from 1960 continually asserted that they could find little
evidence of abuse in the charity sector. To date, there has been
no study of the charitable sector that has found widespread
abuse. Indeed, even the Brougham Commissioners' reports last
century as we noted found little widespread evidence of abuse.
Finally, while there has been considerable debate on the SORP it
has occurred primarily in the forum of the confidential meetings
of the Review Committee. The disputes in the Committee
discussions represent a diversity of accounting approaches for
example between those who have supported the adoption of the
Statement of Financial Activities and those who see 'Fund
accounting as a (rather primitive) form of management
accounting'. The absence of concerted opposition to the revised
SORP to date can be explained by its 'non-appearance' (until
February 1995) as a formal document in relation to the
regulations and therefore the 'costs' of opposing it are not
justified until the final product and its impact is fully
understood.
The above explanation of charity accounting standards is perhaps
rather too deterministic and conspiratorial. It is given as an
example to illustrate how the Watts and Zimmerman theoretical
hypothesis of the determination of accounting standards can be
applied to the emergence of charity accounting standards and
regulation. One issue we have not debated is how tangible is the
Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1979) hypothesis.
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Whittington (1986) describes three main approaches to accounting
theory in the English speaking world of the 20th Century. The
first he calls the 'empirical inductive approach' and is evident
in the earliest writing on accounting theory. Its approach is to
rationalise accounting practice. The second is the 'deductive
approach' which is pure theory and can be completely 'ivory
tower' if the assumptions are unrealistic. The final approach
is:
"The new empiricism based on positivism, derived from
the Chicago school of economics. This regards theories
as worthwhile only if they are testable against
empirical evidence, eg the impact of a particular
accounting practice on investor behaviour as reflected
in share prices." (Whittington, 1986 p7)
It is to this last school that Watts and Zimmerman belong, as
Whittington notes:
"The growth of empirical studies has contributed a
great deal to our knowledge and has more to offer in
the future. However, some of the more extreme
adherents of the positivist school, notably Watts and
Zimmerman(1979), have carried their enthusiasm for the
positivist approach to such an extent that they seem
to denigrate all theories which are not simply
descriptions of what happens in the real world"
(Whittington, 1986 p25).
The principal attacks on Watts and Zimmerman have not come from
a disagreement of their conclusion that the standard setting
process is a political process. Despite the controversy of their
views on accounting standards, there is widespread agreement that
the standard-setting process involves issues of social choice
(Whittington, 1986 p23). The principal attacks have come instead
from the philosophical assumptions that their theory holds (Chua
1986; Okcabol and Tinker 1990; Ryan, Scapens and Theobald 1992).
Thus, criticism of Watts and Zimmerman are the criticisms of
positivism and their belief in the assumption of economic
rationality:
"Positive accounting theory has been subjected to a
number of critiques in recent years; Christenson
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(1983); Lowe et al(1983); Tinker et al(1982); and
Whittington (1987). All these critiques have pointed
to the impossibility of divorcing empirical testing
from theoretical analysis. For example, the design of
any empirical test requires theoretical constructs and
the development of positive theory will inevitably
contain theoretical assumptions. As mentioned above,
much positive accounting research is based on the
assumptions of neoclassical economics and agency
theory. Such research, and especially the work
emanating from Chicago and Rochester, relies on an
implicit belief in the effectiveness of the free
market system. Watts and Zimmerman have been widely
challenged by other writers. As their work is heavily
dependent upon the logical positivist tradition, much
of the criticism levied against them is fairly
levelled against that tradition. It is a different
argument whether their work is sound within the
methodological framework in which they quite
explicitly operate." (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 1982
p79)
A critique of Watts and Zimmerman and the application of their
hypothesis to charity accounting standards would therefore
embrace questioning the very core assumptions implicit in their
work. Okcabol and Tinker (1990) adopt a critique that goes to
the core of their theory:
"This paper deconstructs the sovereign viewpoint
implicit in this literature by delimiting some of its
founding assumptions; its non-self- referentiality;
the autonomy of the political and economic realms; the
subsumption of social value into relative (utility)
value; the hyperrationality of economic actors; the
prevalence of market competition and the absence of
market domination; the dynamic equilibrating
propensity of markets with regard to prices; the
existence of specific kinds of continuous functions
relating technological and economic variables
necessary even for static equilibrium analysis; and
the concurrence of private and social costs and
benefits. Each of these assumptions is delimited to
examine what it represents - the reality that is
denied. The deconstruction of the orthodox accounting
perspective reveals that systematically social
inequality, irrationality [sic], unequal exchange, and
partisanship on the part of accountants, typifies the
alternative scenario that is repressed by the
theoretical status quo." (Okcabol and Tinker, 1990
p71)
Two distinct groups of accounting researchers offer an
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alternative to the positivism of Watts and Zimmerman - the
interpretive, and the critical(Chua, 1986 p626).
The proponents of critical theory offer an alternative view of
society and the acceptance of the established world order. The
critical theorists (Lehman, 1992) view accounting information as
social control measures (Chua, 1986 p625) based upon the unequal
distribution of power in society. Taking their lead from the
critical theory of the Frankfurt school (Arato and Gebhardt,
1978; Habermas 1976). A critical theoretical perspective to the
setting of accounting standards in the charity sector would also
set such a review in an historical and policy context and would
take the following perspective:
The role of charity in Britain in the 1990s is part of the
government's policy towards maintaining a provision of welfare
services despite cutbacks in welfare expenditure. Charity as a
welfare philosophy is opposite to universal services proposed by
socialists. It supports and maintains inequality of wealth in
society. As much wealth, according to Marx (1974), has been
acquired not through hard work but through the appropriation of
surplus value after the initial endowment, facilitated by
'redistribution' after the dissolution of the monasteries;
charity provides a legitimation for 'consciousness' salvaging and
further supports the capitalist state by retention of wealth even
after death through the charitable trust. The delivery of
welfare services by charity as a gift replacing welfare services
as a right.
The charity sector must be efficiently organised to ensure that
the wealth in the sector is supporting the state thereby enabling
other welfare expenditure to be cut. The adoption of accounting
standards based on 'fund accounting' is to ensure that wealth
intended for specific charity causes, which have been limited by
the state, can be identified. Additionally inefficiency can be
identified and ideally, through soft measures of public
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accountability, can improve efficiency. A harder form of
coercion would be available if the softer form fails, for
example, greater intervention by the Home Secretary on the
Charity Commission to get tougher. Adopting the viewpoint that
the state can be both a potential resource or a threat in society
the historical perspective would give examples such as the Tudor
constraint on the creation of trusts for religious purposes
(Jordan, 1958 p115). The content of the accounting standard
would be assessed within a position of: is it designed for the
state to be able to assess the activities of charities for the
states purpose? The use of fund accounting, for example, could
be viewed in this analysis to ensure that charities are spending
their resources on stated conservative purposes within the
constraints of charity law. Therefore, use of funds for
political purposes can be prevented by the legitimation of what
is seen as an independent accounting standard.
An 'interpretative' approach adopts a quite different set of
objectives about society:
"In this case, subjectivism and relativism together
with the view that social order is negotiated through
social interaction lead to the use of qualitative,
naturalistic research methods. The role of accounting
research is seen to be a passive one, and theory is
seen to be a vehicle for enhancing mutual
understanding and communication between the various
groups in society." (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 1992
p81)
The application of this interpretive approach to charity
accounting standards would be to see the recommended practice as
a facilitating tool to enhance communication with various
stakeholders. Accounting has a role as a symbolic mediator.
A leading proponent of this approach is Gambling (Chua, 1986
p615) who is the academic member of the SORP Review Committee.
The application of this approach has featured in one academic
accounting journal that devotes some exposure to charities -
Financial Accountability and Management. Hyndman(1990, 1991)
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illustrates the concern of the interpretative approach to
understand user needs:
"The case with charity reporting is similar. Bird et
al (1981) were aware of the lack of empirical work on
user needs and argued that studies of needs must be
undertaken before anything else was done. Their
research formed the basis of the three ASC
publications on accounting by charities, which
culminated in a Statement of Recommended Practice
(ASC, 1988). Each of the ASC publications stated its
objective in terms of improving the quality/usefulness
of reporting by charities, and the argument was
promulgated that this should be viewed in terms of the
extent to which users' information needs are met.
However, the recommendations made by the ASC were not
based on empirical evidence regarding user's
information needs. As a result of this, the potential
value of the recommendations may be limited. It would
seem appropriate that empirical research regarding the
needs of users of charity reports be carried out to
underpin future developments in this area." (Hyndman,
1990 p296)
The subsequent failure of the first SORP can be explained by this
omission to understand user needs. Hyndman subsequently
undertook empirical research on the perception of information
needs. His findings noted that while the providers of such
reports, charity officials and their auditors, believed reports
addressing contributors were important, the actual information
they provided did not do so. A 'relevance gap' existed Hyndman
(1991) concluded because there was a general complacency by the
providers of information. This was due, he believed, to the lack
of incentive on charity managers to improve charity reports.
Hyndman therefore believed that more user driven reports would
encourage managers to more directly pursue the goals of the
charity.
Gambling (Gambling, Jones and Karim, 1993) reinforces Hyndman's
concerns of the failure to meet donors' information needs by
existing charity reports, but notes:
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...although the review of SORP 2 (following the Charities Act
1992) should go some way toward providing a remedy for this."
(Gambling, Jones and Karim, 1993 p203)
There have been similar research findings in the United States
(Steinberg 1986; Anthony 1991; Blades and Milof sky 1992) with one
paper interestingly enough mirroring the debates in the Review
Committee over fund accounting and rejecting the need for
specialist treatment:
"With one exception, the accounting principles
governing the information reported on the financial
statements of nonprofit organisations should be the
same as those for business organisations, and trustees
should use this information to decide on budgets and
analyse actual performance in essentially the same way
as do business boards of directors. The exception is
that	 nonprofit	 organisations	 receive	 capital
contributions, which are rare in business
corporations. In some nonprofit organisations,
especially colleges, the information that trustees
actually receive is confusing because of the
unnecessary use of fund accounting and other
peculiarities." (Anthony, 1991 p371)
Gambling and his colleagues view the increase in the regulatory
powers of the Charity Commission as a move in the direction to
what they term a:
"formal system of external regulation of the administration of
an organisation, as opposed to external standard-setting for the
content of its accounting reports." (Gambling, Jones and Karim,
1993 p205)
A subsequent development, they suggest, could be independent
bodies with powers to accredit appropriately-qualified
organisations, after a suitable inspection and testing of their
internal systems of administrative control. This would be
required as charities need to convince benefactors of their bona
fides.
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All three theoretical perspectives offer an explanation of the
charity accounting SORP which enhance our knowledge. The
'interpretative' approach has dominated charity accounting
direction in the last few years. It offers empowerment to both
the trustee and to those who wish to contribute to charities.
4.9 THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE.
In a relatively short period of time, the United Kingdom has
introduced a comprehensive supervision system with a specialist
accounting regulation for its charitable sector. The recognition
of a specialist accounting practice adds further support to those
who argue against 'sector blurring' (Hillis, 1993) that we
discussed in chapter 1. But how does this specialist 'British
Model' compare with its European counterparts? Do other European
Union states recognise a separate charitable sector? How do they
monitor such a sector? Have they developed specialist standards
or do they apply commercial practices? How do they compare? The
answer to these questions is particularly important with the
possibility of joint ventures between UK charities and equivalent
European bodies, for both aid and service delivery as well as
potential Euro-wide fundraising (NCVO, 1992). In addition, in
1992 the draft regulation of the statute for a European
Association (the European equivalent to an English charity) was
published (HM Treasury). If there is a common statute throughout
the European Union, which member state's supervision system would
be applicable?
To answer the above questions requires a comparative evaluation
of the current respective practices within the European Union.
However, obtaining information on the auditing, accounting and
supervision practices of other European Union countries in
respect of their voluntary sectors has proved problematic. After
interviews with the English Charity Commission (Corden, 1992),
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the European Officer at the National Council for Voluntary
Organisations (NCVO) (Morrison, 1992), it was discovered that very
little information was available. The Charity Commission through
the Foreign Office had used the Embassies to discover if they had
European counterparts and discovered they were unique as a body.
The European Accounting Association was contacted but they
advised that they had no knowledge of the differing accounting
and audit requirements. Would an International Charity operating
throughout the European Union have such information? An
interview with the International Finance Secretary and the Head
of Audit (Flett and Woods 1993) of the Salvation Army, however,
discovered that while the Salvation Army is treated as a charity
in the UK, there are separate treatments owing to it being a
church in other European countries. Finally, a trip to Brussels
to see the Directorate General Office, DG23 of the European
Commission (Crook 1993) responsible for voluntary organisations
established that they did not have any comparative information
on what were the individual practices of each country.
While the information wanted was not available, I was able to
attain some information from all these bodies that helped shape
the next stage forward; it became obvious that I would have to
obtain the primary information myself.
The NCVO had undertaken a major survey on political activities
(6,1992) of voluntary organisations which assisted in explaining
the respective legal processes. We obtained a copy of the
proposed European Statute (HM Treasury 1992). Finally, the
European Commission (1993) publishes a guide to the Accounting
Standards of the Member States (see appendix 3). Attempting to
obtain the primary information on the respective practices led
to the conclusion that a survey, using an International Firm of
Chartered Accountants, which had offices in each European Union
country would be a method.
Moores Rowland International ranks ninth in size in the world
accountancy practices with offices in every European Union state.
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Moores Rowland agreed to support a survey using the resources of
their respective international offices. To ensure completion,
the Partner for European Affairs in the Brussels office
(DeBlesser, 1993) personally addressed the survey to each
national member and coordinated the response.
A questionnaire was designed with Neil Finlayson of Moores
Rowland, with comments on the final draft from the Charity
Commission's Richard Corden and the NCVO's Janet Morrison. The
questionnaire included two appendices (see appendix 3). Given
the problems that the European Community had in agreeing the
types of organisations which would be included within the
definition of a European Association, that is, the European
equivalent of an English charity, one appendix defined charities
both in terms of European Community legal definitions and by
characteristics following the definitions debate summarised in
chapter 1. These characteristics were summarised as:
Public benefit;
Disinterested Management;
No profit distribution;
Freedom of establishment.
The second appendix to the questionnaire was an illustrative
answer in respect of the English situation. This was compiled
by Neil Finlayson, Senior Manager of the Moores Rowland Charities
Unit. It acted as both a pilot test of the questionnaire and
provided a further focus and contact point for the Moores Rowland
offices to contact if they needed clarification.
With the exception of Greece, information on all the European
Union member states was obtained. The results of the survey are
illustrated in three separate tables to ease explanation (see
appendix 3). They demonstrate that practices range from no
specific controls and no recognition of the charity sector
differences to sophisticated controls that perhaps the SORP
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Review Committee and the Charity Commission should consider,
particularly the French requirements.
France requires a compulsory audit for their large charities as
is now the case in England. However, they go one stage further
by also requiring large associations that have more than three
hundred employees and an income greater than FF20 million to
publish a half-yearly status of the liquid assets and current
liabilities, statement of source and application of funds, a
financing plan as well as an estimated income statement. Given
the Charity Commission's concerns on 'Good Management':
"comparatively few of the charities we looked at in 1993 had
prepared spending plans and budgets at the beginning of each
year." (Charity Commission, 1994 p22)
For the English, SORP only encourages charities to disclose in
their trustee report whether they can meet their obligations as
they fall. The English option is clearly inferior to the French
Statutory Statement.
The view that England has the most developed criteria of
accounting, audit and supervisory practices appears to be
supported by the survey's findings. This can best be illustrated
by extracting the answers to the following key issues:
Mandatory Audit Requirement.
England
France
Denmark
Specific Audit Guidance.
England
France
Ireland
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Portugal
Specific Control Body (independent of Government).
England
Ireland
The designation of a specific control body is particularly
noteworthy as studies in the US (Blades and Milof sky, 1992);
Australia (Sievers and Mcgregor-Lowndes, 1994); New Zealand
(Newberry, 1992) have all concluded that regulation exercised
through the tax authorities have failed to provide adequate
supervision. In the US, the tax authority is usually
complemented at state level by the Attorney General's Office, who
are interested primarily in authorising collections. The failure
of the revenue authorities being attributable to their primary
interest in collecting tax revenues (Blades and Milofsky), the
majority of charities being small and the cost of checking
outweighs benefits. The British system of having a separate
'regulatory' body for the charity sector being complemented by
these studies as a model for their own countries to follow.
Though in the US, specific comment was made on the role of
independent watchdog bodies and the media (Blades and Milofsky
1992).
A negative observation is the absence of auditing requirements
in some European Countries,which means that English and French
charities are incurring higher administrative costs, audit fees.
It should not, however, be assumed that the English system is
therefore the most superior or indeed should become the basis of
any European-wide supervision system. The diversity of cultures
throughout Europe may suggest that alternatives would be more
appropriate than the British system. For example, as we
discussed in Chapter 1, there are constraints on political
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activities by charities. In France it is written into the
Constitution that organisations have a right to politically
campaign and the state may not remove their tax privileges
(6,1992). The English system of having a specific control body,
however, has much to commend it.
There is clearly the need for detailed research to explore the
traditions of the respective voluntary sectors and for European-
wide debates. The Johns Hopkins University study, described in
chapter 1, will hopefully provide such a stimulus and be a
facilitating tool. However, a lead needs to come from the
European Commission's DGXXIII itself, as the NCVO has called for
(NCVO 1992):
"There is concern about how fundraising, which will
increasingly cross member state boundaries, will be
regulated and what standards voluntary organisations
should be meeting... Advances in some techniques of
fundraising may need further pan-European regulation
eg mail marketing, broadcasting appeals, lotteries and
the organisation of transnational events.
There may be potential for the creation of pan-
European accreditation for fundraising professionals,
which ensures that members are bound by certain codes
of conduct and good practice. Should such a system be
left to the voluntary efforts of voluntary
organisations themselves? DGXXIII should gather
together information on different standards in member
states and look at drawing together some proposals for
EC wide regulation." (NCVO, 1992 p12-13)
This small study has met one of the demands of the NCVO on
establishing current accounting standards in the European Union.
We have also identified that further research is required,
particularly of the French requirements:
"DGXXIII should use its questionnaire of governments
to establish what accounting standards are applied to
associations across the EC and whether there is a need
for further research into accounting and auditing
standards and requirements for registration and
supervision of organisations. This research should
help to establish what need there is for minimum
accounting standards across the EC and how the
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submission of accounts could be regulated." (NCVO,
1992 p13)
4.10 CONCLUSION.
In this chapter we have reviewed the regulation of the charity
sector since Tudor times. We have demonstrated that the interest
in regulating the charity sector is correlated with the
importance of charity to the state. We believe, however, that
a statist perspective is too deterministic in describing the
regulation of charity. The charity sector has demonstrated a
degree of independence to date that has led to a unique form of
regulation and a regulatory body. The Charity Commission's
problems of the 1980s were comprehensively reviewed. While the
Charity Commission was in some part to blame for its negative
image there were considerable mitigating factors. The treatment
of the then Chief Charity Commissioner, Denis Peach, was not a
glorious chapter in the Public Accounts Committee history.
The Commission is now well-resourced and equipped with
considerable powers. The Commission, however, faces considerable
problems as it attempts to balance being both a 'regulator' and
a promoter of charity. Owing to its distance from other
government departments, the influence of the Chief Commissioner
is more powerful than a normal Grade 3 public servant. The image
of the Chief Commissioner can be said to also be the
Commission's. We make specific recommendations on this role in
our conclusion. We also endorsed earlier recommendations that
an advisory Board of notable individuals would provide a public
focus for the Commission to ensure that it never returned to its
'sleepy' image.
The new SORP was comprehensively explained.
	
Its distinct
features from commercial accounting strengthen the concept of a
separate sector. Different accounting standards theory was
evaluated against the SORP. While all theoretical perspectives
could be applied the 'interpretative' school offers the most
accurate framework. In the absence of information, a survey of
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the respective accounting, audit and supervision practices in
other European Union states was undertaken. The French standard
featuring on interim statements of liquidity was recommended as
requiring further investigation. The uniqueness of the Charity
Commission as a specialist regulatory body for the sector could
be the model for other countries to follow.
The current regulation structure, particularly after the Charity
De-regulation Task Force has focused the supervision structure
primarily on the larger charities. The Trustees of those
estimated 8,000 charities are in the forefront of ensuring that
their charities are meeting those requirements. It is the
problems of these individuals which we now review in Chapter 4.
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